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L. F. P. , ,Jr • 
No. 77-1844 
No. 78-357 
O~te: February 26, 1Q79 
Mobile v. Bold~n 
wi1Iiams v. Brown 
These are companion cases, the first involvinq the 
city qovernment of Mobil~, and the seconn th~ composition of 
the school board (Boarn of School Commissioners) for Mobile-
County. 
Althouqh the Solicitor GenerAl has filed a single 
amicus brief dealinq with the two cases (99 oaqes long!), 
the cases involve separate •grants• and a number of 
different considerations. 
ThPse cases will be argued in March, and th~r~fore 
are three weeks •off•. But in view of their complexity and 
importance, I write this memorandum at this time to say that 
I will need ~ bench memo on each of them or a consolidated 
memo. I have not yet done more than tak0 a most preliminary 
look at the briefs, although 1 recall fairly clearly thP. 
central issuPS. I will not get into these now b~yond some 
preliminary observations. 
T.n the City of Mobile cas~ (77-1844), the federal 
courts not only invalidated the Commission form of 
goveFnment, but the district court - in an unprecedented 
action so far as I know - devised and ordered effective an 
new form of government for the city. The new city 
judicially imposed, appears in the appendix to the 
itaternent (7d) and ts roughly 50 pages lonq, 
a detai1ed new" form of qovernment for the city. 
three commissioners, under the old form of 
government, were afforded the "opportunity" to recommend a 
new form of government, they declined to do so. Thus, 
unle'ss the judgments below are reversed, the second largest 
city in Alabama will have had imposed upon it a form of 
government never considered by any ~lected representatives 
of the people, and only by federal judqes. Moreover, the 
ne~ form of government is totally different from the 
commission form that Mobile had adopted in 1911, and with 
amendments immaterial to this controversy, had remained in 
effect over the intervening 60-odd years. 
Under the commission form of government, there 
were three commissioners electe~ at large, by majority, 
nonpartisan vote. Each, however, was elected to a "slot" 
with responsibility for particular governmental functions. 
The population of Mobile is roughly two-thirds white and one-
third Negro. No Negro has ever been elected a commissioner, 
and the district court - with obvious enthusiasm - made just 
every finding of discrimination against the Negro 
... 
minority that could be imagined. As the court of appeal 
' 
apparently accepted these findings without question (and 
without any serious review), we are bound by those 
findings of fact as distinguished from conclusions. 
We took the case, as I understand it, to determine 
whether maintaining the commission form of government 
constit uted purposeful discrimination within the meaning of 
Davis and Arlington Heights. Both the district court and 
the court of appeals had no difficulty in finding purposeful 
or intentional discrimination. But they did so on a theory 
that as articulated by CA 5, is novel - so far as I can 
That court said: ~ 
'·~ 
"Under our holding today in Nevett II, these 
findings also compel the inference tfiat the 
system [i.e. the commission form of government] 
has been maintained with the purpose of diluting 
the black vote, thus supplying the element of 
intent necessary to establish a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." 
• * 
"The city ardently asserts that since the 1911 
plan was enacted under 'race proof' circumstances, 
it is immune from constitutional attack. 
* * ' • 
"The city would have us interpret Davis and 
Arlington Heights to require a show1nq of 
3. 
intentional discrimination in the enactment of the . ~:". 
plan. We squarely rejected this contention in 
Nevett II, as it was rejected by the en bane court 
1n Klrksey. [In that case we] held that an 
innocently formulated plan that perpetuates past 
intentional discrimination is unconstitutional. 
In Nevett II, we noted that a plan neutral at its 
':. 'i.\ 
11. ·. ~ 
inception may nevertheless become unconstitutional 
when it is maintained for the purpose of devaluing 
the votes of blacks." 
[We] conclude that 'th~re is a current 
condition of dilution of the black vote resulting 
from the intentional state leqislative inaction 
which is as effective as • • • intentional state 
action." (Emphasis supplied by CA 5). 
The l ~st s~ntence is particularly notable. It 
there may be "state action" when in fact there 
action, a contradiction in terms that is more 
than curious in a judicial opinion. 
I do suppose that if there were proof that the 
commission form of qovernment was purposefully retained 
primarily to discriminate against negroes, this would 
pres,ent a arguable but. difficult question. The commission 
government per se has never been viewed, so far as I 
know, as a more effective means of deprivinq neqroes of 
equal voting opportunities than any other form of 
government. Although discrimination certainly was a way of 
' life in every southern community until 1954, and continued 
wit~ '1 respect to votinq until well into the 1960s, I doubt 
that anyone thought of the commission form of government -
or any other particular form of qovernment - as a means of 
effectuating discriminatory intent. The government 
obviously had been satisfactory to the people of Mobile for 
more than half a century, in all probability quite without 
.. : ' 
regard to discrimination. I therefore question whether the 
rationale of CA 5 is sound. 
The only discriminatory effect found by the courts 
below was that the election at large, ~lus polarized voting, 
precluded the election of a black member to the Board of 
Commissioners, and this resulted in minimizing black 
participation in all governmental activities. Thus, in view 
of the at large election feature of the commission plan, our 
decision in White v. Regester, 412 u.s. 755, is relevant. 
In view the "parade of horrors" marshaled in the opinion of 
the district court (appearing consciously to "track" the 
White v. Regester situation), a decision invalidating at 
large elections may have been justified. The DC was not 
content with any such limited remedy. It concluded that 
dividing the city into three districts, one of which would 
have assured a negro commissioner, was not desirable, and -
without affording the state legislature or the existing city 
government the opportunity to go through the legislative 
process of considering other alternatives, decided that the 
appropriate remedy was a judicially devised new form of 
government. 
If the foregoing preliminary reaction to the case 
is generally correct, I suppose we could hold that the 
remedy exceeded the violation of constitutional rights. 
However, we come out on this case, it will be difficult for 
5. 
me to approve the creation by a federal judge of an entirely 
new form of government. 
I should have mentioned above my concern over the 
emphasis by the courts below on what they refer to as the 
"devaluation [or dilution] of the votes of blacks". This 
reflects the ancient, and often rejected political science 
notion of proportional representation: since one-third of 
the population of Mobile is negro, it should have one-third 
participation in its government. By the same logic, every 
county, city and state should be governed legislatively (and 
perhaps in all administrative agencies and bodies) by a 
racial and ethnic mix in direct proportion to the 
population. Since our national population is - as I 
understand it - about 12% to 15% negro, the Congress of the 
Unit~d States should have this percentage of negro 
f' 
representation. But this simplistic thinking (apart from 
its other falacies, historical and practical) does not take 
into account the diversity and hetrogeneous nature of the 
peoples of this country. The "whites" are not - and never 
have been since the early colonial years - a homogeneous 
American population. One of the unique things about our 
country is that it has been a haven for almost every 
religious, ethnic and divergent cultural component of the 
earth's population. If we start down the road of 




the population, there would be chaos. This was n problem I 
addressed in Ba~ke, but without perceotible imnact on the 
thinkinq of my Brothers. 
Anart from the for~going, I think we have said in 
Whitcomb (and elsewhere) that no seqment of the population -
racial or otherwise - is !.!!.!:.itled to any particular 
representation in a legislative body . The assuring of equal 
votinq rights for all should be the remedy. This already is 
becoming increasinqly evident, as the negro vote ex~rcises 
the balance of power in a number of the most populous stateR 
and cities - PXercisinQ political influence substantially in 
excess of its numerical strength . 
D~spite th~ generalized reactions expressPd above , 
I want my clerl<'s independent iurlqment. As uRual, I also 
want recommennations based on princiPles that can be applied 
consistently ~nd th ~ t will stancl the test of time • 
• • • 
I have not mentioned, in the foreqoing rather 
ramblinq discussion, th~ school board case ( 78-357) . tt is 
a companion case with both similarities and dissimilarities . 
I will, of course, want advic~ on it also • 
* • 
7. 
As so often happens in these cases, the city and 
school board are completely "outgunned" on the briefing. 
The city's brief is particularly amateurish, even thouqh the 
lawyers - whom I know - are experienced and I would have 
thought capable of much higher quality work. This means we 
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Mobile v. Bolden 
W1ll1ams v. Brown 
These are companion cases, the first involving the 
city government of Mobile, and the second the composition of 
the school board (Board of School Commissioners) for Mobile 
County. 
Although the Solicitor General has filed a single 
amicus brief dealing with the two cases (99 pages long!), 
the cases involve separate "grants" and a number of 
different considerations. 
These cases will be argued in March, and therefore 
are three weeks "off". But in view of their complexity and 
importance, I write this memorandum at this time to say that 
I will need a bench memo on each of them or a consolidated 
memo. I have not yet done more than take a most preliminary 
look at the briefs, although I recall fairly clearly the 
central issues. I will not get into these now beyond some 
preliminary observations. 
In the City of Mobile case (77-1844), the federal 
courts not only invalidated the Commission form of 
government, but the district court - in an unprecedented 
action so far as I know - devised and ordered effective an 
entirely new form of government for the city. The new city 
charter, judicially imposed, appears in the appendix to the 
jurisdictional statement (7d) and is roughly 50 pages long, 
constituting a detailed new form of government for the city. 
Although the three commissioners, under the old form of 
government, were afforded the "opportunity" to recommend a 
new form of government, they declined to do so. Thus, 
unless the judgments below are reversed, the second largest 
city in Alabama will have had imposed upon it a form of 
government never considered by any elected representatives 
of the people, and only by federal judges. Moreover, the 
new form of government is totally different from the 
commission form that Mobile had adopted in 1911, and with 
amendments immaterial to this controversy, had remained in 
effect over the intervening 60-odd years. 
Under the commission form of government, there 
were three commissioners elected at large, by majority, 
nonpartisan vote. Each, however, was elected to a "slot" 
with responsibility for particular governmental functions. 
¥-
The population of Mobile is roughly two-thirds white and one-
third Negro. No Negro has ever been elected a commissioner, 
and the district court - with obvious enthusiasm - made just 
about every finding of discrimination against the Negro 
. '· 
2. 
minority that could be imagined. As the court of appeals 
apparently accepted these findings without question (and 
probably without any serious review), we are bound by those 
that are findings of fact as distinguished from conclusions. 
We took the case, as I understand it, to determine 
whether maintaining the commission form of government 
constituted purposeful discrimination within the meaning of 
Davis and A,rlington Heigpts. Both the district court and 
the court of appeals had no difficulty in finding purposeful 
or intentional discrimination. But they did so on a theory 
that as articulated by CA 5, is novel - so far as I can 
recall. That court said: 
"Under our holding today in Nevett II, these 
findings also compel the inference tnat the 
system [i.e. the commission form of government] 
has been maintained with the purpose of diluting 
the black vote, thus supplying the element of 
intent necessary to establish a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." 
* * * 
"The city ardently asserts that since the 1911 
plan was enacted under 'race proof' circumstances, 
it is immune from constitutional attack. 
* * * 
"The city would have us interpret Davis and 
Arlington Hei~hts to require a show1ng of 
intentional d1scrimination in the enactment of the 
plan. We squarely rejected this content i on in 
Nevett II, as it was rejected by the en bane court 
1n K1rksey. [In that case we] held that an 
innocently formulated plan that perpetuates past 
intentional discrimination is unconstitutional. 
In Nevett II, we noted that a plan neutral at its 
3. 
inception may nevertheless become unconstitutional 
when it is maintained for the purpose of devaluing 
the votes of blacks." 
[We] conclude that 'there is a current 
condition of dilution of the black vote resulting 
from the i~ t~ntion ~l state le9 islative inaction 
which is as effective as • • • intentional state 
action." (Emphasis supplied by CA 5). 
The last sentence is particularly notable. It 
states that there may be "state action" when in fact there 
is no state action, a contradiction in terms that is more 
than curious in a judicial opinion. 
I do suppose that if there were proof that the 
commission form of government was purposefully retained 
primarily to discriminate against negroes, this would 
present a arguable but difficult question. The commission 
form of government per se has never been viewed, so far as I 
know, as a more effective means of depriving negroes of 
equal voting opportunities than any other form of 
government. Although discrimination certainly was a way of 
life in every southern community until 1954, and continued 
with respect to voting until well into the 1960s, I doubt 
that anyone thought of the commission form of government -
or any other particular form of government - as a means of 
effectuating discriminatory intent. The government 
obviously had been satisfactory to the people of Mobile for 
more than half a century, in all probability quite without 
' . 
4. 
regard to discrimination. I therefore question whether the 
rationale of CA 5 is sound. 
The only discriminatory effect found by the courts 
below was that the election at large, plus polarized voting, 
precluded the election of a black member to the Board of 
Commissioners, and this resulted in minimizing black 
participation in all governmental activities. Thus, in view 
of the at large election feature of the commission plan, our 
decision in White v. Regester, 412 u.s. 755, is relevant. 
In view the "parade of horrors" marshaled in the opinion of 
the district court (appearing consciously to "track" the 
White v. Regester situation), a decision invalidating at 
large elections may have been justified. The DC was not 
content with any such limited remedy. It concluded that 
dividing the city into three districts, one of which would 
have assured a negro commissioner, was not desirable, and -
without affording the state legislature or the existing city 
government the opportunity to go through the legislative 
process of considering other alternatives, decided that the 
appropriate remedy was a judicially devised new form of 
government. 
If the foregoing preliminary reaction to the case 
is generally correct, I suppose we could hold that the 
remedy exceeded the violation of constitutional rights. 
However, we come out on this case, it will be difficult for 
·'· 
5. 
me to approve the creation by a federal judge of an entirely 
new form of government. 
I should have mentioned above my concern over the 
emphasis by the courts below on what they refer to as the 
"devaluation [or dilution] of the votes of blacks". This 
reflects the ancient, and often rejected political science 
notion of proportional representation: since one-third of 
the population of Mobile is negro, it should have one-third 
participation in its government. By the same logic, every 
county, city and state should be governed legislatively (and 
perhaps in all administrative agencies and bodies) by a 
racial and ethnic mix in direct proportion to the 
population. Since our national population is - as I 
understand it - about 12% to 15% negro, the Congress of the 
United States should have this percentage of negro 
representation. But this simplistic thinking (apart from 
its other falacies, historical and practical) does not take 
into account the diversity and hetrogeneous nature of the 
peoples of this country. The "whites" are not - and never 
have been since the early colonial years - a homogeneous 
American population. One of the unique things about our 
country is that it has been a haven for almost every 
religious, ethnic and divergent cultural component of the 
earth's population. If we start down the road of 
proportional representation for each identifiable segment of 
6. 
the population, there would be chaos. This was a problem I 
addressed in Bakke, but without perceptible impact on the 
thinking of my Brothers. 
Apart from the foregoing, I think we have said in 
Whitcomb (and elsewhere) that no segment of the population -
racial or otherwise - is entitled to any particular 
representation in a legislative body. The assuring of equal 
voting rights for all should be the remedy. This already is 
becoming increasingly evident, as the negro vote exercises 
the balance of power in a number of the most populous states 
and cities - exercising political influence substantially in 
excess of its numerical strength. 
Despite the generalized reactions expressed above, 
I want my clerk's independent judgment. As usual, I also 
want recommendations based on principles that can be applied 
consistently and that will stand the test of time. 
* * * 
I have not mentioned, in the foregoing rather 
rambling discussion, the school board case (78-357). It is 
a companion case with both similarities and dissimilarities. 
I will, of course, want advice on it also. 
* * * 
7. 
As so often happens in these cases, the city and 
school board are completely "outgunned" on the briefing. 
The city's brief is particularly amateurish, even though the 
lawyers - whom I know - are experienced and I would have 
thought capable of much higher quality work. This means we 
cannot rely (as we rarely can) on the briefs alone. 
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SUMMARY: This suit was-b~ght~ a~~ cl~ action under the 
~~~-'~1 f4J 411(, / S"- a..,.., ~'"~ . ~
Civil Rights Act of 1871(-r~U?s.c. §1983, the Voting Rights Act · 
v. 
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments, as an anti-dilution voting rights case. 
Principally relying on White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), aff'd 
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 
(1976), the district court held that the system of electing City 
/ 
- 2 -
Commissioners of Mobile, Alabama at large unconstitutionally impairs 
and dilutes the voting rights of black citizens of Mobile. As a 
remedy, the~urt disestablished Mobile's commission form of govern-___. 
ment elected at large and ordered that a strong mayor-council form 
of local government be created with the council members to be elected 
from single-member districts. The district court set November 21, 1978 
as the date for the election of members of the new city government, 
but the order provides that the election shall be stayed if this Court 
grants review before that date. Petitioner seeks review of the court 
of appeals's affirmance of the district court's findings and remedy. 
FACTS: Mobile, the second largest city in Alabama, has a 
population of 190,026, 35.4% of which is black. Pursuant to a state 
statute [hence, this is an appeal], the city is governed by three 
~ 
commissioners, each assigned specific functions by statute and 
elected at-large. The elections are non-partisan, and there is no --------requirement that commissioners reside in specific subdistricts of 
the city or be elected therefrom. 
After applying Zimmer's multifactor circumstantial evidence test, 
Chief Judge Pittman (S.D. Ala.) found that the at-large election 
system worked an unconstitutional dilution of black voting strength. 
Of the Zimmer "primary" factors, the district court found (1) that 
blacks were effectively denied access to the political process because 
of racially polarized voting patterns that eliminated any reasonable 
expectation of a black candidate succeeding in a citywide election; 
(2) that the at-large elected commissioners have not been responsive 
to the needs of black citizens; (3) that state policy waa neutral 
with respect to the at-large election of commissioners; and (4) that 
- 3 -
,~ longstanding past discrimination against black voters helped to 
preclude the effective participation of blacks in present at-large 
elections of commissioners. The following factors served to enhance 
the dilution of black voting strength deduce~ from consideration of -
the above "primary" factors: (1) Nobile was a large city of 142 
square miles with a population of 190,026; (2) the election of 
commissioners at large requires a majority vote; {3) there is no 
anti-single-shot provision but the candidates run for positions by 
number; (4) commissioners did not run from geographical subdistricts 
and no subdistrict residency requirements were imposed. These Zimme r-
criteria conclusions were found not to be clearly erroneous by the 
court of appeals. The district court further found that, although 
the at-large elected commissioner form of government was racially 
neutral in its inception in 1911, the present dilution of black voting 
t? 
I( l \ 
strength was a "natural and forseeable consequence'' of the at-large 
election system imposed in 1911. Moreover, the current condition 
, t "' 
of dilution resulted from "intentional state legislative inaction 
which is as effective as the intentional state action referred to in 
Keyes." (emphasis in original). This was sufficient, in the district 
court's view, to support a finding of unconstitutionality under 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
HOLDING BELOW: On appeal, the Fifth Circuit panel adopted the 
district court's findings of fact as not clearly erroneous and held 
that the lower court had sensitively and correctly applied the 
"primary" and "enhancing" factors of Zimmer to the facts as found 
· in reaching the conclusion that the voting rights of black citizens 
of Mobile were in fact diluted as a consequence of the at-large 
election system employed pursuant to statute. 
. ( 
- 4 -
The court then turned its attention to the question of whether 
there was sufficie nt evidence of discriminatory purpose or intent 
to make out a constitutional violation under Washington and Arlington 
Heights. As the district court had, the court of appeals rejected 
virtually out of hand the contention that the at-large election system 
was immune from constitutional attack under Wa ~· hington because it was 
not enacted initially with a racially discriminatory purpose in mind. 
The court found that the at-large scheme at issue is "archetypal of 
the intentionally maintained plan we cont~mplated in Ne vett II," a 
contemporaneous decision in which the same panel he ld (1) that a plan 
neutral in its inception may become unconstitutional when it is 
maintained for the purpose of devaluing the votes of blacks, and (2) 
that an inference that the plan is being maintained for such a purpose 
( may be drawn when the aggregate of the evidence under the Zimme r 
criteria indicates dilution. See 571 F.2d 209, 217-25. The court 
held that the district court's finding that the current condition of 
dilution of black votes resulted from intentional state legislative 
inaction was sufficient to support a finding of uncons ~titutiQn~lly 
discriminatory purpose, especially when conjoined with the inference 
of purpose arising out of the diluting effect found by application of 
the Zimmer criteria. 
Judge Wisdom, adopting his comments in Nevett II, 571 F.2c 209, 
231-38 (5th Cir. 1978), specially concurred. He found t he majority's 
'
approach to the discriminatory-purpose issue incons iste nt with washingt on 
v. Dayis and Arlington Heights. Though agreeing that inferring a racia l l y 
discriminatory purpose from the invidious effects of at-large voting 
schemes was acceptable in some cases, he did not believe that such an 




purpose in cases where, as in Bolton, the voting scheme was racially 
neutral or even benign when initiated. Nor, in such cases, could 
discriminatory purpose be found in maintaining the voting plan, that 
is, in taking no affirmative action to cure the discriminatory effects 
of the plan. This view of inaction, he said, was inconsistent with 
Washington v. Davis. 
Nevertheless, Judge Wisdom concurred in the result reached by ------
the majority by adopting the view of the United States as amicus curiae 
that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose was not required 
in voting dilution cases. After all, reasoned Judge Wisdom, neither 
--
Washington v. Davis nor Arlington Heights were voting dilution cases, 
and the Supreme Court had not required proof of a legislative intent 
to discriminate in White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Witcomb 
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the leading voting dilution cases 
involving multi-member districts. With respect to the need to prove 
racially discriminatory purpose, he would~istinguish voting dilution 
cases from all other types of equal protection cases because the right 
to vote is preservative of all other rights. Moreover, voting dilution 
cases involved the Fifteenth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, and 
------------------there was nothing in prior precedent or the language and history of 
the Fifteenth Amendment requiring proof of discriminatory purpose or 
intent in voting cases to which that amendment was limited by its own 
terms. Finally, Judge Wisdom observed that, even if an intent require-
ment were read into the Fifteenth Amendment, the Bolton plaintiffs 
~ could still make out a cas·e under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973, solely on the basis of proof of discriminatory effects. 
CONTENTIONS: Although taking issue with the finding that the 
proof of discriminatory effects had been sufficient to make out a case 
- 6 -
of voting dilution under the Zimmer criteria, appellants' principal 
contention is that the court of appeals erred in holding that 
discriminatory purpose could be found through a "tort" standard of 
intent and legislative inaction. Appellants argue that the "natural 
and probable consequences" test of intent approved by the majority 
is inconsistent with Washington v. Davis, and that discriminatory 
purpose cannot be inferred merely from maintenance of the status quo. 
In this respect, appellants adopt the reasoning of Judge Wisdom's 
concurring opinion. Finally, appellants claim . the remedy ordered by 
the district court was unauthorized by the constitution, though they 
offer no clear legal argument in support of this claim. 
Appellees contend that the district court's finding that the 
Mobile at-large voting scheme had the effect of disenfranchising 
black voters is supported by the overwhelming weight of the evidence, 
and that the "two court" rule immunizes the district court's findings 
from review here. E.g., Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271, 
275 (1961). Appellees also deny that the lower courts adopted any 
"tort'' standard of intent, for the decisions below rested on a finding 
that the at-large voting scheme had been deliberately maintained for 
racially discriminatory purposes. Pointing to the testimony of Alabama 
legislators that the legislature would not pass any redistricting plan 
that would benefit black voters in Mobile, the appellees contend the 
courts below were well justified in concluding that the maintenance 
of at-large voting in this case was racially motivated in fact. 
Moreover, appellees claim, no proof of racially discriminatory intent 
was required in this voting dilution case for the reasons noted by 
~ Judge Wisdom. Finally, appellees argue that appellants are estopped 
from challenging the remedy ordered by the district court because they 
--
- 7 -
stubbornly refused to offer the court any alternative plan. 
ANALYSIS: I believe this appeal raises substantial questions of 
federal constitut~al law warranting review by this Court. The Court 
should make clea~ether proof of discriminatory intent is required 
in voting dilution cases based on the Fifteenth, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, it is questionab~ether the majority 
view of legislative inaction as sufficient to support a finding of dis-
criminatory purpose is consistent with Washington v. Davis and Arlington 
Heights, though those cases might be distinguishable because there is 
some direct testimony concerning racially discri~ory motivation 
here that was not present in those cases. Final~he remedy ordered 
by the district court is, indeed, a sweepin~ one that not only altered 
the manner of electing local governmental officials, but also the 
entire structure of the local government itself. Arguably, a colorable , 
though not necessarily persuasive, Tenth Amendment attack on the distri c 
court's remedy might be maintainable in light of Usery~ 
The Court may wish to call for the views of the Solicitor General 
before making any decision as to whether or not to note probable 
jurisdiction. 
There is a response. 
9/5/78 
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QUESTIONS ·PRESENTED: { f trP-ti. ~~) 
1) Does the intent requirement of Arlington Heights and 
Washington v. Davis apply to cases involving vote-dilution under the 
Fourteenth Amendment? 
2) Should · vote-dilution cases be decided under the 
Fifteenth Amendment? Would the legal standard under that provision 
vary from that under the Fourteenth, especially with regard to the 
intent requirement? 
3) Is invidious intent demonstrated by maintenance of an 
t 
electoral structure that is neutral on its face, but that in pracice 
~ ~ 
results in white dominance of all elected offices? 
4) Did the DC overstep its remedial powers in No. 77-1844 




These cases involve challenges by black voters to the at-
large election of th~obile City Commission and t~obile County 
Board of School Commissioners. The complaints alleged that although 
blacks make up 35 per cent of the 190,000 city residents, and 32 per 
cent of the 337,000 county residents, a black has never been elected 
to either body because votes are cast strictly on racial lines in 
Mobile, and the white majority invariably swamps any black 
candidates. In the context of the long history Of discrimination in 
Mobile and the unresponsiveness to black needs of the City Commission 
and the School Board, the plaintiffs argued that the at-large system 
violates their constitutional right to participate in the political 
process. The District Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs in both 
cases. Under a new City Charter that he promulgated, the judge 
replaced the commission form of government in Mobile with a mayor-
council system. He established nine single-member districts for 
appeal.1/ In 
the 
council, but elections were stayed pending this the 
school board case, the court ordered election of the five board ----------members from single-member districts on a staggered basis from 1978 
through 1982. Two new members, both black, were elected in 1978. 
A. The City Commission: Mobile adopted the commission form 
of government in 1911, in the midst of a national wave of municipal --reform. By electing the three commissioners at-large in a non-
partisan manner, the reformers hoped to end the corruption and "ward-
h 1 • II h h d • ~ ee 1ng t at a character 1 zed the mayor-alderman governments 1n 
--------'-~-------------~------Alabama. The State Constitution of 1901 had disenfranchised 
blacks, so the city (appellee in this case) argues that in 1911 there 
I 
~ j ~ 4lrru.:t ~. 
3. 
was no intent to exclude blacks from the city commission. As amended 
/l L \ 
in 1945, the system provides for election by majority vote of three -commissioners to numbered posts. If no candidate received a majority 
~----
for a particular post, a runoff would be held between the two top 
vote-getters. There was requiremen ..... t 
-----~------------------
no residency for the 
commissioners. After election, the commissioners would designate one 
of their number as mayor, but they jointly exercised all legislative 
and administrative power in the city without formal distribution of 
specific duties. A proposal to replace the Commission with a mayor-
council system was defeated in a referendum in 1963. 
~
In 1965, the state legislature approved Act 823, which 
authorized the holding of another referendum on the mayor-council 
form of government. If approved by the voters, the Act provided for 
seven at-large councilmen. According to testimony by a former state 
legislator, the Act did not propose single-member districts because 
such a provision would have been considered an attempt to get blacks 
elected to state office. Brief for amicus United States, at 22. A 
referendum under this statute was defeated in 1973. 
Act 823 also designated that one commissioner should be 
responsible for each of three administrative areas :d)public safety, 
cj) finance an~ublic works and services. After this lawsuit was filed, 
the City submitted Act 823 to the Attorney General for clearance 
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c 
(1976). On March 2, 1976, the Attorney General objected to the 
statute. He contended that so long as each commissioner had a 
particular substantive responsibility, single-member districts would 
be unconstitutional, since they would permit one section of the city 
4. 
to control policy in one area but have little voice on other matters. 
The city has not appealed the Attorney General's ruling to the 
District Court of the District of Columbia, so commission seats are 
Also in 1975, a bill was introduced in the state legislature 
to permit Mobile to adopt a strong-mayor/council government by 
referendum. The bill, which would have provided for seven single-
member council districts and two council members elected at-large, 
delegation operates on a sort of liberum ·veto on all local 
legislation). Two black legislators testified at trial that the 
referendum bill was defeated because it "would allow the possibility 
for blacks to hold public office in the City Government." Appellees' 
brief, at 24. Referring to the history of redistricting attempts in 
Mobile, the District Court observed, "The evidence is clear that 
whenever a redistricting bill of any type is proposed by a county 
delegation member, a major concern has centered around how many, if 
any, blacks would be elected." Juris. St. at 30b. 
The DC found extreme racial polarization in voting in 
Mobile. Due to traditional methods of discrimination, blacks never 
voted in substantial numbers until after the Voting Rights Act went 
into effect. Now, according the the District Court, blacks are 
unrestricted in their registration and voting. But when a candidate 
--~--------------------------------------is identified with the black community, "a white backlash occurs 
~ 
li'"P~ which usually results in the defeat of the black candidate or the 
white candidate identified with the blacks." Juris. St. at 8b. No 
black has ever been elected to the City Commission. Only three 
~~ 
~~~ 
and all unsuccessfully ~ 
blacks have run for the l ~ 
inexperienced" blacks 
blacks have run for the City Commission, 
competed for the post in 1973. The only time 
Commission was 1973, when three "young, 
---------------------"mounted extremely limited campaigns." Id. They received little 
support even in the black community. In 1969,a white incumbent 
commissioner who had been identified with the black community was 
defeated for reelection by white votes, and lost a bid for the 
commission in 1972. The DC also cited a 1969 race for the state 
legislature when the county made up one multimember district. Two 
black candidates were well-supported in their own community, but were 
defeated. Similarly, black candidates for the School Commission lost 
at-large run-offs in 1962, 1966, and 1974, and a white "moderate" 
lost such a run-off in 1970. 
There is some dispute about these election statistics. The 
1969 defeat of Joseph Langan, the white incumbent commissioner who 
was identified with blacks, was attributed by some to a partial 
boycott of the elections by black militants and to a low turnout 
caused by Hurricane Camille. And plaintiffs' expert stated that 1969 
was the high point of polarization in Mobile and predicted that 
racism would ebb as a force in political contests. Part of the basis 
for this prediction, however, was the observation that many black --=----
Plaintiffs, and the SG, argue that the 
supporting data is unreliable, since the black candidates were not 
very impressive. Indeed, there is no recent data on at-large voting 
\~ 
patterns because since 1972 state leg isla tors have been elected in 1::::::: 
single-member districts in Mobile, after 1976 the only school board 
------------~ ~ 
6. 
races have been in single-member districts, and there was no City 
Commission election in 1977 due to this lawsuit. 
In October, 1976, the District Court found the at-large 
-------~--------------------------
election of commissioners to be invidiously discriminatory. 
Following the failure of a legislative effort to establish single-
member districts by authorizing a referendum on the subject, the 
judge asked the parties to submit remedial plans. The city refused 
to propose a plan that did not include at-large election of 
commissioners, but agreed to recommend two people to serve on a 
special committee to advise the court on redistricting. The third 
member of the committee was nominated by plaintiffs. The committee 
v~~odelled its ~~-.plan on the municipal government 
~~ontgo~ry, which is ab~e same size as Mobile. 
in 
The court -
~I"' modified the plan in response to solicited comments from various 
...v '--" i::' segments of the community, and then o_r_d_e_r_e_d __ _:_h_a_ ..... t ...__~ b~ ~l_lo':;!ed in 
~ ~~ the 1977 elections. The DC stayed its injunction pending appeal, and 
f1~ offered to dissolve the injunction if the legislature adopted a 
constitutional reapportionment scheme. 
CA 5 affirmed the DC, and this Court granted cert. The case 
A~ argued last March, and was then held for reargument. 
~ _.. B. The School Board: The Mobile County Board of School 
l g~" ~mmissioners was established in 1826. In all its permutations since 
~~~it has always been elected on an at-large basis. After 1919, 
~ ~- there were five commissioners elected by the whole county. 
~Candidates ran for numbered seats on a partisan basis. No black was 
ever elected to the at-large board. Unlike contests for the City 
Commission, school board elections are relatively inexpensive, so the 
? 
7. 
black community has produced higher-quality candidates for the board. 
From 1962 until 1974, three blacks and one white civil-rights 
activist ran for the board in the Democratic primary. All four made 
it into the runoff, only to lose. ~f- ~ ~·~ __________.,... 
Before this suit was filed, Sen. Cain Kennedy, a black from 
Mobile, introduced legislation to establish single-member districts 
for the Mobile Board. Alabama has two kinds of statutes: local laws 
like Kennedy's bill and "general" laws. The "local" law was 
advertised in the Mobile newspapers, as required, at which point the 
incumbent school board members asked that the implementation dates be 
slightly altered. Sen. Kennedy agreed, and in October, 1975, the 
legislation was signed into law. Consequently, the DC disimissed 
this suit without prejudice on November 21, 1975. In February 1976, 
however, the Board of School Commissioners won a state decision 
~ dec.__--.:;;=--......-""'"lt,_Kennedy bill unconsti tut · onal because the language of 
~ th~ bill as enacted was different from the language as advertised in 
?~~ ~e Mobile newspapers. Of course, the only change in that language 
,tuM~ 
, ~~come at the request of the board itself. The nominal defendants 
tJ-i ~the suit the sheriff, circuit clerk and probate judge 
~ ~arcely contested it, and the final judgment came twelve days after 
~ ''~e suit was initiated. 
~.....sthen revived this action, they point out that the delay due to the 
No appeal was taken. Although appellees 
Kennedy bill ensured that the 1976 board elections would occur before 
the DC could issue a decision in this case. 
In 1976 the board prepared a second legislative proposal, 
cast as a "general law of local application. A black legislator from 
Mobile refused to sponsor the bill, but Rep. Sonnier, a white, agreed 
8. 
to present it. Counsel for the school board immediately requested 
that this litigation be continued pending legislative action on the 
-----------------~~ 
Sonnier bill. The school board assured the District Court that the 
legislation would meet "all constitutional requirements." The 
District Court denied the continuance. During a subsequent exchange 
over a 1939 "general" law dealing with the school board, the board's 
counsel insisted that "general laws of local application" were 
unconstitutional. Judge Pittman asked counsel if the same principle 
applied to the Sonnier Bill. Counsel replied in the affirmative, and 
then conceded that the legislation was unconstitutional as drafted. 
Appellees' brief at 28-29. 
The District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and 
ordered that the School Commissioners be elected in single-member 
districts on a staggered basis. Two districts, which both had black 
majorities, were to hold elections in 1978, one in 1980, and the last 
two in 19 82. Due to the residence patterns of the incumbents, the 
plan resulted in a six-member board between 1978 and 1982. The court 
ordered that one of the incumbents should be designated non-voting 
chairman for each year during that period. After two blacks won the 
primaries for the seats that were available in 1978, the incumbents 
adopted a rule requiring the assent of at least four commissioners to 
every major substantive or procedural action. The district court 
held three of the Board members in contempt for promulgating the 
rule, but on Oct. 27, 1978, Mr. Justice POWELL stayed the contempt 
proceedings and the November elections. On Halloween, however, Mr. 
Justice POWELL vacated his stay of the elections, which took place in 
the first week of November. The District Court then enjoined the 
I 
~~~~~ 
z~ v /lfC:J-Gu·~ 9. ----
Board from adopting its new rules and from voting to dismiss the 
instant litigation. 
CA 5 affirmed the District Court's actions in a two-
paragraph per -curiam opinion that cited only its opinion in the City 
Commission case. 
II. OPINIONS BELOW 
The District Court opinion in No. 77-1844 served as the 
framework for its effort in No. 78-357, with only the facts changed. 
At the court of appeals, No. 77-1844 received a full airing, while 
No. 78-357 was affirmed in two paragraphs. Accordingly, I will 
concentrate in this section on the City Commission case. 
A. District -court: The DC applied the standards for vote-
dilution cases under the Fourteenth amendment that were articulated 
v 
by the Fifth Circuit en bane in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 
( 197 3), which was affirmed by this Court "without approval of the 
constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals." East 
Carroll Parish School · Board v. · Marshall, 424 u.s. 636, 638 (1976). 
The DC found that three of the primary factors identified by Zimm~r 
were satisfied here, and that the fourth was neutral, while several 
"enhancing factors" were also present. Although the DC divided its 
opinion betwee~ Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the City 
argues that many allegedly factual statements are based on inferences 
and should be carefully scrutinized by this court. 
1) "Lack of Openness in the Political Process to Blacks" --
The DC cited "mas~ive official and private discrimination" before the 




--although it also observed that now "blacks 
1 0. 
Juris. St. at 7b. Despite 
this superficial equality of the franchise between black and white, 
the DC felt that racially polarized voting patterns barred blacks 
from meaningful participation in the political process. Judge 
Pittman compared black failure at the polls in at-large districts to 
the election of blacks from single-member legislative districts 
established by court order in 1972. He concluded: 
Black candidates at this time can only have a 
reasonable chance of being elected where they have a 
majority or a near majority. There is no reasonable 
expectation that a black candidate could be elected in a 
citywide election race because of race polarization. The 
court concludes that an at-large system is an effective 
barrier to blacks seeking public life. 
2) "Unresponsiveness of the Elected City Officials to the 
Black Minority" Judge Pittman pointed to numerous examples of 
official discrimination, including the paucity of black public 
'--"' servants at higher levels (e.g. , 15 of the 43 5 city fireman are 
~black, while the police department is under a court order to 
~regate). Public facilities like the municipal golf course, the 
~ ~ ;irport, and public transportation were integrated by court order in . ./ 
~~he 1960s, and city advisory boards are more than 90 per cent white. 
fv~ The DC also found that the City Commission has provided quicker, more 
effective assistance to white neighborhoods faced with Mobile's 
drainage problems than to black areas, and the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury found discrimination in the use of revenue-sharing funds for 
resurfacing roads. He also criticized "sluggish" response by public 
officials to twenty or thirty cross-burnings in 1976 and a mock-
lynching by police officers of a black robbery suspect who was later 
released without charge. 
1 1 • 
3) "Pas t--,~ Racial Discrimination" Starting from the 
disenfranchisement of blacks in the 1901 Constitution, the Court 
found that the "existence of past discrimination has helped preclude 
the effective participation of blacks in the election system today • 
II Juris. St. at 20b. 
4) "State Policy in Favor of At-Large Districts" Judge 
Pittman concluded that, in view of the diversity of forms of 
I( ~---municipal government in Alabama, there is ~o stat~ p~f 
. . =- .;..::z., ~ "- H ~ 
the Commission system as established 1n Mob1le. ~  ~ ~ 
5) "Enhancing Factors" The DC said the discriminatory 
effect of the at-large system was buttressed by the large size of the 
district (which means that many people are disenfranchised, I guess), 
by the requirement that commissioners be elected by majority vote 
rather than simple plurality, by the "place" system of running 
candidates for particular seats on the Commission, and by the absense 
of a requirement that each commissioner reside in a different 
geographicdistrict. 
Armed with these findings, Judge Pittman faced the question 
of whether to apply to this vote-dilution case the requirement of 
Washington " V. · navis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976), that invidious intent be 
demonstrated in an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. His discussion of the issue is somewhat elliptical, but 
he squarely concluded that the plaintiffs did have 
----------~--~--------------~--~-~~·~---------------------
to demonstrate -
discriminatory intent. The City Commission, however, was established 




neutral statute, the DC decided that discriminatory intent 
inferred from the law's current "disproportionate impact" on 
? 
- ~,,&~~ l~~~~~ 
~4cA-s-- ----
The Court stated that "It is not a long step from the 
systematic · exclusion of blacks from juries ..• to a present purpose 
to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case." Juris. St. at 
31b (emphasis in original). Judge Pittman then reached his 
controversial conclusion: 
Id. 
There is a "current" condition of dilution of the 
black vote resulting from intent~on~l s.tate le~ islativ~ J 
11 inaction '' which is as effective ~s the intent i onal state 
ac tfc3n ~ferred to in [Keyes v~ School District No. 1, 413 
u.s. 189 (1973)]. 
(emphasis in original). This conclusion relies on Judge 
Pittman's earlier assertion that because the legislature in 1911 ~ 
"should have reasonably expected that the blacks would not 
(}) disenfranchised," "the present dilution of black Mobilians is a 
natural and foreseeable consequence of the at-large system imposed in 
1911." Id. 
B. Court of Appeals: Judge Tjoflat, writing for himself 
and Judge Simpson, affirmed on the basis of the DC's application of 
the Zimmer factors. The panel incorporated by reference its 
conclusion in a companion case, Nevett v~ Sides (Nevett II), 571 F.2d 
209 (5th Cir. 1978), that a vote dilution case was subject to the 
same intent requirement as all other equal protection cases after 
Washington v~ Davis and Arlington ·Heights. The findings of the DC on 
the Zimmer factors, according to the panel, "compel the inference 
that the system has been maintained with the purpose of diluting the 
black vote, thus supplying the element of intent necessary to 




legislative inaction and intent. 
------------~--
Thus the accepted Judge Pittman's equation between CA 
Id. at 13a. Judge Tjoflat pointed 
.. • 
1 3. 
to Act 823 in 1965, which linked each commission seat to a 
substantive administrative responsibility, as "probative of an intent 
to maintain the plan by injecting additional policy grounds that 
would justify, and perhaps insulate, the at-large feature of all of 
the commission seats." Id. at 14a. He also cited the DC's finding 
that all redistricting efforts are evaluated in the legislature 
according to their racial impact. 
The panel also upheld the remedial order of the DC, 
emphasizing the temporary nature of the the remedy "until the state 
or the city adopts a constitutional replacement." Id. at 17a. Judge 
Tjoflat also noted that the city had refused to submit a 
reapportionment plan, and argued that "[a] concomitant to the ability 
of a court to hear a case is that it be able to decide the case and 
remedy a wrong, if found." Oddly, the opinion then cites language in ---........__ Swann v~ - charlotte~Mecklenburg - Board · of · Education, 402 u.s. 1, 15-16 
(1971), that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the 
remedy." As I will argue later, that very principle undermines the 
!t 
~ 
tnLJ I . 
In Nevett II and in this case, 
¥-(l~~~p-)..) 
Judge Wisdom filed a special 
DC's remedial order. 
concurrence that deserves mention. He argued that the Zimmer factors 
cannot provide the basis for the inference of discriminatory intent: 
~ Then, if invidious effects preponderate, the court by 
~-~ inference declares that the legislative body which initiated 
~ the plan had a racially discriminatory intent. If for 
historical or other reasons the voting scheme could not 
fr 
!> ~initially have been motivated by a racially discriminatory 
.vi.~_.. intent, ••• then failure of the legislative body to take 
u r affirmative curative action demonstrates, ••• an illegal 
W intent to maintain diluted voting rights. 
'-....--
571 F.2d at 231. Judge Wisdom found this reasoning inconsistent with 
' ' 
----~--------------~'----------~----
-~-·- 7\ , 
~~#fe-/ls-~~~~~~ 14~ 
~~ ~ ~ te> ~ ~~u ~J.ti;;:;_ , 
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, and argued that when "a 
court must consider a laundry list, an 'aggregate' of factors, some 
pointing one way and others pointing another way, the case turns on 
the attitude of the trial judge and the appellate judges toward the 
American brand of federalism." Id. at 233. 
~~he ~ch, for Judge Wisdom, would be to 
stinguish voting rights cases from all other equal protection 
}r4 1 i tigat~n, in view of the "fundamental importance of the right to 
~vote," which "argues for expansive protection of that right." Id. at 
~ 234-35. In order to avoid further confusion of equal protection 
~theory, he proposed considering this and similar cases under the 
J L"~ . ~~:~~.L .. I J Fifteenth Amendment. ~: ~ --~~
/ ~-
When a government adopts a system of y6~~-ng that . • • ttt!f. 
places black citizens at a disadvantage, the government's ~~~' h-
reasons are irrelevant. The right to vote has been~~ 
abridged. W. lAA. 
Where the equal protection clause is a "broa~~ Id. at 236. 
A• 
statement, without self-evident limits," the Fifteenth Amendment "by P~ 
its terms is less expansive." By actingf. nder that 
would not question the validity of other government 
provision itself is "limited to racial groups." 
z....... 
amendment, courtsp~ '-
programs, and the~ 
Id. Consequently, 
Judge Wisdom would look only to the impact of government policies on 
the right to vote of racial minorities. Because he found that the 
impact of the at-large system in Mobile was to dilute the votes of 
blacks, Judge Wisdom concurred in the judgment of the panel. 
III. VOTE~DILUTION IN MULTI~MEMBER DISTRICTS 
According to the 1972 Municipal · Year ·Book, about 12,000 
municipalities and over 1,000 counties use at-large elections, though 
.. ( 
many may combine at-large seats 
Although most of this court's decisions on multi-member districts 
have involved state legislatures, some have involved the at-large 
election of local officials. ~se · v~ Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978) 
(city council); ~allas · county ·v. · Reese, 421 u.s. 477 (1975) (county 
commission); Avery v. Midland County, 390 u.s. 475 (1968); Sailors v. 
Board · of · Education of ·county ·of Kent, 387 u.s. 105 (county school 
board). As early as Reynolds · v~ -sims, 377 u.s. 533, 579 (1964), the 
Court referred to the use of multi-member districts to "achieve some 
~ flexibility" in local government. And the Court has repeatedly 
stated that such districts are not per ·· se unconstitutional. After 
reviewing the Court's treatment of multi-member districts, I will 
/ 
examine some issues raised by at-large election of local officials 
that the Court has not yet explored. 
A. The ·· Precedents: The verbal standard that has been applied to 
challenges to multimember districts comes from Fortson v. ·oorsey, 379 
U.S. 433 (1965), involving the Georgia legislature. 
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-
member constituency apportionment scfieme, under the 
circumstances of a particular case would operate to minim~ 
or ·· cance ..J ·out · the · voting ·· strengt~ · pf 11racral ·· or · pol1t1cal 
elements ' of tlie ·vot1ng population. 
Id. at 439 (emphasis supplied). The underlined language in that 
statement is the source of part of the argument that intent is not 
relevant to vote-dilution cases. Regardless, the Court found that 
the vote-dilution argument had not really been made below and 
certainly was not proved on the record of the case. Similarly, in 
Burns ·· v~ Richardson, 384 u.s. 73 (1966), concerning the use of 
multimember districts in the Hawaii legislature, the Court did not 
~v~U:.W.(~)- Siii2' ·->'<!-~~ 16 
 ~ -r v.;t; "A~~~. . 
that the districting scheme "effects an invidious result." Id. find 
at 88. Again, the Court's phrase suggested that intent was not an 
element of a vote-dilution case. 
The most thorough consideration of multimember districts 
came . V h. b Ch . 1n W 1tcom v~ ·· · av1s, 403 u.s. 1 24 ( 19 Z.l ) , where the Court 
a.---
upheld multimember districts for the Indiana legislature, and White 
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), a Texas case and the only instance ~~ 
where the Court has found sufficient vote-dilution to order ~ 
redistricting. In Whitcomb, blacks and poor people claimed that the --------use of a county-wide district in Indianapolis, which almost 
invariably voted Republican, denied them effective participation in 
the political process. A three-judge court ruled in their favor, but 
this Court reversed. Mr. Justice WHITE's opinion for the Court 
reflected great unease with the idea that the courts should intervene 
in an apparently open political system to assist the election of 
members a particular group in society. 
Id. 
[The District Court's holding] is not easily contained. It 
is expressive of the more general proposition that any group 
with distinctive interests must be represented in 
legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command at 
least one seat and represents a majority living in an area 
sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district. 
at 1 56. Mr. Justice WHITE acknowledged that multimember 
districts have the potential to "submerge" minorities, but argued 
that petrs had not demonstrated such a state of events in 
Indianapolis. Because the Democratic party nominated black 
candidates and was responsive to the black community, the Court found 
that the political system was not discriminatory: 
'' 
[T]he failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in 
proportion to its population emerges more as a function of 
prp--L--3> [~- ~~-:,;.~7~~----
~ losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes . 
• • • We have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection 
to deny legislative seats to losing candidates, even in 
those so-called 'safe' seats where the same party wins year 
after year. 
Id. at 153. 
The majority opinion in Whitcomb muddied the waters a bit on 
the need to show discriminatory intent in vote-dilution cases. At 
one point, the Court seemed not to care about intent, stating that a 
plaintiff must "carry the burden of proving that multimember 
districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting 
strength of racial or political elements." Id. at 144 (emphasis 
supplied). Later on, however, Mr. Justice WHITE framed the issue in 
the case as whether the at-large districting was "conceived 
o~d as purposeful devices 
discrimination." 
~ 
Id. at 149. 
to further racial 
This statement suggests that a 
districting scheme not conceived as a discriminatory device may 
nevertheless be "purposefully" operated to deny legislative 
representation to certain groups. This idea might be especially 
relevant to the Mobile cases. 
White · v~ - Regester focussed on multimember legislative 
districts in Dallas County, where blacks claimed they suffered vote-
dilution, and Bexar County (San Antonio), where the plaintiffs were 
Mexican-Americans. The portion of Mr. Justice WHITE's opinion on 
multimember districts, which was joined by the whole Court, affirmed 
the three-judge court's conclusion that the votes of the minorities 
had been unconstitutionally diluted. The opinion, however, is 
unsatisfactory. Its basic statement · highlights the importance of --- ~ .......... 
----------~- ------------
"participation in the political process" by a minority. 
( 
1 8. 
[I]t is not enough that the racial group allegedly) 
discriminated aga~ not had legislative seats in ~ 
proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiff's burden 0 
is to produce evidence to support findings that the 
political processes leading to nomination and election were 
not equally open to participation by the group in question -
that its members had less opportunity than did other 
residents in the district to participate in the political 
processes and to elect legislators of their choice. 
412 u.s. at 766. 
But when Mr. Justice WHITE turned to the facts in each -county, his discuss ion was unill uminat ing. For Dallas County, the 
opinion enumerates several factors supporting the lower court's 
ruling: 1) the history of official racial discrimination in the 
county; 2) the requirement of a majority vote in primaries and the 
enumeration of specific seats for which candidates competed directly; 
3) only two blacks had ever been elected to the legislature from 
Dallas County since Reconstruction; 4) the role of the Dallas 
Committee for Responsible Government, a white-dominated organization, 
that "slated" candidates for the Democratic primary. These elements 
supported the DC's conclusion that blacks were "generally not 
permitted to enter into the political process in a reliable and 
meaningful manner." On Bexar County, Mr. Justice WHITE was even less 
helpful. He noted the history of discrimination against Mexican-
Americans in the community, and the "cultural and language barrier" 
they face in this country. The result, he said, was that only five 
Mexicam-Americans since 1880 had served in the Texas Legislature from 
Bexar County, even though in 1971 Mexican-Americans made up a 
majority of the population (but only a minority of the voting 
population). At this point, Mr. Justice WHITE argued that the 
findings of the District Court deserved deference, "representing as 
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they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the 
design and impact of the Bexar County multimember district in the 
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." Id. at 
769-770. 
I find no strong rule in the White opinion. Past 
discrimination is clearly important to any showing of vote dilution. 
It might be considered significant as support for an inference that 
the dilution is intentional. For the White Court, however, a history 
of discrimination was important because it established that the 
minorities had been excluded from the general political process. 
II Access to the political 
,, 
process was certainly concern the Court's 
over the slating organization in Dallas County which provided the 
"something extra" which distinguished Dallas County from Indianapolis 
in Whitcomb. But for Bexar County, the Court pointed to nothing more 
than the language and cultural barriers faced by Mexican-Americans. 
I would not belittle those barriers, but I am hard pressed to find 
them substantially greater than the cultural barriers -- including 
skin color and a history of slavery -- between black and white. See 
} generally, Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: 
\ Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 27-28. 
Standards of 
Access to the political process was also discussed in 
Chapman ·v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975), where the Court reversed a DC 
redistricting of the North Dakota legislature because the DC had 
retained multimember districts. In dictum, Mr. Justice BLACKMUN 
stated that in order to win a vote-dilution suit, "There must be 
'- evidence that the group has been denied access to the political 
process equal to the access of other groups." But in Chapman the 
20. 
Court applied its rule that redistricting by courts is subject to 
closer scrutiny for constitutional violations than redistricting by 
legislation. See Connor v. · Finch, 431 u.s. 407 (1977) (you 
~n~eft ). 
'/~ ~-~n ~ses, the Court ha:- upheld the use of at-large 
~~g for local governments. In v>Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 
~ (1967), the Court did not disturb the creation of a city council for 
~~ginia Beach with four members elected at-large without residency 
/ ~ requirement an and seven others, also elected at-large, who each had 
~~ to live in one of seven residential districts. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS 
,~- 1 "The Seven-Four plan seems to reflect a detente 
urban and rural communities that may be important in 
complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation 
to the city, the suburbia, and the rural countryside." Id. at 117. 
vballas County (Ala.) v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477 (1975), involved at-large 
election of county commissioners. Each of the four commissioners had 
to live in one of four districts. The city of Selma constituted one 
district, and thus was entitled to only one commissioner, although it 
held half the population of the county. The Court ruled that "each 
commissioner represents the citizens of the entire county and not 
merely those of the district in which he resides." Id. at 477.* In 
neither case, it should be stressed, was a convincing argument 
presented to the Court that the votes of a racial group had been ~ 
------ I *In Abat~ · v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), the Court did not disturb a 
County CommlSSlon made up of one representative from each of the five 
towns i~ the county. Even though the towns varied widely in 
population, the Court deemed the scheme adequate because it served 
"the pe~uliar needs of the community" by enhancing coordination 
betwee~ the county and town governments. 
21. 
diluted. 
B. General ·Considerations: Several features of at-large elections 
f local government bod'es deserve some mention. A citywide or 
countywide perspective would seem more valuable to someone with 
administrative responsibility for that district than for a 
legislator. See Comment, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1851, 1857 (1974). Like a 
mayor, a city commissioner might need that breadth of view in order 
to dis.;harge his duties conscientiously, without being subject to 
parochial pressures. At oral argument last March, the bench 
indicAted some interest in this line of reasoning. 
rejected in Avery ·v. · Midland County, 390 U.S. 
This argument was 
475, 485 (1968), 
because the County Commission had 
the entire geographic area served 
"general governmental powers over 
by the body." That holding may 
have been prompted by the facts of that case: the County Commission 
was el~cted at large with one commissioner from a district containing 
67,000 people, and three from districts with less than 1,000 people 
each. In Sailors · v~ Board · of Education ·of ·county of Kent, 387 u.s. 
105 (1967), the Court ruled that a county board of education 
"performs essentially administrative functions; and while they are 
important, they are not legislative in the classical sense." Id. at 
110. ~mong the administrative duties were the selection of a 
superintendant, preparation of the budget, and oversight of 
instruction. Because 
administrative function, 
of the county 
the Court approved 
board's predominantly 
the appointment of the 
county Board from popularly elected local school boards of varying 
sizes. These two rulings might yield the tentative rule that a local 
body that is primarily administrative must meet a lower standard in 
. ' ' 
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response to a vote-dilution challenge, but that a body with mixed 
legislative and administrative responsibilities will be treated like 
a legislature. 
A 1968 scholarly article points out two significant 
~~----------~------------
distinctions between multimember districts for state legislatures and 
at-large local elections. Jewell, Local · systems ·of Representation: 
Political Consequences and Judicial ·choices, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
790 (1968). The use of at-large elections for a local body does not 
create any difference in representation between individual voters, 
while such differences arise when some state legislators are elected 
from s~ngle-member districts and some from multimember ones. Id. at 
800. On the other hand, in legislative elections the majority-sweep 
feature of multimember districts may be offset by the possibility 
that minorities will win in other m~~ (~n single-m~~ '· 
districts. ~~t) -:;::::f 
In any single city or county, however, the discrimi(atory 
effect of at-large el ctions is @so.J.ute: there is ~~ way 7 of balancing out dis riminations against various groups, and 
7
· 
it is possible th t voters who consti~e ,some k!nd of 
minority ( p,erl;J;sap ~or other) will be unable to elect a 
representative of l:heir~n over a period of many years. 
that passage, Jewell rather accurately described the 
in Mobile. 
INTENT 
All vote dilution opinions of this Court have focused on the 
Although the 
Court is now committed to a requirement that discriminatory intent be 
demonstrated in cases claiming a denial of equal protection, resps 





voting is such a fundamental right. They also argue, following Judge 
Wisdom's concurrence in Nevett · II, that the Fifteenth Amendment 
should be the basis for the Court's decision here because that 
provision mandates that voting rights shall not be abridged on the 
basis of race, regardless of questions of intent. I shall ~eal with 
each Amendment in order. 
A. Fourteenth ·Amendment As noted above, the basic 
argument here derives from language in the earliest cases, Fortson 
and Burns, that dilution occurring "designedly or otherwise" could be 
unconstitutional. Neither Whitcomb nor White really considered 
intent, but rather concentrated on the effects on minority voting of 
the political structure and historical practices of the community. 
This neglect of intent could be seen as part of the Court's 
uncertainty over the role of intent in equal protection analysis at 
that time. For example, in Palmer · v~ · Thompson, 403 u.s. 217 (1971), 
Mr. Justice BLACK wrote for the Court that intent was irrelevant so 
long as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason existed for a 
governmental action. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to 
the ·problem ·of ·unconstitutional ·Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 9 5. Since Washington v~ ·navis and Arlington Heights, however, 
there has been no such confusion. The alternative view, pressed here 
by appellees, is that voting is such a fundamental interest for all 
citizens that the Court has consciously refrained from injecting 
issues of intent into voting rights cases under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. (Significantly, amicus United States does not argue this 
position, but concedes that discriminatory intent must 
·~, ----_."~--~~~~<7~--·-ce=-~----~¢~--~c>~-~<>~~~-~c=~ =~~--
be 
demonstrated in a vote-dilution case.) 
=>-r~"C>"~~~~ ~ ~~ 
,,~~,,~~~~ -~ 
~ • /lLe_ ~ ~fn-~. L--u .. )~_j.. 
~9- c£ . .&~,f~~~~ 
~~~~'-·~~ ~~ ~.~2~ 
The treatment of this question in the courts below and in 
v 
briefs has focussed on Wright v~ Rockefeller, 376 u.s. 52 (1964), 
a gerrymander case concerning congressional districts in Manhattan. 
~
claim was an odd one from our current perspective: minority 
citizens argued that they had been unconstitutionally lumped into one 
district, leaving four districts in the county with white majorities. 
In other words, they urged that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments required dilution of their votes. The seven-man majority 
of the Court affirmed the DC's finding that appellants had not proved 
"that the New York Legislature was either motivated by racial 
considerations or e districts on racial lines." Id. 
~
at 56. The Court accepted the DC's conclusion "that appellants have 
not shown that the challenged [redistricting] was the product of a 
state contrivance to segregate on the basis of race or place of 
origin." Id. at 58 (emphasis added). 
in Wright was cited in both 
) 
~he language of intent 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240, and Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 
at 265. Because of that, the Fifth Circuit in Nevett II concluded 
that this Court meant to extend the intent requirement to voting 
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellees dispute that reading 
on the basis of language in Wright discussing discriminatory impact 
as well. Moreover, they add, Washington and Arlington ·· Heights did 
(! ..... ~ ';..:.._k...;f ·;..._ ~) 
position is more accurate. ;J 
not cite any other voting cases. 
I think the Fifth Circuit's 
Although Washington and Arlington ·Heights only decided the case 
before the Court at the time, the discussion in both cases -- in 
/ particular the survey of various areas of equal protection law 
~r---~ I .,...~ -,---:f~ ) z:;c; oz:rr~ ~ ~~~~ ~ 
~~ ~~ I~!!Z-~, ~~ ftu..t 2s. J 
t+c..~ '"""'~ 
indicated a desire to provide a comprehensive framework for handling 
such cases. The ~tation of Wright, a case that has had little 
impact in any other respect, betrays a conviction that voting cases 
should also be the subject to the intent requirement. Equally, 
I failure of the Washington and Arlington Heights opinions to discuss White v~ · Regester or Whitcomb does not seem inadvertent. Rather, 
because the vote-dilution cases had not dealt with intent, they were 
not relevant to the Court's new approach. This view is buttressed by 
I 
Justice Stewart's statement in United Jewish - organization 




. ..,., ~ 
~ 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is 
the reapportionment plan represents purposeful 
discrimination against white voters. Washington v~ · Davis, 
426 U.S. at 229. Disproportionate impact may atford some 
evidence that an invidious purpose was present. [Arlington 
Heights, 429 u.s. at 266.] But the record here does not 
support a finding that the redistricting plan undervalued 
the political power of white voters relative to their 
numbers. 
Id. at 179-180. 
The case against this approach, as Greg Morgan argued in his 
law review note, Racial ·vote · Dilution ·· in ·· Multimember Districts: The 
tl-1y Constitutional Standard ·· After ·washington v o Davis, 76 Mich o Lo Rev o 
~ 6 (1978), i~d. The right to vote is so 
fundamental that the question of legislative or administrative intent 
If r i : irre'i'"evant so 
~ vot1ng rights 
long as discriminatory impact is demonstrated. And 
are a sufficiently discrete set of personal 
entitlements that the Court could exclude intent as a consideration 
in voting cases without undermining Washington and Arlil'!g_ton Heights 
with respect to other equal protection areas. I think this argument -
~ may be naive. By recognizing such a "fundamental interest" exception 
"----' ~
to the intent requirement, the Court would be inviting future 
litigants to pose their arguments in that language. Once the Court 
I 
begins defining interests as fundamental and not-fundamental, -----------------' ---------·--------------- ---- ------ -----'f,d-/ 
B. Fifteenth Amendment In Nevett · II, Judge Wisdom 
proposed using the Fifteenth Amendment to establish special 
protection for voting cases by looking only to discriminatory impact, 
not intent. That constitutional provision applies specifically to 
the voting rights of racial minorities, so there would be little 
danger that the Court's ruling would "seep" into other equal 
protection cases; and by proscribing any abridgment of voting rights, 
the Amendment is broad enough to reach the devaluation of the vote 
presented by dilution cases. 
The major problem 
with it, however, is the desuetude into which the Fifteenth Amendment ----- --has fallen. No major case has been decided on the basis of that ----provision since Gomillion v. ·Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and even 
then its use was primarily designed to permit Justice Frankfurter to 
evade his "political thicket" pronouncement in Colegrove v; ·Green, 
328 u.s. 549 (1946). Indeed, there is very 1 it tle precedent from 
this Court on the Fifteenth Amendment. Several of the cases 
upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965 discuss congressional power 
under the Amendment, e.g~, South Carolina v~ Katzenbach, 383 u.s. 301 
( 1966), but I could only find three cases in the last fifty years 
discussing its direct applicaton. 
The plaintiffs in Gomillion challenged the redrawing of the 
town boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama so as to exclude every black 
27. 
family and no whites. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court 
c istinguished Colegrove as involving the retention of unequal 
apportionment (or legislative inaction), while the redefinition of 
Tuskegee had just taken place (legislative action). 
More direct guidance for the Mobile cases comes from Terry 
v~ ·Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), involving the role of a private 
political group, the 
1 ~aybird \\ Party, that staged white primaries 
before the Democratic primary, and whose candidates always won the 
Democratic primary and general election. Writing for himself and two 
other judges, Mr. Justice BLACK found that the Jaybird Party "holds 
exactly the kind of election that the Fift~nth Amendment tries to 
prevent." He added: 
It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state. 
to permit within its borders the use of any device that 
produces the equivalent of the prohibited election ••• 
The effect of the whole procedure. is to do 
precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids 
strip Negroes of every vestige of [political] influence • 
Id. at 469-470. 
While Mr. Justice BLACK was willing to impose a duty on the 
state to prevent the use of any device that would abridge voting 
rights of blacks, regardless of intent, Mr. Justice 
FRANKFURTER,needless to say, would not go so far. He concluded that 
th~ exlusion of blacks from a meaningful voice in local government 
was "not an accidental, unsought consequence of the exercise of civil 
rights by voters to make their common viewpoint count. • It was 
\ 
the design, the very purpose of this arrangment • 
-------------------------------------
76. Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER rather desperately searched for state 
action in the Jaybird primary, finally concluding 
" Id. at 475-
obscurely that, 
~ .. • lt•. 
-· 
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"The evil here is that the State, through the action and abdication 
of those whom it has clothed with authority, has permit ted white 
voters to go through a procedure which predetermines the legally 
devised primary." Id. at 477 (emphasis supplied). Mr. Justice 
CLARK's opinion for three other justices simply argued that the 
Jaybird Party was a political party "whose activities fall within the 
Fifteenth Amendment's self-executing ban," id. at 482, adding, "Quite 
ev i ~Pntly, the Jaybird Democratic Association og:rates a-s an 
auxiliary of the local Democratic Party •• " Id. at 483. Justice 
Clar~ concluded: 
[W] hen a state structures its electoral apparatus 
in a form which devolves upon a political organization the 
uncontested choice of public officials, that organization 
itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of 
government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into 
play. 
Id. at 484. 
In Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), this Court struck 
down an Oklahoma requirement that all people who had not previously 
voted (which included all blacks in the state) register in one 
twelve-day period. Noting that the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies 
sophisticated as well as simple-minded" methods of denying the vote 
to minorities, the Court rejected the statute because its "practical 
effect" was to abridge the right to vote. 
L""' i .. _J Jtr/ Both ~ and Terry seem to provide Judge Wisdom with what ~rr·~ 
u}~e wants -- an impact-oriented standard for evaluating restrictions 
f/LlA"' t on voting rights. In particular, the discussion in Terry of state 
actjon offers several bases for arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment 
is violated by state acquiescence in the abridgment of black voting 
rights. 
,, ,, 
The Wisdom approach would represent a major departure from 
behind the Fifteenth Amendment. (Some discussion of that history 
appears in Brief for Appellees in No. 77-1844, at 87-90, and Bri e f 
for Amicus, at 86-89.) Nevertheless, his approach has much to 
c~mmend l t. Where the equal protection clause is obscure and applies 
broadly, the Fifteenth Amendment is clear and specific to voting 
rights of racial minorities. And the right to vote is arguably the 
most basic right we have, protected by the provision in Articles I 
and II for the election of Congress and the President, by the First 
Amendment's attention to free speech, assembly and petition of the 
government, and perhaps even inherent in some notion of societal due 
'-.._...r process. 
I Wisdom's burden on plaintiffs. 
intent requirement by following Judge Dispensing with the 
lead would simplify voting rights litigation and ease the 
The result could be greater intervention by 
federal courts into local districting matters. That result might not 
be so unattractive under a more clear notion of the remedial powers 
of the DCs, as I will discuss below, but should be acknowledged as a 
possible drawback. Realistically, I would not expect the whole 
I 
Court, or a very sizable minority, 
But I would commend it to your careful attention. ~~ ~ ------- -  
to embrace Judge Wisdom's view. 
IV. WAS THERE INTENT -IN THESE CASES? 
Jt ~ 
The most troubling feature of 
~~~/
tt/J4~ ,rtf. a_.,.~....; ... ~ 
~C..•e/--.t~ 
the opinions below is their 




support for the DC'sf pproach comes from this Court's decision in 
Norwood · v. · Harrison, 413 u.s. 455 (1973), a case which presented a 
strikingly similar sequence of events. In 1940, Mississippi had 
adopted a program of giving textbooks to students in private schools. 
After the state's public schools were desegregated in 1962, however, 
hundreds of "white academies" sprang up that benefitted from this 
policy. The Supreme Court found a violation of equal protection even 
assuming that the textbood aid program was not "motivated by other 
than a sincere interest in the educational welfare of all Mississippi 
children." Id. at 466. The program, according to the Court, "has a 
significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private 
discrimination," and could not "be shielded altogether from 
constitutional scrutiny because its ultimate end was not 
discrimination but some higher goal." Id. at 466, 467. In addition, 
this Court's discussion in White v. Regester of the position of 
Mexican-Americans in Bexar County and of blacks in Dallas County made 
no mention of discriminatory intent. I think it is reasonable to 
view both Norwood and White as pre-Washington v. Davis decisions that 
could not now be reached without a showing of intent. Nevertheless, 
I think the decision of the courts below can be supported without 
resort to the artless and wide-ranging language they used. 
~ 
The threshhold question is: Whose intent? The most useful 
--.._....-
~~treatment of this issue, for me, was in Note, Segregative · Intent and 
the De · Facto/De · Jure · Distinction: Reading ·· the ·· Mind ·· of ·· the ·· School 
Board, 86 Yale L.J. 317 (1976), arguing that the Court has looked to 
"institutional intent." Rather than focus exclusively on the 
statements of particular actors, the Court will infer segregative 
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intent from the pattern of actions taken by an institution, compared 
to alternative actions that were open to it. Id. at 337-338. Of 
course, the at-large systems in this case were established by the 
state legislature. The DC found, however, that the local delegation 
controls all legislation that effects only Mobile. And, as was 
demonstrated by the whirl of legislation responding to this 
litigation, the delegation is responsive to the requests of local 
governmental bodies. Consequently, I 
1 
~hink this case would focus on \' 
th~ inte~action~ the M~bile legislative delegation, 
the City Commission, and the Board of School Commissioners. 
~-
Second, discrimination need not be the dominant or primary 
purpose of an action in order to trigger strict scrutiny by the 
courts. So long as it is "a" motivating factor, "judicial deference 
is no longer justified. " Arlington Heights, 429 u.s. at 266. 
The problem of divining discriminatory intent behind 
facially neutral classifications is chronic, and acute. As you noted 
in Arlington Heights: 
Determining whether invidious discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as 
may be available Sometimes a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the 
effect of the state action • • • . But such cases are rase. 
Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, 
impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must Iook 
to other evidence. 
429 u.s. at 266. You listed five sources of "other evidence": 1) an 
historical background of discrimination; 2) the "specific sequence of 
events leading up to the challenged decisions"; 3) whether there were 
departures from normal procedures; 4) whether there were changes in 
substantive policy; and 5) the evidence of participants in the 
32. 
decisionmaking process. Id. at 267. 
Although it might be argued that the complete failure of 
black candidates to win an at-large election demonstrates the needed 
discriminatory intent, I would look to the totality of factors. The 
----------------~ --- . 
~ f':_cts of ~ cas:_s provid.:_ ~om.=_ ~asis for finding_ discr.iminatory 
~ i~nt, particularly wit~ to the school ~o!rd.~rst, there 
~ is a long history of discrimination against blacks in Mobile, and 
~~iable black candidates have repeatedly lost runoffs for the school 
~ board. In addition, the board sabotaged the 1975 Kennedy Bill to set 
/ ~ single-member districts, and then ;-ponsored another 
~~- unconstitutional reapportionment measure, the Sonnier Bill. 
Following the victories by two blacks in the 1978 primary, the board 
enacted its rule requiring four votes for major actions in a 
transparent attempt to ensure that no school policy could be set 
without the support of a majority of the white board members. 
Concededly, this is not legislative intent in the sense that a 
majority of the Alabama Legislature agreed to keep blacks off the 
ro~e Board of School Commissioners. Yet the actions taken by the 
s~r~ reflect both discriminatory intent and bad faith • . 
The City Commission presents a closer case, in my view. The 
~election results are less compelling because no Ll . l v1ab e .. black 
candidate has run for that office. Appellees insist that this has ----
been due to the expenie of mounting a serious campaign combined with 
the certainty of defeat for blacks. Moreover, there has been no 
demonstration that the Commission has fought single-member districts 
tooth-and-nail the way the school board has. Nevertheless, the 
District Court found that race was a major factor in all 
33. 
redistricting proposals, and that racial considerations were 
instrumental in . defeating 1965 and 1975 legislation to authorize a 
referendum on single-member districts. The DC drew this conclusion 
on the basis of testimony of legislators which, although perhaps 
subject to question on the grounds of personal interest, is certainly 
more direct evidence that ordinarily arises in equal protection 
cases. And there is much in the record -- the mock lynching, cross-
burnings, and still almost lily-white upper levels of the city 
bureaucracy that suggests that discriminatory motivations underlie 
many of the Commission's policies. 
VI. VOTING · RIGHTS · ACT ~ ~ - ?-t-<J //. "' ... -i~ _.. ~ 
-~r~~~-~i 
Appellees repeat somewhat desultorily their claim that
at-large elections in Mobile violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
<:...... 
Act of 1965, 42 u.s.c. § 1973c ( 1976), and point out that this 
Court's practice is to decide a case on statutory grounds if 
possible, before reaching constitutional issues. E • g • , Wood · v. 
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 314 (1975). CA 5 decided the case on the 
constitutional claim because that point had been fully developed by 
the DC and because "to remand this case [for decision on the 
statutory question] would be a purposeless waste of judicial 
resources." Juris. St. at Sa. CA 5 also pointed out that no vote-
dilution claim has been sustained under the Voting Rights Act. This 
Court has poted that in some circumstances the constitutional-
decision-avoidance rule may be abused, particularly when there is 
little basis for the statutory claim and the case has been litigated 
exclusively on the constitutional issue. Mayor ·· of · Philadelphia v ~ 
I ~ 
~hj .S~ ~- S"hi?iS"L.-.. Lh, 
v:-/3~ ~~~1~/-.o~,~fJ.q, 
~ducational · Equality · League, 415 u.s. 605, 629 (1974).I would follow 
34. 
l 
that theory here. 
VII. THE ·REMEDY 
The DC's order in the City Commission case is questionable. 
~ - ~--------------------~--------
This Court has stated repeatedly that in court-ordered 
reapportionments, single-member districts are preferred unless unique 
circumstances are present. E.g., Mahan v~ Howell, supra; Connor v~ 
Johnson, 402 u.s. 690, 692 (1971). But this Court has also insisted 
that the "scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent 
~---------------------~~-----------------------of the constitutional violation." Milliken v. · Bradley, 418 u.s. 717 
(1974). Or as you stated in your concurrence to the vacation and 
remand of Austin · Independent · School - oist~ - v~ -united -states, 429 U.S. 
990, 991 (1976): "A remedy simply is not equitable if it is 
disproportionate to the wrong." This approach has been applied 
beyond the confines of school desegregation cases. Hills · v~ 
Gatreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). The ~~ntrolling case~• for this t:l.w 
-k 
litigation, in my view, is Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v~ ,-G, ... ~ 
Beens, 406 u.s. 187 (1972). The DC in that case had reapportioned 
the state senate, and in the process had reduced the number of 
senators from 67 to 35. The Court's per curiam opinion stated that 
"a federal reapportionment court should accomodate the relief ordered 
to the appropriate provisions of state statutes relating to the 
legislature's size insofar as is possible," Id. at 197, and added: 
.. 
) 
We know of no federal constitutional principle or 
requirement that authorizes a federal reapportioning court 
to go as far as the District Court did and, thus, to bypass 
the State's formal judgment as to the proper size of its 
legislative bodies • 
~ ~,..,-r -~ _, ____..---,....-, ---.....------ w ~ _.- .,_--......,.. 
~ ~-·~, k;:t-~~~~ 
In the instant case, the DC' s order drafting a new city 
charter and imposing a new form of government represents a massive 
intrusion on local prerogatives. It is particularly unacceptable in 
view of the availability of intermediate remedial measures that could 
~~ve responded to the vote-dilution problem. The DC could have 
~~nned the "place" requirement that establishes head-to-head 
~~ elections for each seat on the Commission, and required true at-large 
o~i~g. Or the DC could have divided the ~y · into three districts 
and imposed a requirement that a commissioner reside in each 
district. Indeed, the Attorney General had paved the way for this 
approach in his 1976 rejection of Act 823's linkage of specific 
administrative duties to particular commission seats. I see no way 
The remedy in the school board case was a simple conversion 
and was far v from multimember districts to single-member districts, 
~less intrusive. Such action is clearly within the powers of a 
~ederal court in a vote-dilution case. 
M· 
VIII. RECOMMENDATION: 
I would give serious consideration to Judge Wisdom's 
Fifteenth Amendment approach. Under traditional equal protection 
analysis, I think that Washington · v ~ · Davis and Arlington · Heights 
require a showing of discriminatory intent. This means revising the 
"participation in the political process" standard of White and 
Whitcomb. In view of the obscurity of that standard, though, such a 
change would be for the best. 
I would find on these facts the requisite intent to support 
36. 
the vote-dilution claim. As I noted above, the question seems closer 
with respect to the City Commission, especially in view of the 
stronger local interest in having the executive branch chosen on a 
citywide basis . in order to lessen parochialism. Some relief could be 
granted without imposing a new type of municipal government, however. 
More important, this Court has emphasized the need to defer to DC 
findings in cases like this. E.g~, White v~ ·Regester, sup~, 412 
u.s. at 769-770 (need for "intensely local appraisal" of the facts 
"in the light of past and present reality"); Mayor ·of Philadelphia · v~ 
Educational · Equality League, supra, 415 u.s. at 621 n.20. 
I would overturn the remedy ordered in the City Commission 
case. 
David 
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for the Fifth Circuit. 
1 ey . o en et a . 
[January - 1 1980] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by 
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by 
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is 
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates 
the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contrave11tion of fed-
eral statutory or constitutional law. 
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action 
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile.1 Named as de-
fendants were the city and its three incumbent Commis-
sioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The 
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Com-
missioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of 
Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965/ 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found 
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been vio-
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1Approximatf'ly 35.4% of the re~idents of Mobile are Negro. ~ 
2 79 Sia(,. 437, 42 U. S. C. 197a. Thf' complaint nl:.,;o contained claims ~ -./ ~ _ 
based on the Fir::;t :.md Thirteenth Amendments and on 42 1). S. C. § 1983 - f ~ ~. 
and 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) . Tho..-;c claims have not bl>en PI'essed in this J  
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City Comrnission be disestablished and replaced by a munic-
ipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council 
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F. 
Supp. 384.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in 
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing 
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate 
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, 'id., at 245, and finding that the remedy fornlU-
lated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was 
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, -
U. S. ~. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term, 
and was reargued in the present Term. 
J[ 
In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may 
ado})t is governed by state law. Until1911 cities not covered 
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves 
through a mayor and city counciU In that year, the Ala-
bama Legislature authorized every large municipality to 
adopt a commission form of government.5 Mobile estab-
lished i~s City Commission in the same year, and has main-
tained that 'basic system of muuicipal government ever since. 
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative, 
executive, and admi11istrative power in the municipality. 
They are required after election to designate one of their 
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal 
provisio11 is made for allocating specific executive or adminis-
trative duties among the three.6 As required by the state 
8 The District Court lw; stayed it::; orders pending di::;position of the 
present appeal. 
4 Alabama Codr, Chapter 11-43 (1975). 
"Act. 281, 1911 Alabamn Ads, at 330. 
6 In 1965 the Alabama Legi::;lature enacted Aet 82:~. 1965 Alabama. 
Act:<, nt. 15:39 , § 2 of which dr,;ignated H]Wcifir admini~lrative ia~k:< to be 
performed b~' ench CommiHsioner and provided that the titlr of Mayor be 
rotal·ed arp.ong the three. After the prc:>ent lawsuit. wa;; commenced, the-
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law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Com-
mission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of 
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected 
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic 
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of 
municipalities ·and other local governmental units throughout 
the Nation.7 
II 
Although required by general principles of judicial adminis-
tration to do so, Ash·wander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 
(Brandeis, J., concurring), neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals addrf'SSf'd the complaint's statutory claim-
that the MobilE> elf'ctoral system violates § 2 of the Votil)g 
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that 
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the 
appellees' complaint. 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides: 
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap-
plied by any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizeu of the United States on 
account of race or color." 
Even assuming, for present purposes. that there exists a pri-
vate right of action to enforce this statutory provision, a most 
city of Mobile belatedly submtttrd Art 23 to the Attorney General of the 
United Stairs under § 5 of the Voting Hights Art of 1965. 42 U. S. C. 
197ar. 'The Attomry Genrral objrrted to the lrgi;;lation on the ground 
that the C'ity had not. o;howu that § 2 of the Art would not have the effect 
of abridgin11: the nght of Kegroe~< to vote. No :·mit ha8 been brought in 
tho District Court for tlw District of Columbia to s<•t•k ri<•Hrance under 
§ 5 of the Voting Hights Art and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 i8 in 
abeyatwe 
7 A('rording to thr 1979 :Municipal Year Book, in addttion to the cities 
that have a commi~sion syHtrm of government., 6:3.4% of the citir;.; with ~• 
populntion of 25,000 or more persom; that have city councib, eleet all 
cottncil member;< tJtrough at-large rlcrtion:s. 
. ' 
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dubious assumption in light of our recent cases,8 it is apparent 
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that 
of the Fifteenth Amendment,'9 and the sparse legislative his-
tory of § 2 1nakes clear that it was int~nded to have an effect 
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself. 
Section 2 was an uncontroversial ·provision in proposed 
legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted dis-
pute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that §·2 
"grants ... a rigl~.t to be free from enactment or enforce-
ment of voting qualifications ... or practices which deny or 
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color." 
H . R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See 
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 
(1965). The view that this section simply r('stated the pro-
hibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was 
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings. 
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether 
or ,not covered by the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the 
proposed legislation, were prohibited from discriminating 
against Negro votBrs by § "2, which he termed "almost a re-
phrasing of the 15th [A]mendment." Attorney General 
Katzenbach agreed. See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 208 (1965). '2--' s 
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear 
legislative history, it is ev1dent that this statutory provision 
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amenoment claim. 
we turn, thereFore, to a consiiT'eration of' trie validity oCthe 
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the Fif-
teenth Amendment, 
8 See Tmnsameri.ca Mortgage Adviser·s, Tnc . v. Lewis, - U. S. -, 
-; 1'o'Uche-Ross & Co. v. Redington,- U. S.-,-. 
9 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
"The right of the citizen:s of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United State~:; or by any SttLtc on account of mce., . 
color, or previou;:; condition of servitude." 
,. 
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III 
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment established that it imposes but one limitation on the 
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against 
Negroes in matters having to do wiWvoting. Se~ Ex parte 
Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 217. The Amend .. 
ment's command and effec.t are wholly negative. "The Fif-
teen'th Amendment does not ·confer the right of suffrage upon 
any one," but h~s "invested the citizens of the United States 
with a new constitutional right which is within the pro-
tecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from 
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on ac-
count of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude." !d., 
at 217-218. 
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a 
State that is racia.lly neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth 
Amendment o.cl;r 1! motivated j>Y a d1scrimmatory purpose. 
lri Guinn v. United States, 238 U. ]. 3'47, this Court struck 
down a "grandfather" clause in a state constitution exempting 
from the requirement that voters be literate any person or 
the descendants of any person who had been entitled to vote 
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense 
that the provision was immune from · review, since a law 
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to 
the legislative authority an occult motive," or "because of 
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and 
resulting discrimination arising . .. from inequalities nat-
urally inhering in those who must come within the standM·d 
in order to enjoy the right to vote." ld., at 359. Despite 
this argument, the Cour.t did not hesitate to hold the grand-
father clause unconstitutional, because it was uot "possible to 
discover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than 
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The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle 
that radall discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredi-
ent of a Fifteenth menc men . violation. In Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 1T. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a 
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries 
stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. · The con-
stitutional iBfirmity of the state law in that case, according 
to the allegations of · the complaint, was that in drawing the 
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely ·concerned 
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Neg~;o 
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing 
municipal vote." !d. , at 341. ' The Court made clear that in 
the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is constitu-
tionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it 
chooses. !d. , at 347. 
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court upheld 
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment stat-
ute agaillst claims that district lines had been racially gerry-
mandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legis-
lature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in 
fact drew the districts on racial lines" ; or that the statute 
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the 
basis of race or place or origin." 1 d., at 56, 58. See also 
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277. 
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Arnendment decisions 
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the neces-
sity of showing purposeful disc;imination in oraer to show a 
Fifteenth Amenament violation. The cases -or Smitn v. All-
wnght, 321 U. . 49, and Terry v. Adams·, 345 U. S. 461, for 
example, dealt with the question whether a State was so in-
volved with racially discriminatory voting practices as to 
invoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts 
differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the 
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially 
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an 
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abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas 
Democratic Party primary in Srnith v. Allwright was regulated 
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were 
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court con-
cluded that the state Democratic Party had become the 
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "en-
dorse[d], adopt[ed], and enforce[d] the discrimination 
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S., at 664. 
'Perry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question of 
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that 
case was conducted by a county political organization, the 
Jaybird Association, that was neither ·authorized nor regulated 
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird pri-
mary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic 
primary and in the general election, and the Court found 
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although 
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation 
Qf this conclusion, there was agreement that the State was 
involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from par-
ticipation in the election process. 
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v. 
Allwright and rPerry v. Adarns support the conclusion that the 
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitutional, 
reasoning that the effect of racially polarized voting in Mo-
bile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary. 
The only effect, however, of the exclusionary primaries that 
offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were not 
permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was 
whether the "State ha[d] had a hand in" in the patent dis-
crimination practiced by a nominally private organization. 
1'erry v. Adarns, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
The simple answer to the Fifteenth Amendment reasoning 
of the appellees is that. as the District Court expressly found, 
the appellees were not denied the i·ight to vote by anyo e. 
'l'he e ng t to have 
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Negro candidates elected, and neither Smith v. Allwright ·nor 
Terry v. Adams ·contains any implication to the contrary, 
That Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory 
denial o;- abridgment l')yg'O'Vernme;;t of tEe freNfom to vote 
1'on~ace, co for ;or prev1ous condition of servitudeo." 
Having found that Negroes in ''Mobile "register and vote with-
out hindrance," the District Court ai1d the Court of Appeals 
were in error in believing tha~ the appellants invaded the pro-
tection of that Amendment in the present case. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court 
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourtee1ith Atneridment. ·· There re-
mains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judg-
ment on that score. 
The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally 
deny to some persons tllC 'Equal Protection · of the· Laws has 
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. · That 
contention has been raised most often with regard to multi-
member constituencies within a state legislative apportion-
ment system. The constitutional objection to multimember 
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from 
apportioumeut on a population basis in violation of Reynolds 
v. Simms, 377 U. S. 533, and its progeny. Rather the focus in 
such cases has beeri on the lack of representatiou multimem-
ber districts afford various elements of the voting population 
in a system of representative legislative 'democracy. "Cri-
ticism .[of multimember districts] is rooted in their winner-
take~all aspects; their teiidency to submerge minorities ... ' 
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community in-
terests as closely as possible and disenchantment with politi-
cal parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences 
between conteHcling interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403' 
u. s. 124, 158--159. 
Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember 
~· LuI 
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legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they 
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v. 
Hill, 386 U.S. 120; Burns v. Richar:dson, 384 U.S. 73; Fort-
son v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433.10 We have recognized, how-
ever, that such legislative apportionrMnts coulaviolate-the 
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to 
min~t the voting potential of racial or ethnic 
minOI'Ihes. "See W1ide v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v. 
Chav'is, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, 
supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show 
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected 
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Reg-
ester, supra, at -; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at -. A 
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived 
or operated as [a] purposeful device[] to further racial dis-
crimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. This bur-
den of proof is simply one aspect of the basic principle that. 
only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a vio-
lation of the :Eq~l Protection Clause of the Fourt~h 
Amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Vil-
~age of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Ho'using Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252; Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts-
v. Feeney,- U. S. -. 
In only one case h!.,S the Court sustained a claim that multi-
member legislative districts uuconstitutionally diluted the 
votin strength of a d1screte group. That case was White v. 
Regester, supra. 'I ere t 1e Court upheld a constitutionaf 
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a 
10 We have made clear, however, that a court in formulating an appor-
tiomnent plan as im exrrcise of its equit'YPQwers ~;hould, 1.1s <1. geneml 
rule, not permit multimember legislative di~trict.~. "[S]ingle-member dis-
tricts are to be preferred in court-ordered legi:>lative apJ>ortionment plans 
unless the eonrt can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors,.. 
that jn~tifie~ a differeut result. Mahan v. !lowell, 410 U. S. 315, 333."' 
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legislative reapportionment plan adopted by the State of 
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts 
for the counties in which they resided minimized the effect of 
their votes in violation ~f the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the Court held that the pln.intiffs had been able to "produce 
evidence to support the finding that the political processes 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to 
participation by the group[s-1 i11 question." 412 U. S., at 
766-767. Iu so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in 
the record that included a long history of official discrimina-
tion against the groups, indifference to their needs and inter-
ests on the part of white elected officials, and, in one county, 
the effective exclusion of Negroes from the process of slating 
candidates for the Democratic Party. 
We may assume, for presellt purposes, that an at-large elec-
tion of city officials with all the legislative, executive and ad-
ministrative power of the municipal government is constitu-
tionally indistinguishable from the election of a few members 
of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although 
this may be a r~sh assumption. 11 B~t even making this as-
sumption, it is clear that Uie evidencein the present case fell 
farsnort of sliowing thafl the appellants "couceived or oper-
ateCI raJ purposeful device [] to further racial discrimina-
tion." Whitcomb'V:""C1iams, ~(J'J 0". S., at 149. 
"-'1.1le District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light 
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunder-
11 See Wise v_ Lipi!COmb, 435 u. s_ 535, 549, and 550 (concurring 
opinion). His noleworth~- that a ::;y:-;tem of at-large city elections in place 
of election:; of city official::; by the Yoter::; of ~mall geographic wards was 
univer::;ally heralded uot many year:; ago ws a praiseworthy and progres-
sive reform of corrupt municipal governmenL See, e. g., K Banfield and 
J. Wilson, City Politics 151 (1963) ; :see ah;o L. Steffens, The Shame of 
the Cities (1904) • 
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~tanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory pur~ 
pose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient. 
See 485 F. 2d, at 1304-1305, and n. 16.12 
In light of the criteria identified in Zimmer, the District 
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on 
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City 
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of ra-
cially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found 
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests 
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of 
these findings, the court concluded that the political proc-
esses in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its 
seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions 
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact Ne-
groes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F .. 
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the 
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system 
was invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.13 
12 This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Zim-
me!' v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court 
and explicitly "without approval of the constitutional view~ expressed by 
the Court of Appeals." Ea.!t Carroll Par~h School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 
U. S. 636, 638 (per curiam). 
13 The only indication given by the Di~trict Court of an inference that 
there existed an invidious purpose was the following statf'ment: "[i]t is 
not a long step from the tSystematic rxclusion of black:; from juries which 
is itself such an 'unequal application of the law ... as to show inten-
tional discrimination,' Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 404, .. . to [the] 
present purpo~e to dilute the black vote as evicleucf'd in this case. There-
is a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote resulting from 
intentional :state. legislative inaction whirh is as effective as the intentional 
state action referred to in Keye11 [v. School District No. 1, Denver Colo,, 
413 U.S. 189}."' 423F. Snpp., at 398. 
Wfmt the Di~trict Court may have meant by t,his ;;tatement is uncertain. 
In any event the analogy to (h(' nwially exclusionary jt~ry ca;;es appears· 
Jnista:&:en. l'I10::;e case:; typically Jlave involved a consi:stent pattern of 
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In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals ac~ 
knowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrimination/• 
but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit pur-
pose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its 
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. ·Thus, because the I 
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that a d~scriminatory purpose 
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent 
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arling~ 
ton Heights, supra. Although 'the presence of the indica 
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discrimina- ! 
tory purpose, satisfaction of-those criteria is not of itself suffi-
cient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Ztmm,er criteria 
upon which t~Distrlct Court and ' the Court of Appeals 
discrete official actions that demonstrated almost to a mathematical cer-
tainty that Negroes wE're being excluded from juriE'S because of their 
race. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 1J. S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17; Patton 
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463t 464; Pie1Te v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359; 
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S."587, '591. 
If the District Court meant by its statement tlwt the existence oJ the 
at-large electoral sy:-;tem was, like the systematic exclusion of N E>groes from 
juries, unexplainable on grounds ot.her than race, its inference is contra-
dicted by the history of the adoption of that system i11 Mobile. Alter-
natively, if thE' District Court mE>ant that the state legislature may -be 
pre;,umed to have "intended" that there would be 110 Negro Commis-
sioners, simply becauHe that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large 
voting, it applied an ·incorrect legal standard. " 'Discriminatory pur-
pose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness 
of consequences. . . . It implies that the dE>cisionmaker ... selected or· 
reaffirmed a partirular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not 
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects· upon an identifiable group." 
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, - U. S. -, - (footnotes 
omitted) . 
14 The Court of Appeals expressed the view tha.t the District Court's 
finding of discrimination in light of the Zimme1· criteria was "buttreRsed'•· 
by the fact that the Attorne~· General had interpo~ed an objection under 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the stnto statute designnting the-
functions of each Commissioner. 571 F. 2d, at 246. See n. 6, supra. 
' 
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relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitu. 
tionally discriminatory purpose in the present case. 
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no 
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission. 
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to 
nomination and election were not open equally to Negroes. 
But the District Court's findings of fa.ct, unquestioned on ap· 
peal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile 
"without hindrance," aiid that there are no obstacles in the 
way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election 
to the Coiiiiillssion.- lnoeed, It was undisputed that tfie only 
active "slatmg" organization in the city is comprised of Ne-
groes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, 
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation. 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 160; see Arlington Heights, 
supra, at 266, and n. 15.1~ 
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that 
the persons who were elected to the Commission discriminated 
against Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing 
public services. If that is the case, those discriminated 
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit 
of a sort quite different from that sought iu the present case. 
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimi-
nation because of race by any unit of state government, what-
ever the method of its election. But evidence of discrimina-
tion by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as the most 
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional 
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained 
their offices. 
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals sup-
ported their conclusion by drawing upon the substantial his-
1 " There have been only three Negro candida.tes for the City Com-
mission, all in 1973. According to the Di~trict Court, the Negro CiLndi-
dates "were young, inexperienced, and mouuted f'xtremcly limited cam-
paigns" and recf'ived only "modest support from the black com-
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tory of official racial discrimination in Alabama. But past ( 
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn 
governmental action that is not itself unlawful. The ulti-
mate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has 
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official J 
discrimination in other cas'es are of limited help in resolving 
that question. 
Finally, the ·District Court and the Court of Appeals 
pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system it-
self as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously 
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system, 
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to dis-
advantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v. 
Regester, supra. ·They are far 'from proof of a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants 
in this case.16 
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the 
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further pro~ 
·· ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
16 According to the District Court, voters in the city of Mobile are 
represented in the state legislature by three state senators, any one of 
whom can veto proposed local legislation under the ~xisting courtesy 
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile's 11-member House delegation can 
prevent a bill from reaching the floor for debate. Unanimous approval 
of a local measure by the city delegation, on the other hand, virtually 
assures passage. 423 F. Supp., at 397. 
There was evidence in this case that several proposals that would have 
altered the form of Mobile's municipal government have been defeated 
in the state legislature, including at least one that would ha.ve permitted 
Mobile to govern itself through a mayor and city council with members 
elected from individual districts within the city. Whether in this litiga-
tion , or in future litigation against other defendants, the appellees may be 
able to prove that Mobile's pre:;ent governmental and electoral systern. 
has been retained for :a racially discriminatory purpo:;e, we are in .n~ 
position now to say, 
1ll80 
No. 77-1844 Mobil~ v. Bolden 
PottPr: 
As I indicated in our telaphone talk Saturday, I 
likP your opinion in this case and expect to join it. It may 
servP th<" purpose of moving the Court back to the Whitcomb 
view that no group is ~ntitle1, as a matter of right, to 
n•prr>s~>ntr~tion in <m e1ectec'l body. Sine"' Whitcomb, the Court 
has moved - thouqh not in a straight line - away from that 
sound doctrine, primarily in cRsr.>s undr.>r ~5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. - ~ 
I do havr.> a f ew suggestions for your opinion that 
are attached to this lPtter. 1 will state briefly my reasons 
for thinking that these may blunt some of the criticism from 
dissenters. 
The first suqqestion is based on the presence in 
the Fifteenth Amendment. of thP word "abridge". My proposed 
modification would give appropriate r~cognition to that word 
without, I believe, diluting the force of your opinion. 
The second suggestion is prompted by the c'lifficulty 
of distinguishing Whit~ v. RPgister. That decision - which 
is the highwater mark of the Court's movement away from 
Whitcomb - is not easy to distinguish from the present case. 
It seems to me that the lanquaqe I suggest would be less 
vulnerable to criticism by the dissent than the sentence I 
would omit. This, of course, is a judgment call. I do think 
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ThP thir~ suqqPstion concPrns thr l~ngu~qP in the 
second nar.agrr1ph of footnote 16, p. 14. T r1.m not sure what 
you hav~ in mind, but guess th~t you may be thinking of thP 
school bo~rd casP. I aqrPA that ther~ wns Pvidence of the 
boar~'s partici?ation in efforts to rlefoat lPqislation that 
would hPve chanqe~ th~ systPm of electing boar~ m~mbers. 
Whethpr this evidence, considered in liqht of other relevant 
ovidPncP, is Pnouqh to brinq about i'l 1iffP.rent answer i.n thP 
school board c~se iq 0n open question with me - althouqh that 
case is much rlosAr than this one. 
Also, T ~m puzzled by the l~st SPntPncc in not~ 16, 
as it c~n be rPad as an open invitRtion for a further attack 
on "Mobile's praspnt aovnrnment" (Although pr~sumably aqainst 
som(-' fut-ure m"'mberc: of th(~ Board of Commissioners). I waul~ 
prefer ~ot to exten~ such an invit~tion. This litigation 
should comP to ~n fi"n(l. 1 f the CommissionPrs i.qnore thP 
mPssaqp nf vour opinion, a new Euit ran be instituted. 
If l un~arst~nd wh~t you h~v~ i~ ~j~~, T have 
sugqPstn~ ~he 1~nauaq~ rhangos in th~ l~st SPrt?n~e of 
NotP 1~, as set forth in th~ enclose~ mPmorandum. 
T am not snnding copiaP o~ this latter to the othPr 
CharnbPrs. 
Mr. Justic~ Stpwart 
J ... FP/l .ab 
. 
' ' 1/7/80 
No. 77-1844, City of Mobil~ v. Bol~en 
Possibl~ lanquqge changes in the ~rAft opinion 
circul~ted January 4, 1QBO: 
1/ tn pl~c~ of tho first sentence of the last 
oar~graph that begins on p~q~ 7: 
"The anRWPr to the Rpo~lle~s' argument is th,t they hav~ not 
been denied the right to voto by anyone and tl1ere has beon no 
fin~inq that the city rommission elections i~ Mobile havP 
been designed intentionally to abridqP th~ voting rights of 
2/ At the en~ of the c~rryover par4gr.~ph from p?qe 
9 to page 10, I woul~ droo the last senten~P and insert 
language substantially as follows: 
"In so holding, t~P C011rt relied upon evidence in the record 
that included ~ lonq history of official discrimination 
against minorities as well as indifference to their nP~ds and 
interests on tho part of white elected officials . The Court 
also found in each county additional factors that restricted 
the ~ccess of minoritv groups to th~ political process . In 




PTOC0SS of sl~tinq rRndi~atPS for th~ D~mocr?tir Party, whi)o 
th!"' plo int iffq in th~ oth&>or county w~r0 M~x ic~n-Am~rici'lns \llho 
"suffer [edl a cnlturol an(1 J anquaqe barriar 11 thot mar'!P 
"particioation in r-ornmunity processes c:>xtrPJT\oly ('iifficult, 
Portirul~rlv ••• with respect to thP polit1r-al lif~" of thP 
county. T~., at 76R (footnot~ omittPn)." 
3/ Subst it ut r-• for the 1 ast t\<10 S'-'nt ·:-nr-0s of 
footnotn 16 lanquaqa along thP following lina~: 
"TherP hi'ls baP-n no finding, howevar, t~at any lPqisl~tivc 
action involving Mohila's Plectoral process0q was motivat~n 
by discriminatory purpoSE'"> . See 42:? F. Supp., -'\t 397. We 
th~rpfore att~cn no siqnificanco to thP pronnsals for chonqP 
that were ~efeated. Of coursE', evinPnce of r~ci~lly 
motivated oonosition to lPqisl~tiva chanqP hv a local 
qovarnmen~ d l entity would bP hiqhly rPl~vant in ,,otinq rtqhts 
litiq3tion." 
4/ Minor lanauaao modifications appP~r on p~q~s 10 
ann 13 . 
f 
I Vl.-tl• v' l / 
,.., I 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
January 9, 1980 
No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 9, 1980 
No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
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C HAMBE RS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAU L ST E V E NS 
~ntJr.tlltt <!Jmui d Ur.t ~ttit.t?t ~hdtl1 
:.ZU\'Jrittghm. ~. OJ. 2ll,?J!~ 
January 10, 1980 
77-1844 - City of Mobile Alabama v. Bolden 
Dear Potter: 
As I hope I indicated at Conference, my reasons for 
voting to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals are 
somewhat different from those set forth in your opinion 
for the Court. Even though I will therefore probably 
write separately, it may be useful to you to have me 
indicate in brief form the points of difference between us. 
First, in view of the fact that the Court found an 
implied cause of action under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
in Allen v. State Board of Education, 393 u.s. 544, and in 
view of the further fact that none of our recent cases 
casts any doubt on the viability of Allen, I do not agree 
that the assumption that there is a private right of 
action to enforce § 2 is "dubious." 
Second, I also disagree with the portion of the 
opinion that holds that the Fifteenth Amendment cannot be 
violated unless the State action is motivated by 
discriminatory purpose. I do not think the prior cases 
compel this result; nor do I think it is necessary to so 
decide in this case in order to reverse, even on the 
ground that you select in Part III. 
Third, I believe the Fifteenth Amendment does place 
limitations on a State's ability to draw district 
boundaries, and therefore that the simple answer to the 





bottom of page 7 and the top of page 8 is insufficient. I 
realize that Gomillion can be interpreted as a case 
involving a den1al of the right to vote, but I think it 
more correct to analyze the case as one striking down an 
impermissible gerrymander. 
Fourth, although I agree with most of what you say in 
Part IV, I believe the so-called "discriminatory purpose" 
standard is somewhat confusing and may have different 
meanings in a districting case than in various other 
contexts such as the employment discrimination involved in 
Washington v. Davis. If "purpose" is the standard, it 
may be important to identify the governmental entity whose 
purpose is controlling. Is it the City of Mobile, or is 
it the Alabama Legislature? If the latter, then almost 
all of the evidence of discriminatory purpose on which the 
Fifth Circuit relied is quite irrelevant. 
Finally, in my own thinking ~ have been assuming that 
we are deciding the question that you leave open in the 
last sentence of footnote 16. In short, there is no 
question about the legitimacy of the Mobile council form 
of government at its inception; the question is whether 
the retention of that system today can only be explained 
as having been based on racial factors or other "grounds 
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid State 
objective." Turner v. Foust, 396 u.s. 346, 362. 
Because this is such an important case, I hope you 
will bear with me if it takes me longer than usual to put 
an opinion together. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~nprmu Qfourl of tlft~b ~bttt.s 
'Jfu Jri:ngLttt. ~. C1J. 2llgtJt. ~ 
January 11, 1980 
Re: No. 77-1844, City of Mobile v. Bolden 
Dear John, 
Thank you very much for your letter of January 
10. You did make clear at our Conference discussion that 
your reasons for voting to reverse the judgment in this case 
are somewhat different from those of the rest of us who would 
reach the same result, and I appreciate the written summary 
of your views as contained in your letter. It seems to me 
that there should be no difficultly in effecting an accommo-
dation of our differences on one of the points you raise, but 
I am quite doubtful as to the possibility of an accommodation 
on at least some of the others. 
The first point of difference you mention -- re-
lating to whe~her there is a private cause of action ·under § 
2 of the Voting Rights Act can, I think, be settled very 
easily. Indeed, I have already toned down my original state-
ment in revisions sent to the printer today, and you will see 
a modified version in a recirculation early next week. 
Our other areas of difference are not so easily 
reconcilable. As to the Fifteenth Amendment, I firmly be-
lieve, after again reviewing this Court's decisions in the 
process of preparing the present opinion, that a violation of 
it can be shown only if purposeful state racial discrimina-
tion is shown. See,~., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. 
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54. Perhaps more importantly, 
I am convinced that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only 
what it purports to prohibit -- the denial or abridgment of 
Negroes' freedom to vote. This denial or abridgment could be 
effectuated through a purposeful racial gerrymander, as the 
Gomillion case held and Wright v. Rockefeller conceded, but 
whatever the apparatus utilized, the state must be shown pur-
posefully to have denied or abridged the freedom of Negroes, 
as such, to vote, if a Fifteenth Amendment violation is to be 
shown. 
.. 
Whether the Fifteenth Amendment means what I think 
it means, or has the somewhat broader meaning that you at-
tribute to it, seems to me, however, ultimately to be of no 
great importance. I say this because I think you will agree 
that in the light of the contemporary development of consti-
tutional law under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment 
(and the Seventeenth as well), have been embraced by our 
present understanding of the constitutional demands of equal 
protection under the law. It is perhaps for this reason that 
I gather we both think that the present case is really a 
Fourteenth Amendment case. 
As to the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment, my 
impression is that there is an area of agreement between us, 
but that we disagree in certain fundamental respects. My own 
view is that purposeful discrimination, which is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, has basi-
cally the same meaning in any context, whether in employment, 
voting, zoning, or whatever. This is a view that I would not 
lightly abandon or qualify. On the other hand, I agree with 
you that failure to change a system may be purposefully 
racially discriminatory, although that system in its incep-
tion may have been entirely legitimate. I had thought that 
my proposed opinion recognizes this, and simply holds that 
there was a failure of proof of _any such purposeful racially 
discriminatory retention of the at-large voting system on the 
part of the defendants in the present case. 
I fully agree with you that this is an important 
case -- involving as it does a constitutional attack on the 
at-large system of voting in American cities, a system em-
ployed by thousands of cities and local governments and one 
that has been hailed as a progressive reform of corrupt mu-
nicipal government. It certainly took us "longer than usual 
to put an opinion together," and I shall not only gladly bear 
with you, but fully understand, if it takes you longer than 
usual also. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by: 
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by 
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is ~ ~ 1«411T 
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates 
the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contravention of fed-
eral statutory or constitutional law. 
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action 
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile.1 Named as de- f"~ ~ 
fendants were the city and its three incumbent Commis-
sioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The 1 _r-7~  
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Com-
missioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of ~as~t:2.41!. 1; ~ 
Negroes in violation of ~ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965/ r d 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found ~ 
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been vio-
lated, entered a judgmeut in their favor, and ordered that the 
1 Approximately 35.4% of the re~idenhl of Mobile are Negro. 
2 79 St~lt 4a7, 42 U. S. C § 197a. The complaint al~o contained claims· 
based on the First and ThirtPenth Amendments and on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 
and 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) . Those claims have not been pre&ied in this: 
Court. 
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City Commission be disestablished and replaced by a munic, 
ipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council 
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F. 
Supp. 384.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in 
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing 
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate 
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, id., at 245, and finding that the remedy fornm-
lated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was 
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, -
U. S. --. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term, 
and was reargued in the present Term. 
I 
In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may 
adopt is governed by state law. Until 1911 cities not covered 
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves 
through a mayor and city counciJ.4 In that year, the Ala-
bama Legislature authorized every large municipality to 
adopt a commission form of government.5 Mobile estab-
lished its City Commission in the same year, and has main-
tained that basw system of municipal government ever since. 
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative, 
executive, aHd administrative power in the municipality. 
They are required after election to designate one of their 
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal 
provision is made for allocating specific executive or adminis-
trative duties among the t.hree.6 As required by the state 
3 The District Court has stayed itl:s ordt'r:; pending di::;position of the 
pre~ut appeal. 
4 Alabama Code, Chapter 11-43 (1975). 
o Act 281, 1911 Alabam<t Acts, at 330. 
6 In 1965 tht' Alabama Legnslature enactt'd Act 823, 1965 AlaLarna. 
Acts, aL 1539, § 2 of which de::;ignated ~>'Pecific administrative task:; to be-
performed by each Commissioner and provided that the title of Mayor be-
l'Otat.€d among tlw tluee. After the pn.o;,;ent law::~uit wa..s commenced, the-
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law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Com-
mission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of 
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected 
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic 
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of 
municipalities ·and other local governmental units throughout 
the Nation.7 
II 
Although required by general principles of judicial adminis-. 
tration to do so, Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 
(Brandeis, J'. , concurring), neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claim-
that the Mobile electoral fSystem violates § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that 
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the 
appellees' complaint. 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides! 
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap-
plied by any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States on 
account e>f race or color." 
Assuming, for present purposes, that there exists a private 
city of Mobile ·belatedly submitted Act 8~3 to the Attorney General of the 
United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1§65. 42 U. S. e, 
§ 1973c. The Attorney General objected to the legislation on the ground 
that the city had not shown that § 2 of the Act would not have the effect 
of abridging t.he right of Negroes to vote. No suit has been brought in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek clearance under 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 is in 
abeyance. 
1 
'7 According to the 1979 Municipal Year Book, most municipalities of 
over 25,000 people conducted at-large elections of their city commissioners 
or council members as of 1977. ld., at 98-99. lt is reasonable to suppose 
th;~m an even larger majority of other municipalities did so. 
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right of action to enforce this statutory provision,8 it is apparent 
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that 
of the Fifteenth Amendment,11 and the sparse legislative his-
tory of § 2 makes clear that it wa.S intended to have an effect 
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself. 
Section 2 was a.11 uneontroversial provision in proposed 
legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted dis-
pute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that § 2 
"grants ... a right to be free from enactment or enforce-
ment of voting qualifications ... or practices which deny or 
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color." 
H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See 
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 
(1965). The view that this section simply restated the pro-
hibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was 
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings. 
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether 
or not covered by the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the 
proposed legislation, were prohibited from discriminating 
against Negro voters by § 2, which he termed "almost a re-
phrasing of the 15th [A] mendment." Attorney General 
Ratzenbach agreed. See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 208 (1965). 
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear 
legislative history, it is evident that this statutory provision 
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amendment claim. 
We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the validity of the 
8 Cf. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544. But see Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, Inc . v. Lewis, - U. S. -, -; Touche-
Ross & Co. v. Redington, - U. S. - , - . 
0 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
"The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be deuied 
or abridged by the United StittRs or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.'' 
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judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the }i"if .. 
teenth Amendment. 
III 
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment established that it imposes but one limitation on the 
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against 
Negroes ip. matters having to do with voting. See Ex parte 
Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665; Neal v. Dektware, 103 U. S. 
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 217. The Amend .. 
ment's command and effect are wholly negative. "The Fif-
teenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon 
any one," but has "invested the ·citizens of the United States 
with a new constitutional J.Tight which is within the pro .. 
tecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from 
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on ac .. 
count of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude." Id., 
at 217-218. 
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a 
State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth 
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 
In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, this Court struck 
down a "grandfather" clause in a state ct5nstitution exempting 
from the req4irement that voters be literate any person o:r 
the descendants of any person who had been entitled to votl' 
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense that 
the provision was immune from successful challenge, since a law 
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to 
the legislative authority an occult motive," or 1'because of 
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and 
resulting discrimination ·arising . . . from inequalities nat-
urally inhering in those who must come with~n the standard 
in order to enjoy the right to vote." ld., at 359. Despite 
this argument, the Court did not hesitate to hold the grand-
father clause ur.tconstitutional, because it was not "possible to 
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d.iscover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than 
the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment. ld_., 
at 365. 
The Court's more recent decisions confirm the· principle· 
that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredi-
ent of a Fifteenth Amenc)Jnent violation. In Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a 
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries 
stated a claim under the Fifteei1th Amendment. '"The con~ 
stitutioual infirmity of the state law in that case, ·according 
to the allegations of the complaint, was that in drawing the· 
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely concerned 
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negto 
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing 
municipal vote." ld., at 341. The Court made clear that in 
the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is constitu-
tionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it 
chooses. ld., at 347. 
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court ·upheld 
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment sta~ 
ute against claims that district lines had been racially gerry-
mandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legis. 
lature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in 
fact drew the districts on racial lines"; or that the statute 
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the 
basis of race or place or origin." !d., at 56, 58. See also 
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277. 
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment decisions-· 
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the neces-
sity of showing purposeful discrimination in order to show a 
Fifteenth Amendment violation. The cases of Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U. S. 649, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, for · 
example, dealt with the question whether a State was so in· 
volved with racially discriminatory voting practices as to-
invoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts;; 
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differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the 
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially 
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an 
abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas 
Democratic Party primary in Smith v. Allwright was regulated 
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were 
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court con-
cluded that the state Democratic Party had become the 
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "en-
dorse[d] , adopt[ed], and enforce[d] the discrimination 
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S., at 664. 
Terry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question of 
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that 
case was conducted by a county political organization, the 
Jaybird Association, that was neither authorized nor regulated 
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird pri-
mary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic 
primary and in the general election, and the Court found 
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although 
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation 
of this conclusion, there was agreement that the State was 
involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from par-
ticipation in the election process. 
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v. 
Allwright and Terry v. Adams support the conclusion that the 
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitutional, 
reasoning that the effect of racially polarized voting in :M.o-
bile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary. 
The ouly effect, however, of the exclusionary primaries that 
offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were not 
permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was" 
whether the "State ha[d] had a hal)d in" in the patent dis-
crjmination practiced by a nominally private organization. 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J.,.. 
concurring). 
The auswer to the appellees' argument is that, as the Dis--
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trict Court expressly found, their freedom to vote has not been 
denied or abridged by anyone. The Fifteenth Amendment 
does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, and 
neither Smith v. Allwright nor Terry v. Adams contains any 
implication to the contrary. That Amendment prohibits only 
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by govern-
ment of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, OI" 
previous condition of servitude." Having found that Negroes 
in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District 
Court and Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the 
appellants invaded the protection of that Amendment in the 
present case. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court 
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There re-
mains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judg-
ment on that score. 
The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally 
deny to some persons the Equal Protection of the Laws has 
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. That 
contention has been raised most often with regard to multi-
member constituencies within a state legislative apportion-
ment system. The constitutional objection to multime.mber 
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from 
apportionment on a population basis in violation ofReynolds 
v. Simms, 377 U. S. 533, and its progeny. Rather the focus in 
such cases has been on the lack of representation multimem-
ber districts afford various elements of the voting population 
in a system of representative legislative democracy. ''Cri-
ticism {of multimember districts] is rooted in their winner-
take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities ..• , 
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community in-
terests as closely as possible and disenchantment with politi-
cal parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences-. 
"' 
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between contending interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
u. s. 124, 158- 159. 
Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember 
legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they 
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v. 
Hill, 386 U. S. 120; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73; Port-
son v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433.10 We have recognized, how-
ever, that such legislative apportionments could violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to 
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic 
minorities. See ·white v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, 
supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show 
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected 
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Reg-
ester, supra, at - ; Whitcorri"b v. Chavis, supra, at -. A 
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived 
or operated as [a] :purposeful device[] to further racial dis-
crimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. ·This bur-
den of proof is simply one aspect of 'the ·basic principle that 
only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a vio-
lation of the Equal ·Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See ·washington v. ·Davis., 426 U. S. 229; Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U.S. ·252; Personnel Adm'r of MassachuseU$ 
v. Feeney,- U. S. -. 
In only one case has the Court sustained a claim that multi-
member legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the 
10 We have made cleat·, however, that a court in formulating an appor-
tionment plan as an exercise of its equity powers should, as a general 
rule, 11ot pennit multimember legislative districts. " [S]ingle~member dis-
trict<> are to be preferred in court-ordered legii:Jative apportionment plans 
unless ·the court can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors~ 
that justifies a differe11t result. Mahan , v." Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 333~"" 
' Connor v: Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415 •. 
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voting strength of a discrete group. That case was White v. 
Regester, supra. There the Court ·upheld a constitutional 
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a 
legislative reapportionment plan ·· adopkd by the · State of 
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts 
for the two counties in which they resided minimized the effect / 
of their votes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the Court held that the plaintiffs had been able to "produce 
evidence to support the finding that the political processes 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to 
participation by the group[s] in question." 412 U. S., at 
766-767. In so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in the 
record that included a 'long history of official discrimination 
against minorities as well as indifference to their needs and 
interests on the part of white elected officials. ·The Court 
also found in each county additional factors that restricted the 
access of minority groups to the political process. In one 
county, Negroes effectively were excluded from the process 
of slating candidates for the Democratic Party, while the 
plaintiffs in the other county were Mexican-Americans who 
"suffer[ ed] a cultural and language barrier" that made "par-
ticipation in community processes extremely difficult, partic-
ularly ... with respect to the political life" of the county. 
Id., at 768 (footnote omitted). 
We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large elec-
tion of city officials with all the legislative, executive and ad-
ministrative power of the municipal government is constitu-
tionally indistinguishable Trom the election of a few members 
of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although 
this may be a rash assumption.11 But even making this as-
11 See Wise v. Lipscomb, 435 U. S. 535, 549, and 550 (concurring 
opinion) . It is noteworthy that a syl:item of at-large city elections in place 
of elections of city officials by the voters of small geographic wardl:i was 
univerl:ially heralded not many year::; ago a:; a praiseworthy and progres-
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sumption, it is clear that the evidence in the present case fell 
far short of showing that the appellants "conceived or oper-
ated [a] purposeful device[] to further racial discrimina-
tion." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149. 
The District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light 
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zirnrner v. McKeithen, 485 
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunder-
standing that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory pur-
pose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient. 
See 485 F. 2d, at 1304-1305, and n. 16.12 
In light of the criteria identified in Zirnrner, the District 
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on 
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City 
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of ra-
cially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found 
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests 
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of 
these findings, the court concluded that the political proc-
esses in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its 
seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions 
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact Ne-
groes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F. 
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the 
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system 
sive reform of corrupt municipal government. See, e. g,, E. Banfield anq 
J. WilHo n. City Politic~ 151 (1968). Compare, M. Seasongood, Local Gov~ 
ernment (1933): L. Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (1904) . 
12 Thi:s Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Zim-
mer v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court 
and explicitly "without approval of the constitutional view:s expressed by 
the Court of Appeals." East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424· 
U.S. 636, 638 (pet• cw·iarn). 
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wa!:l invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.18 
In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals ac~ 
knowledged that the :Ejqua] Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrimination,t• 
18 The only indication given by the DiiStrict Court of an inference that 
there exiiSted an invidious purpol:le was the following ~:;tatement: "[i]t is 
not a lm1g step from the systematic exclusion of 'blacks from juries which 
is it!>elf such an 'unequal application of the law ... as to show inten-
tional discrimination,' Akins v. · 'l'exas, 325 U. S. '398, 404, ... to [the] 
pre:;ent purpOile to dilute the black vote aiS evidenced in this case. There 
is a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote re:;ulting from 
intentional state legisla.tive inaction wbich is as effective as the intentional 
state action referred to in Keyes [v. School District No. 1, Denver Colo., 
413 U. S. 189] ." 423 F . Supp., at 398. 
What the Dil;trict Court may have meant by this statement is uncertain. 
In any event the analogy to the racially exclusionary jury cases appears 
mistaken. Those cases typically 11ave involved a consistent pattern of 
discrete official actions that demonstrated alm~-t to a mathematical cer-
tainty that Negroes were being excluded from juries because of their 
race. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17; Patton 
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 464; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359; 
No1Tis v. Alabama, 294 1J. S. 587, 591. 
If the District Court meant by its statement that the existence of the 
at-large electoral system was, like the systematic exclusion of Negroes from 
juries, mu•xplainable on grounds other than race, its inference is contra-
dicted by the history of the adoption of that sy~tem in Mobile. Alter· 
natively, if the District Court meant that the state legislature may be 
pre;umed to have "intended" that there would be no Negro Commie--
sioners, simply because that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large 
voting, it applied an incorrect legal standard. "'Discriminatory pur-
pose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness 
of consequences. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker . .. selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of 11ction at least in part 'because of,' not 
merely ' in spite of,' its adverse effect-s upon an identifiable group." 
Personnel Atlrn'r of Mass . v. Feeney, - U. S. -, - (footnotes 
omitted) . 
14 The Court of A ppf'al::> expressed the view that the District Court's 
finding of discrimination in hght of the Zimmer criteria was "buttressed" 
by tbe fact that the Attorney General had interposed an objection under 
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but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit pur .. 
pose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its 
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. Thus, because the 
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that a discriminatory purpose 
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent 
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arling. 
ton Heights, supra. Although the presence of the indicia 
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discrimina.. 
tory purpose, satisfaction of those criteria is not of itself suffi., 
cient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Zimmer criteria. 
upon which the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitu .. 
tionally discriminatory purpose in the present case. 
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no 
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission, 
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to 
nomination and election were not open equally to Negroes, 
But the District Court's findings of fact, unquestioned on ap-
peal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile 
" without hindrance," and that there are no official obstacles in 
the way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election 
to the Commission. Indeed, it was undisputed that the only 
active "slating" organization in the city is comprised of Ne-
groes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, 
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation. 
Whit comb v. Chavis, supra, at 160; see Arlington Heights, 
supra, at 266, and n. 15.15 
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the state statute de~:~ignating the 
functions of each Commissioner. 571 F. 2d, at 246. See n. 6, :supm. 
1 ~ There have been only three Negro candidates for the City Com .. 
tnil:!sion, all in 1973. According to the Di::;trict Court, the Negro candi .. 
dtttes "were young, inexperienced, and mounted extremely limited cam .. 
paigns" and received only "modest support from the black com,. 
lll~nity. , .• " 423 F. Supp., at 388. 
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the persons who were elected to the Commission discriminated 
e,gainst Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing 
public services. If , that is the CMe, those discriminated 
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit 
of a sort quite different from that sought in the present case. 
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimi-
nation because, of race by any unit of state government, what-
ever the method of its election. · But evidence of discrimina-
tion by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as the most 
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional 
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained 
their offi:ces. 
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals sup-
ported their conclusion by dqtwing upon the substantial his-
tory of official racial aiscrimination in Alabama. But past 
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn 
governmental action ·that is not itself unlawful. The ulti-
mate question remains · whether a discriminatory intent ha.s 
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official 
discrimination in other cases are of limited help ·in resolving 
that question. 
Finally, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system it-
self as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously 
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system, 
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to dis-
advantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v. 
Regester, b'Upra. They are far from proof of a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants 
in this case.18 
16 According to the District Court, voters in the city of Mobile are 
represented in the state legi:slature by three state senators, any one of 
whom can veto proposed local legislation under the existing courtesy 
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile's 11-member House delegation can 
prevent a local bill fl:om reaching the ffoor for debate. Unanimous 
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For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the 
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It ·is so ordered. 
approval of a lucal mea~ure by the city delegation, on the other hand, 
virtually a:iHtlfP:i pa~;sagP . 423 F. Supp., at 397. 
'TI'Iere wal:i evidence in tim, ca~c that t;Pveral propo~ul~ that would have 
altered the form of Mobile'~; municipal government have bePn defeated 
in the :state lPgl~lature, including at least one that would have permitwd 
Mobile to govern itself through a mayor and city council with members 
t•lec1Pd from individual dllitrict~; within the city. Whether it may be pot;-
sible ultimately to provP that !VIobile'~ present governmental and electoral 
;,;yi-item ha~ been retamPd for a mr~ally discriminatory purpo:::e, we are in 11(). 
position now to ~ay. 
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MR. Jus•rrcE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by: 
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by 
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is 
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates ~ 
the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contravention of fed- I 
eral statutory or constitutional law. A"£.~_ L-...... 
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District~' ~ 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class ac.tion v ... ~ L 
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile.1 Named as de- '-v I 
fendants were the city and its three incumbent Commis- /-
sioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The J- ~ 1 . 
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Com-~
missioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of 
Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found 
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been vio-
lated, entered a judgmeut in their favor, and ordered that the 
1 Approximately 35.4% of the re::;idents of Mobile are Negro. 
2 79 St<~t. 4:37, 4~ U. S. C. § 197a. The complaint also contained claims· 
based on the First and Thirteenth Amendment::; and on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 
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City Commission be disestablished and replaced by a munic, 
ipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council 
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F. 
Supp. 384.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in 
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing 
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate 
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, id., at 245, and finding that the remedy forn1U-
lated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was 
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, -
U. S. -. · The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term, 
and was reargued in the present Term. 
1[ 
In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may 
adopt is governed by state law. Until 1911 cities not covered 
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves 
through a mayor and city counciU In that year, the Ala-
bama Legislature authorized every large municipality to 
adopt a commission form of government.5 Mobile estab-
lished its City Commission in the same year, and has main-
tained that basic system of municipal government ever since. 
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all 'legislative, 
executive, and administrative power in the municipality. 
They are required after election to designate one of their 
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal 
provision is made for a11ocating specific executive or adminis-
trative duties among the three.6 As required by the state 
8 The District Court has stayed its order~ pending disposition of the 
present appeal. 
4 Alabama Code, Chapter 11-43 (1975). 
5 Act 281 , 1911 Alabama. Acts, at. 330. 
6 In 1965 tl1e Alabama Legislature enactpd Act 823, 1965 Alabama 
Acts, a.L 1539, § 2 of which de~igna.ted ,;pecific administrative tasks to be 
performed b y each Commissioner and provided tlmt the title of Mayor ·be-
rotated. among the three. After the pre~ent lawsuit was commenced, the-
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1aw enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Com· 
mission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of 
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected 
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic 
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of 
municipalities ·and other local governmental units throughout 
the Nation.7 
II 
Although required by general principles of judicial admini~ 
tration to do so, Ashwander v. 1'V A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) , neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claim-
that the Mobile elect&a] 15ystem violates § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that 
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the 
appellees' complaint. 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides: 
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap· 
plied by any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right of any citiztln of the United States on 
account of race or color." 
Assuming, for present purposes, that there exists a private \ 
city of Mobile ·belatedly submitted Act 823 to the Attorney General of the 
United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1§65. 42 U. S. C, 
§ 197ac. The Attorney GenPral objected to the lPgislation on the ground 
that the clty had not shown ti1at § 2 of the Act, would not have the effect 
of abridging t.he right of NPgroet-> to vote . No suit iws been brought in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek clearance undeF 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 is in 
abeyance. 
7 According to the 1979 MuniC'ipal Year Book, most municipalities of \ 
over '25,000 people conducted at-largP elections of their city commissioners 
or council mPmbers as of 1977. /d., at 98-99. It is rea~;onable to suppose 
th~m an even larger majority of other municipalitic~ did so. 
''"' 
•• ,..$... )• 
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right of action to enforce this statutory provision,8 it is apparent 
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that 
of the Fifteenth Amendment,'0 and the sparse legislative his-
tory of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect 
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself. 
Section 2 was an uncontroversial provision in proposed 
legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted dis-
pute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that § 2 
"grants ... a right to be free from enactment or enforce-
ment of voting qualifications ... or pract.ices which deny or 
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color." 
H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See 
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 
(1965). The view that this section simply restated the pro-
hibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was 
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings. 
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether 
or not covered by the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the 
proposed legislation, were prohibited from discriminating 
against Negro voters by § 2, which he termed "almost a re-
phrasing of the 15th [A]mendment." Attorney General 
Katzenbach agreed. See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 208 (1965) . 
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear 
legislative history, it is evident that this statutory provision 
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amendment claim. 
We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the validity of the 
8 Cf. Alleu v. State Board of Electious, 393 U. S. 544. But see Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, Inc. "· Lewis, -- U. S. - , -; To·uche-
Ross & Co . v. Redington,- 1J. S. - , - . 
9 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
"The right of the citizen,: of the United State:; to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United State:-; or by any State on account of raoe, 
color, or previous condition of serviLude .. " 
.. ,. ... 
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judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the Fif~ 
teenth Amendment. 
III 
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment established that it imposes but one limitation on the 
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against 
Negroes in matters having to do with voting. See Ex parte 
Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 217. The Amend .. 
ment's command and effect are wholly negative. "The Fif-
teenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon 
any one," but has "invested the citizens of the United States 
with a new constitutional right which is within the pro .. 
tecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from 
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on ac .. 
count of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude." !d., 
at 217-218. 
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a 
State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth 
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 
In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, this Court struck 
down a "grandfather" clause in a state c~nstitution exempting 
from the requirement that voters be literate any person or 
the descendants of any person who had been entiUed to vote 
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense that 
the provision was immune from successful challenge, since a law 
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to 
the legislative authority an occult motive," or "because of 
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and 
resulting discrimination arising . . . from inequalities nat-
urally inhering in those who must come with~n the standard 
in order to enjoy the right to vote." ld., at 359. Despite 
this argument, the Court did not hesitate to hold the grand-
tather clause UllCOnstitutional, because it was not "possible to 
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djscover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than 
the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment. !d., 
at 365. 
The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle 
that ra;cially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredi-
ent of a Fifteenth Amenc!_ment violation. · In Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a 
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries 
stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. 'The con-
stitutional infirmity of the state law in that case, according 
to the allegations of the complaint, was that in drawing the· 
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely concerned 
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing NegJ;"o 
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing 
municipal vote." !d., at 341. .. The Court made clear that in 
the absence of su~ch an invidious purpose, a State is constitu-
tionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it 
chooses. ·Td., at 347. 
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court upheld 
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment stat-
ute against claims that district lines had been racially gerry-
mandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legis-
lature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in 
fact drew the districts on racial lines"; or that the statute 
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the 
basis of race or place or origin." I d., at 56, 58. See also 
. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277. 
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment decisions 
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the neces-
sity of showi11g purposeful discrimination in order to show a 
Fifteenth Amendment violation. The cases of Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U. S. 649, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, for 
example, de.alt with the question whether a State was so in-
volved with racially discriminatory voting practices as to-
invoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts;: 
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differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the 
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially 
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an 
abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas 
Democratic Party primary in Smith v. Allwright was regulated 
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were 
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court con-
cluded that the state Democratic Party had become the 
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "en-
dorse[d], adopt[ed], and enforce[d] the discrimination 
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S. , at 664. 
Terry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question of 
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that 
case was conducted by a county political organization, the 
Jaybird Association, that was neither authorized nor regulated 
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird pri-
mary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic 
primary and in the general election, and the Court found 
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although 
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation 
of this conclusion, there was agreement that the State was 
involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from par-
ticipation in the election process. 
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v. 
Allwright and Terry v. Adams support the conclusion that the 
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitutional, 
reasoning that the effect of ra-cially polarized voting in Mo-
bile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary. 
The ouly effect, however. of the exclusionary primaries that 
offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were not 
permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was· 
whether the "State haldl had a haud in" in the patent dis-
crimination practiced by a nominally private organization. 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J.,.. 
concurring) . 
The answer to the appellees' argument is that, as the Dis-
;, 
77-1844-0PINION 
8 MOBILE v. BOLDEN 
trict Court expressly found, their freedom to vote has not been 
denied or abridged by anyone. The Fifteenth Amendment 
does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, and 
neither Smith v. Allwright nor 'Terry v. Adams contains any 
implication to the contrary. That Amendment prohibits only 
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by govern~ 
mellt of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude." Having found that Negroes 
in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District 
Court and Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the 
appellants invaded the protection of that Amendment in the 
present case. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court 
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There re-
mains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judg-
ment on that score. 
The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally 
deny to some persons the Equal Protection of the Laws has 
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. That 
contention has been raised most often with regard to multi~ 
member constituencies within a state legislative apportion-
ment system. The constitutional objection to multimember 
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from 
apportionment on a population basis in violation of Reynolds 
v. Simms, 377 U. S. 533, and its progeny. Rather the focus in 
such cases has been on the lack of representation multimem-
ber districts afford various elements of the voting population 
in a system of representative legislative democracy. "Cri-
ticism [of multimember districts] is rooted in their winner-
take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities . . . , 
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community in-
terests as closely as possible and disenchantment with politi-
cal parties a11d elections as devices to settle policy differences~ 
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between contending interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
u. s. 124, 158-159. 
Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember 
legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they 
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v. 
Hill, 386 U. S. 120; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73; Fort-
son v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433.10 We have recognized, how-
ever, that such legislative apportionments could violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to 
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic 
minorities. See .. White v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, 
supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show 
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected 
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Reg-
ester, supra, at -; Whitcorrib v. Chavis, supra, at-. A 
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived 
or operated as [a] -purposeful device[] to further racial dis-
crimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. This bur-
den of proof is simply one aspect of 'the basic principle that 
only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a vio-
lation of the Equal ·Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See ·washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252; Personnel Adm'r of Massachusettlt 
v. Feeney,- U. S. - . 
In only one case has the Court sustained a claim that multi-
member legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the 
10 We have made cleat•, however, that it court in formulating an appor-
tionment plan as an exerci~e of its equity power:; should, as a general 
rule, not permit multimember legdative di~tricts. "[S]ingle-member dis-
tricts are to be prE:>ferrrd in court-ordered legi;:;lative apportionment plans 
unless "the court can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors' 
that jm;tifics a differe11t result. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 333."" 
' Co-nnor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415. 
.. 
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voting strength of a discrete group. That case was White v. 
Regester, supra. There the Court upheld a constitutional 
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a 
legislative reapportionnH:int plan '· adopted by the · State of 
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts 
for the two counties in which they resided minimized the effect 
of their votes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the Court held that the plaintiffs had been able to "produce 
evidence to support the finding that the political processes 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to 
participation by the group[s] in · question." 412 U. S., at 
766-767. In so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in the 
record that included a long history of official discrimination 
against minorities as well as indift'erence to their needs and 
interests on the part of white elected officials. ·The Court 
also found in each county additional factors that restricted the 
access of minority groups to the political process. In one 
county, Negroes eft'ectively were excluded from the process 
of slating candidates for the Democratic Party, while the 
plaintiffs in the other county were Mexican-Americans who 
"suffer[Pd] a cultural and language barrier" that made "par-
ticipation in commullity processes extremely difficult, partic-
ularly . .. with respect to the political life" of the county. 
!d., at 768 (footnote omitted). 
We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large elec-
tion of city officials with all the legislative, executive and ad-
ministrative power of the municipal government is constitu-
tionally indistinguishable Irom the election of a few members 
of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although 
this may be a rash assumption.11 But even making this as-
11 See W~e v. L-ipscomb, 435 U. S. 535, 549, and 550 (concurring 
opinion) . It is noteworthy that a sy:;tem of at-large city elections in place 
of elections of city official~ by the voter::; of small geographic ward:; was 
universally heralded not many year:; ago a:; a praiseworthy and progres-
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sumption, it is clear that the evidence in the present case fell 
far short of showing that the appellants "conceived or oper-
ated [a] purposeful device[] to further racial discrimina-
tion." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149. 
The District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light 
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunder-
standillg that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory pur-
pose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient. 
See 485 F. 2d, at 1304-1305, and n. 16.12 
In light of the criteria identified in Zimmer, the District 
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on 
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City 
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of ra-
cially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found 
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests 
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of 
these findings, the court concluded that the political proc-
esses in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its 
seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions 
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact N e-
groes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F. 
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the 
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system 
sive reform of corrupt municipal government. See, e. g,, E. Banfield and 
J . Wibon. City Politi(),.; 151 (1968). Compare, M. Srasongood, Lora! Gov-
ernmrnt (1933): L. Steffen;;, The Shamr of the Citirs (1904). 
12 Thi~ Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal::; in Zim-
me1' v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court 
and explicitly "without approval of tl1e constitutional view::; expre::;sed by 
the Court of Appeals ." East Can·oll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424-
U. S. 636, 638 (pel' cw'iam) . 
.. 
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was invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.13 
In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrimination/4 
13 The only indication given by the District Court of an inference that 
there existed an invidious purpose was the following statement: "riJt is 
not '' long l:ltep from the systematic exclusion of blacks from juries which 
is itself such an 'unequal application of the law ... as to show inten-
tional discrimination,' Akins v. ·Texas. 325 U. S. 398, 404, ... to [tlle] 
prese11t purpo::;e to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case. There 
is a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote re:;ulting from 
intentional :;tate legisla.tive inaction which is as effective as the intentional 
state action referred to in Keyes [v. School District No . 1, Denver Colo., 
413 U. S. 189] ." 423 F. Supp., at 398. 
What the District Court may have meant by this statement is uncertain. 
In any event the analogy to the racially exclusionary jury cases appears 
mistaken. Those case::; typically have involved a consistent pattern of 
discrete official actions that demon:;trated almoot to a mathematical cer-
tainty that Negroes were being excluded from juries because of their 
race. See Castaneda v. Pa1·tida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17; Patton 
v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 464; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 359; 
Nol'l'is v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591. 
If the District Court. meant by its statement tl1at the existence of the 
at-large electorall:lystem was, like the systematic exclusion of Negroes from 
juries, unexplainable on grounds other tl1an race, its inference i::; contra-
dicted by the history of the adoption of that sy::;tem in Mobile. Alter-
natiwly, if the District. Court meant that the state legislature may be 
pr&>"'tnned to have "intended" that there would be no Negro Commis-
sioners, simply because that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large 
voting, i~ a.pplied an incorrect legal standard. "'Discriminatory pur-
pose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness 
of conseque"nces. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker . .. selected or 
reaffirmed a partirular course of action at least. in part 'because of,' not 
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 
Personnel Adrn'1· of Mass . v. J?eeney, - U. S. -, - (footnotes 
omitted) . 
14 The Court of Appt>als expre::;sed the view that the Di::;trict Court's 
finding of di::;crimination in light of the Zimmer criteria was "buttressed,. 
by the fact that the Attorney General had interposed an objection under 
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but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit pur~ 
pose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its 
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. Thus, because the 
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that a discriminatory purpose 
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent 
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arling. 
ton Heights, supra. Although the presence of the indicia 
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discrimina~ 
tory purpose, satisfaction of those criteria is not of itself suffi .. 
cient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Zimmer criteria 
upon which the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitu~ 
tionally discriminatory purpose in the present case. 
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no 
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission. 
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to 
nomination and election were not open equally to Negroes, 
But the District Court's findings of fact, unquestioned on ap-
peal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile 
"without hindrance," and that there are no official obstacles in 
the way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election 
to the Commission. Indeed, it was undisputed that the only 
active "slating" organization in the city is comprised of Ne-
groes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, 
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation. 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 160; see Arlington Heights, 
supra, at 266, and n. 15.15 
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the state statute de;ignating the 
functions of each Commissioner. 571 F. 2d, at 246. See n. 6, s'Upra. 
15 There have been only three Negro candidates for the City Com .. 
mh;sion, all in 1973. According to the Dh;trict Court, the Negro candi .. 
dates "were young, inexperienced, and mounted extremely limited cam .. 
paigns" and received only "modest support from the black com .. 
(Il~n\ty ••.• " 423 F. Supp., at 388. 
·.-~ 
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the persons who were elected t~ the Commission discriminated 
against Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing 
public services. If ' that is the case, those discriminated 
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit 
of a sort quite different from that sought in the present case. 
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimi-
nation because. of race by any unit of state government, what-
ever the method of its election. · But · evidence of discrimina-
tion by white officials it1 Mobile is relevant only as the most 
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional 
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained 
their offices. 
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals sup-
ported their conclusion by drawing upon the substantial his-
tory of official racial aiscrirnination in Alabama. But past 
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn 
governmental action ·that is not itself unlawful. ·The ulti-
mate question remains -whether a discriminatory intent haa 
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official 
discrimination in other cases are of limited help in resolving 
that question. 
Finally, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system it-
self as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously 
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system, 
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to dis-
advantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v. 
Regester, b'Upra. ·They are far from proof of a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants 
in this case.16 
10 According to the District Court, voters in the city of Mobile are 
represented in the state legislatme by three state senators, any one of 
whom can veto propo;;;ed local legislat-ion under the existing courtesy 
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile't; 11-member House delegation can 
prevent . a local biU fr.om reaching the floor for debate. Unanimous . 
77-1 44-0PINION 
MOHILE v. BOLDEN 15 
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the 
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
approval of a local mea~me by the cJty deJrgation, on the other hand, 
virtually a,;;;ure~ pao;sage. 423 F. Supp., at 397. 
Tlicre wao; evidence in thi::; ca:>e that ~::~eventl propo~::~al:; that would have 
altered the form of ::Vlobile'::; municipal government have been defeated 
in the ~::~tate legii::ilature, including at lea::;L oue that would have permitted 
Mobile to govern ito;elf through a. mayor and city council with members 
elrcted from individual di:,;trict,; wit bin the city . Whether it may be po:,;-
~ihle ultimately to prove that :VIobil<' '~ present ~owrnmental and electoral 
:sy~>tem ha::: bern retalnrd for a rarwlly disC'riminator~· purpo,;e, we are in n(). 
position now to say. 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 17, 1980 
Re: No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden 
No. 78-357 - Y.lilliams v. Brown 
Dear Potter: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent 
in these cases. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
..§u.p-umc <!jlltl.rf of tift ~nittlt ~tatta 
~aslpnghm. ~ . <!J. 2llgtJ!..;l 
Re: No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden 
Dear Potter: 
February 6, 1980 
/ 
I hope you do not mind if, for now, I await the 
dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!II!:FIS 0,.-
J USTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~n:prtntt <!fourl of tfrt ~b ~htttg 
Jfrur~ ~- OJ. 21l.;tJI.~ 
February 27, 1980 
RE: Nos. 77-1844 and 78-357 - City of Mobile, Alabama 
v. Bolden and Williams v. Brown, et al. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I join your dissent except the second paragraph 
of Part IV. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
§uvr.c:tn:c <t~·rnrt of ±~t J.1n1:tdt ~t;tf~g 
)Uetsl)ittgfmt ~~. P. OJ. 
February 27 , 198 0 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re : No. 77-1844 , Mobile v. Bolden 
I contemplate adding to this opinion , 
in footnote or text and probably in considerably 







Followina our recP.nt telephone talk, I have 
discussed Thurqood's rtissent more carefullv with my clerk, 
David Stewart. 
~'Jk ,.f 
At my request hP. has reduced to a ~emorandum an 
elaboration of the ideas suqqested in your draft footnotes, 
toaether with some additional thouqhts. Thurqooo's dissent 
is vulnerable when our decisions are properlv apolied, but it 
is facially imoressive. I think it warrants a full response • 
..... i} 
Apart from my interest in havinq "mv side" prevail 
in a case, I view this case as critical to the successful 
governance of our cities. I know from experience that wholly 
without reqard to minorities, a ward system is dP.trimental to 
qood municipal qovernment. If a decision by this Court 
required wards, and that they be shaped to assure 
proportional representation of identifiable "POlitical 
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
In White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), this Court unan-
imously held the use of multimember districts for the election 
of state legislators in two counties in Texas violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, 
based on a careful assessment of the totality of the circum-; 
stances, they were found to exclude Negroes and Mexican-
Americans from effective participation in the political proc-
esses in the counties. Without questioning the vitality of 
White v. Regester and our other decisions dealing with chal-
lenges to multimember districts by racial or ethnic groups, the 
Court today inexplicably rejects a similar holding based on 
meticulous factual findings and scrupulous application of the 
principles of these cases by both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals. The Court's decision is flatly inconsistent 
with White v. Regester and it cannot be understood to flow 
from our recognition in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 
( 1976), that the Equal Protection Clause forbids only pur-
poseful discrimination. Both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals properly found that an invidious discrimi-
natory purpose could be inferred from the totality of facts 
in this case. The Court's cryptic rejection of their conclu-
sions ignores the principles that an invidious discriminatory ~ _;f)~ "·U~ 
purpose can be inferred from objective factors of the kind --~ 
relied on in White v. Regester and that the trial courts are in ~ ~
a special position to 1nake such intensely local appraisals. ,t.;_.,.y ,,., J ~ 
~cM~~7· 
Auz1~~ 
.eM" H...t. .,..,ru.f~ ~..e_ 
~ ~~6'/~-~-f/...v lJI 
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I 
Prior to our decision in White v. Reyester, we upheld a 
number of multimember districting schemes against constitu-
tional challenges, but we consistently recognized that such 
apportionment schemes could constitute invidious discrimina-
tion "where the circumstauces of a particular case may 
'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of 
racial or political clements of the voti11g population.' " 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 143 (Hl71), quoting from 
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439 (1965); Burns v. R'ich-
ardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966). In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
supra, we noted that the fact that the number of mt>mbers of 
a particular group who were legislators was 110t in proportion 
to the population of the group did not prove invidious dis-
criminatioJJ absent evidence and fi11dings that the members 
of the group had less opportunity than did other persons "to 
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators 
of their choice." Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149. 
Relying on this principle. in White v. Reyester we unani-
mously upheld a district court's conclusion that the use of 
multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar C'ounties in Texas 
violated the Equal Protection Clause in the face of findings 
that they excluded Negroes and Mexican-Americans from 
effective participa.tion in the political processt>s. With respect 
to the exclusion of ~egroes in Dallas County. "the District 
Court first referred to the history of official racial discrimina-
tion in Texas, which at times touched the right of Negroes 
to register and vote and to participate in the democratic 
processes." White v. Reyester, 412 U. S., at 766. The Dis-
trict Court also referred to Texas' majority vote requiremeut 
aud "place" rule. "11either in themselves improper nor invidi-
ous," but which "enhanced the opportunity for racial dis-
flrimina.tion" by reducing legislative elections from the multi-
member district to "a head-to-head contest for each position.'' 
lb'id. We deemed more fumlamenta1 the District Court's. 
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findings that only two Negro state representatives had been 
elected from Dallas County since Reconstruction and that 
these were the only two ~egroes ever slated by an organization 
that effectively controlled Democratic Party candidate slating. 
I d., at 766-767. We also noted the District Court's findings 
that the Democratic Party slating organization was insensi-
tive to the 11eeds and aspirations of the Negro community and 
that at times it had employed racial campaign tactics to defeat 
candidates supported by the black community. Based on this 
evidence, the District Court concluded that the black commu-
nity generally was "uot permitted to enter into the political 
process in a reliable and meauingful manner." !d., at 767. 
We held that "l t J hese findings and conclusions are sufficient 
to sustain the District Court's judgment with respect to the 
Dallas multimember district and, ou this record, we have no 
reason to disturb them." Ibid. 
With respect to the exclusio11 of Mexican-Americans from 
the political process in Bexar County, the District Court 
referred to the continuing effects of a long history of invidious 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in education, em-
ployment, economics, health, politics, aud other fields. !d., 
at 768. The impact of this discrimination, coupled with a 
cultural and language barrier, made Mexican-American par-
ticipation in the political life of Bexar County extremely diffi-
cult. Only five Mexican-Americans had represented Bexar 
County in the Texas Legislature since 1880 and the county's 
legislative delegation "was insufficiently responsive to Mex-
ican-American interests." I d., at 769. "Based on the total-
ity of the circumstances, the District Court evolved its 
ultimate assessment of the multimember district, overlaid, 
as it was, 011 the cultural and economic realities of the 
Mexican-American community in Bexar County and its rela-
tionship with the rest of the county." lb,id. "[F]rom its 
own special vantage point" the District Court concluded that 
tha multirnember district invidiously excluded Mexican-
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Americans from effective participation in the election of state 
representatives. We affirmed, noting that we were "not 
inclined to overtum these findings, representillg as they do a 
blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design 
aud impact of the Bexar County multimember district in the 
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." !d., 
at 769-770. 
II 
In the itJStant case the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals faithfully applied the principles of White v. Regester 
in assessing whether the maintenance of a system of at~large 
elections for the selection of Mobile City Commissiollers 
deHied Mobile Negroes their Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment rights. Scrupulously adhering to our admoni-
tion that "r t] he plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to 
support fiudings that the political processes leading to nomi-
natiou and electiou were not equally open to participation by 
the group in question." id., at 766, the District Court con-
ducted a detail<:>d factual inquiry into the openness of the 
candidate s<:>lection process to blacks. The court noted that 
"Mobile blacks ·were subjected to massive official and private 
racial discrimillation until the Voting Rights Act of H)65" 
and that "r t l he pervasive effects of past discrimination still 
substantially affects black political participation." 423 F. 
Supp. 384, 387 (SD Ala. 1976). Although the District Court 
noted that "[s]ince the Voting Rights Act of 1965. blacks reg-
ister and vote without hindrance," the court found that "local 
political processes are not equally open" to blacks. Despite 
the fact that Negroes constitute more than 35%· of the popul~ 
tion of Mobile, no Negro has ever beell el<'ckd to the Mobile 
City Commission. The plaintiffs introduced extensive cvi~ 
dence of severe racial polari~ation in voting patterns during 
the 1960's aud 1970's with "white voting for white and black 
for black if a white is opposed to a black" resulting in the 
defeat of the black calHlidate or, if two whites are running,. 
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the defeat of the white candidate most identified with blacks. 
I d., at 388. Regressiou aualyses covering every city commis-
sion race in 1965 . 1960, and 1973, both the primary and gen-
eral election of the county commission in 1968 and 1972, 
selected school board races in 1962, 1966, 1970, 1972, and 
1974, city referendums in 1963 and 1973. and a countywide 
l<'gislative race in 1969 confirmed the existeuce of severe bloc 
voting. ld., at 388- 389. Nearly every active candidate for 
public office testified that because of racial pola.rization "it is 
highly unlikely that anytime in the foreseeable future. under 
tlw at-large system. that a black can be elected against a 
while." I d., at 388. After single-member districts were 
created in Mobil<' County for state legislative elections. "three 
blacks of the pr0sent fourteen member Mobile County dele-
gation have been elected." !d., at 389. Based ou the fore-
going evidence. the District Court found "that the structure 
of the at-large election of city commissioners combined with 
strong racial polarization of Mobile's electorate contiu ues to 
effectively discourage qualified black citizens from seeking 
office or being elected thereby denyiug blacks equal access to 
the slating or ca nclida te selection process." Ibid. 
The District Court also reviewed extensive evidence that 
the city commissioners elected under the at-large system have 
not been responsive to the Heeds of the Negro community. 
The court found that city officials have been unresponsive to 
the interests of Mobile Negroes in municipal employment, 
appointnwnts to boards and committees, and the provision of 
municipal services in part because of "the political fear of a 
white backlash vote when black citizens' needs are at stake." 
!d. , at 392. The court also found that there is no clear-cut 
state policy preference for at-large elections and that past dis-
crimination affecting the ability of Negroes to register and to 
vote "has helped preclude the effective participation of blacks 
in the election system today." !d., at 393. The adverse 
impact of the at-large election system on minorities was found 
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to be enhanced by the large size of the citywide E>lection dis-
trict. the majority vote requireme11t, the provision that ca11di-
dates run for positions by place or number, and the lack of 
any provision for at-large candidates to run from particular 
geographical subdistricts. 
After concluding its extensive findings of fact. the District 
Court auJressE>d the question of the effect of Washington v. 
Davis, 423 U. S. 229, on the White v. Regester standards. The 
eourt concluded that thr requirement that a facially neutral 
statute involve purposeful discrimination befon• a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause can be established was not 
inconsistent with White v. Regester in light of the recognition 
i11 Washi11gton v. Davis, supra, at 241-242. that the discrimi-
natory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the 
relevant facts. including the discriminatory impact of the 
statutR. 423 F. Supp., at 398. After noting that "whenever 
a redistricting bill of any type is proposed by a county delega-
tion member, a major concern has centered around how many, 
if any, blacks would be elected." id., at 397, the District Court 
eoncludNl that there was "a present purpose to dilute the 
black vote ... resulting from intentional state legislative 
inactio?t . ... " 1 d., at 398. Based on an "exhaustive analy-
sis of the evidence in tlw record," the court held that "rt]he 
plaintiffs have met the burden cast in White and Whitcomb," 
and that "the multi-mernber at-large election of Mobile City 
Commissioners results in an unconstitutional clilutiou of black 
voting strength." I d., at 402. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judg-
mrnt in one of four consoliuated "dilution" cases decided on 
tlw same day. Bolde·n v. Mob·ile, 571 F. 2d 238 (CA5 1978); 
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F. 2d 209 (CA5 1978) (Nevett II); 
Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. Shreveport, 571 
F. 2<1 248 (C'A5 1978); 'l'homasville Branch of NAACP v. 
Thomas County, Georgia, 571 F. 2d 257 (CA5 1978). In the 
lead case of 1Vevett v. Sides, supra, the Court of Appeals held 
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that under ·washington v. Davis, supra, and Arl·ington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 
( 1977), "a showing of racially motivated discrimination is a 
necC'ssary C'kment" for a successful claim of uncoustitutio11al 
voting dilution under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendment. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F. 2d, at 219, 220. The 
court concluded that the standanJs for proving unconstitu-
tional voting dilution outlilH'd in WhiteY. Regester were con-
sistent with the requirement that purposeful discrimination be 
shown because they focus on factors that go beyond a simple 
showing that minorities are not represented in proportion to 
their numbers in the general population. !d., at 219-2:20, 
11. 13, 222-224. 
Tn its decision in the instant case the Court of Appeals 
reviewPd the District Court's findings of fact. found them not 
to be clearly erroneous and held that they "compel thr infer-
ence that rMobile's at-large] system has been maintained 
with tlw purpose of diluting the black vote. thus supplying 
thP element of intent necessary to establish a violation of the 
fourteenth amendment. Village of Arlington Heights Y. N!etro-
politan Housing Developrnent Corp., 420 U. S. 2i)2 (1977) ; 
lT' ashington v. Davis, 426 F. R. 229 (1976). aud the fifteenth 
amendment. Wright Y. Rockefeller, 3761T. R. 52 (1964)." 571 
F. 2cl. at 245. The court observed that the District Court's 
"finding that the legislature was acutely conscious of the racial 
consequences of its districting policies." coupled with the 
attempt to assign different functions to each of the threP city 
commissioners "to lock in the at-large feature of the scheme" 
constituted "direct evidence of the intent behind the main-
tenancP of the at-large plan." Id., at 246. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that "the district court has properly con-
ductrd thr 'spnsitivf' inquiry into such circumstautial and 
direct rvidrncc of intent as may be available' that a. court 
must undertake in 'rciJetermining whether invidious clis-
eriminatory purpose \vas a motivating factor ' i11 the main.-
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tenance or enactment of a districting plan." Ib·id., quoting 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp., 429 U. S., at 266. 
III 
The Court today confirms the holdings of the courts below 
that maiuteuance of Mobile's at-large system for election of 
city commissioners violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments only if it is motivated by a racially discrimina-
tory purpose. The Court also apparently reaffirtHs the vital-
ity of H'hite v. Regester and Whitcomb v. Chavis, which estab-
lished the standards for determining whether at-large election 
systems are unconstitutionally discriminatory. The Court 
nonetheless casts aside the meticulous applica.tion of the prin-
ciples of these cases by both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals in holding that the evidence they relied upon 
"fell far short of showing" purposeful discriminatio11. 
The Court erroneously suggests that the District Court 
erred by considering the factors articulated by the Court of 
Appeals in Zimmer Y. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1973) , 
to determiuf' whether purposeful discrimination has been 
shown. This remarkable suggestion ignores the facts that 
Zimmer articulated the very factors deemed relevant by White 
v. Regester and Whitcotnb v. Chavis-a lack of minority 
access to the candidate selection process. unresponsiveness 
of elected officials to minority interests, a history of discrimi-
nation , majority vote requireme11ts, provisions that candidates 
run for positions by place or number, the lack of any provision 
for at-large candidates to run from particular geographical 
subdistricts-and that both the District Court and the Court 
of Appea.Is considered these factors with the recognition that 
they are relevant only with respect to the question whether 
purposeful discrimination can be inferred. 
Although the Court does acknowledge that "the presence 
of the indicia relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence: 
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of a discriminatory purpose," it holds that the evidence relied 
upon by the courts below was "most assuredly insufficient to 
prove an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose in the 
present case." The Court apparently bases this holding on 
the fact that there are no official obstacles barring Xegroes 
from registering. voting, and running for office coupled with 
its conclusion that none of the factors relied upon by the 
courts below would alone be sufficient to support an inference 
of purposeful discrimination. The absence of official obstacles 
to registration, voting. and running for office heretofore has 
never been deemed to insulate an electoral system from attack 
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In White 
Y. Regester, 412 V. S. 755. there was no evidence that Negroes 
faced official obstacles to registration. voting, and running for 
office, yet we upheld a finding that they had been excluded 
from effective participation in the political process in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause because a multimember 
districting scheme. in the context of racial voting at the polls, 
was being used invidiously to prevent Negroes from being 
elected to public office. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 
339 (1969). and Terry Y. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1~)53), we 
invalidated electoral systems under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment not because they erected official obstacles in the path of 
Negroes registering, voti11g or running for office, but because 
they were used effectively to deprive the Negro vote of any 
value. Thus, even though Mobile's Negro community may 
register a11d vote without hindrance, the system of at-large 
election of city com missioners may violate the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments if it is used purposefully to exclude 
~ egroes from the political process. 
In conducting "an intensely local appraisal of the design 
and imnact" of the at-large election scheme, White v. Reges-
ter, 412 U. S .. at 769. the District Court's decision was fully 
consistent with our recognition i11 Washington v. Davis, 426 
TT. S., at 242, .th~t "an invidious discriminatory purpose may 
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often h<' inferr<'cl from the totality of thP relevant facts 
including th<' fact. if it is true. that tlw law bPars more heavily 
on one race than another." Although the totality of the facts 
relied upon by the District Court to support its inference of 
purposeful discrimination is even more comj)('lling than that 
present in White Y. Regester, the Court today rejects the 
inference of purposeful discrimi11ation apparently hecaUS(' 
each of the factors relied upon by the courts below is alonC' 
insufficient to support the infen:'nce. The Court states that 
the "fact [that ~egro candidates havC' been defeated] alone 
does not work a constitutional deprivation.'' that l'viclCJlCC' of 
the unresponsiveness of C'lectecl officials "is relevant only as 
the most tenuous a11d circumstantial l'Vidcnce.'' that "tlw sub-
stantial history of official racial discrimination . . . r is l of 
limited help." and that the fC'atures of the electoral system 
that Pnhanc<' tlw disadvantages faced by a voting minority 
"are far from proof of a racially discriminatory purpose." By 
viewing each of the factors relied upon below in isolation. and 
ignoring the fact that racial bloc voting at the polls makes it 
impossible to elect a black commissioner under the at-large 
system. the Court n'.iects the "totality of the circumstancC's" 
approach vvC' endorsed in White v. Reoester, 412 LT. R .. at 7613-
770. Tr(Lshinglon "· Davis, 426 F. R .. at 241-242. and l 'illage 
of Arlington Heir;hts "· Metropolitan Housi'II{J Development 
Corp., 429 F. 8 .. at 266. and lC'aves the courts below adrift on 
uncharted seas with rPspect to how to proceC'd on remancl. 
Because I believe that the findi11gs of the District Court 
amply support an inferencE' of purposeful discrimination in 
violation of t}w Fourteenth and Fiftpenth Amendments, T 
respectfully dissent. 
CHAMI!IERB OP" 
..JUSTICE w ... ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR. March 13, 1980 
RE: No. 77-1844 City of .Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The City of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by 
a City Commission consisting of three members elected by 
the voters of the city at-large. The question in this case is 
whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates 
the rights of Mobile 's Negro voters in contravention of fed-
eral statutory or constitutional law. 
The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action 
on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile.1 Named as de-
fendants were the city and its three incumbent Commis-
sioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The 
complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Com-
missioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of 
Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965/ 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found 
that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been vio-
lated, entered a judgment in their favor, and ordered that the 
1 Approximately 35.4% of the residents of Mobile are Negro 
2 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S. C.§ 1973. The complaint abo contained chums 
based on the First and Thirteenth Amendments and on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 
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City Commission be disestablished and replaced by a munic-
ipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council 
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F. 
Supp. 384.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in 
its entirety, Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F. 2d 238, agreeing 
that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate 
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, id., at 245, and finding that the remedy formu-
lated by the District Court was appropriate. An appeal was 
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, -
U. S. -. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term, 
and was reargued in the present Term. 
I 
In Alabama, the form of municipal government a mty may 
adopt is governed by state law. Until 1911 cities not covered 
by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves 
through a mayor and city counciJ.4 In that year, the Ala-
bama Legislature authorized every large municipality to 
adopt a commission form of government.5 Mobile estab-
lished its City Commission in the same year, and has main-
tained that basic system of municipal government ever since. 
The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative, 
executive, and administrative power in the municipality. 
They are required after election to designate one of their 
number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal 
provision is made for allocating specific executive or adminis-
trative duties among the three.6 As required by the state 
~--The District Court has stayed its orders pending disposition of the 
present appeal. 
~Alabama Code, Chapter 11-43 (1975). 
fi Act 281, 1911 Alabama Acts, at '330. 
6 In 196o tne Alabama Legislature enacted Act 23 , 1965 Alabama 
Acts, at 1539, '§ 2 of which designated specific aclminiHtrative ta~k~ to be 
performed 'by each Commissioner and provided that the title of Mayor be 
rotated among the tbree. After tbe present lawsuit wal:i commenced, tbe: 
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law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Com-
mission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of 
four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected 
only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic 
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of 
municipalities and other local governmental units throughout 
the Nation.7 
II 
Although required by general principles of judicial adminis-
tration to do so. Spector Motor Co. v. M cLaughli11, 323 
U. R. 101, 105; Ashwander v. '/'VA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 
(Brandeis, J., concurring), neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claim-
that the Mobile electoral system violates § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that 
claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the 
appellees' complaint. 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides: 
"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap-
plied by any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States on 
account of race or color." 
Assuming, for present purposes, that there exists a private 
city of Mobile belatedly submitted Act 823 to the Attorney General of the 
United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. of 1965. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c. The Attorney General objected to the legioilation on thr ground 
that the city had not shown that § 2 of tho Act would not have tho effect 
of abridging the right of Negroes to vote. No suit has been brought in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek clearance under 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, accordingly, § 2 of Act 823 1::, in 
abeyance. 
7 According to the 1979 :Municipal Year Book , mo~t munici palities of 
over 25,000 people conducted at-largr clrction~ of their city rommi~><ioners 
or council member,; as of 1977. !d., at 98-99. It is rra,;onablc to suppo;,e 
than an even larger majority of other municipalitie~ did so. 
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right of action to enforce this statutory provision,8 it is apparent 
that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that 
of the Fifteenth Amendment,O and the sparse legislative ·his-
tory of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect 
no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself. 
Section 2 was an uncontroversial provision in proposed 
legislation whose other provisions engendered ·protracted dis-
pute. The House Report on the Bill simply recited that § 2 
11grants ... a right to be free from enactment or enforce-
ment of voting qualifications ... or practices which deny or 
abridge the right to vote on account of race or color." 
H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See 
also S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 19- 20 
(1965). ·The view that this section simply restated the pro-
hibitions already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was 
expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings. 
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all States, whether 
Qr not covered by the preclearance provisions of § ·5 of the 
proposed legislation, were prohibited from aiscriminating 
against Negro voters by § 2, which he termed 11almost a re-
phrasing of the 15th [A]mendment." Attorney General 
Katzen bach agreed. SeeVoting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 208 (1965). 
In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear 
legislative history, it is evident that this statutory provision 
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amendment claim. 
We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the validity of the 
8 Cf. Alleu v. State Board of Elect-ions, 393 U. S. 544. But see 'l'rans-
america Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, - U. S. -, -; 'l'ouche-
,Ross & Co. v. Redington, - U.S.-,-. 
9 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides : 
"The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account <Of race. 
•colo-r, ·o-r previous condition of .servitude:" 
-. 
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judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the Fif-
teenth Amendment. 
III 
The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment established that it imposes but one limitation on the 
powers of the States. It forbids them to discriminate against 
Negroes in matters having to do with voting. See Ex parte 
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 
370, 389-390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 
555-556; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214. The Amend-
ment's command and effect are wholly negative. "The Fif-
teenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon 
any one," but has "invested the citizens of the United States 
with a new constitutional right which is within the pro-
tecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from 
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." !d., 
at 217-218. 
Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a 
State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth 
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 
In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, this Court struck 
down a "grandfather" clause in a state constitution exempting 
from the requirement that voters be literate any person or 
the descendants of any person who had been entitled to vote 
before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense that 
the provision was immune from successful challenge, since a law 
could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to 
the legislative authority an occult motive," or "because of 
conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and 
resulting discrimination arising ... from inequalities nat-
urally inhering in those who must come within the standard 
in order to enjoy the right to vote." /d., at 359. Despite 
this argument, the Court did not hesitate to hold the grand-
father clause unconstitutional, because it was not "possible to 
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discover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed than 
the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., 
at 365. 
The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle 
that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredi-
ent of a Fifteenth Amendment violation. In Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, the Court held that allegations of a 
racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries 
stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. The con~ 
stitutional infirmity of the state law in that case, according 
to the allegations of the complaint, was that in drawing the 
municipal boundaries the legislature was "solely concerned 
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro 
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing 
municipal vote." Td., at 341. The Court made clear that in 
the absence of such an invidious purpose, a State is constitu-
tionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it 
chooses. !d., at 347.10 
In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, the Court upheld 
by like reasoning a state congressional reapportionment stat-
ute against claims that district lines had been racially gerry-
mandered, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legis-
lature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in 
fact drew the districts on racial lines"; or that the statute 
"was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the 
basis of race or place or origin." ld., at 56, 58.'' See also 
111 The Court. ha!; rr]watedly citrd Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 ll. S. H8, 
for the prinriple that. an invidiou~ purpose mu~t br adducpd to ~upport a 
claim of uneon~titutionalit~·. Ser Persounel Adrnin'r of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, 442 U. S. 25G, 272; Arlington Heights Y. Metropolitan £lousing 
Corp., 420 U. S. 252, 265, 26G ; Washington \' .Davis. 426 11. S. 22D. 240. 
11 Ma . .T ut-~TJ CB ::'llAHt;HALL hH H rl~cwhrrr dr::>r ribe>d the fair import of the 
Gomillion Hml ·wright ta~r:<: "In the> two Fif'tPenth Amrndmrnt rrdi~tr iC't ­
ing ('a::;r:<, Wright v. Rockefe/lel·, a76 11. S. 52 (HHH). and Oomillion \', 
Lightfoot, ;3(i:3 l'. S. 14.S (1960), the Court ~uggr~tPd that I Pgi~latiw pur-
JlO~<'" alom• i::; dt'!Prminatin•, although languagr in both ca:<l'::! may be 
i::;olatrcl tlutl Hcrm::; (o approve ;;ome inquiry into Pfi'rct in>'ofar a~ it ehH·i-
77-1844-0PINION 
MOBILE v. BOLDEN 7 
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 
45; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 368, 275-277. 
While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment decisions 
have dealt with different issues, none has questioned the neces-
sity of showing purposeful discrimination in order to show a 
Fifteenth Amendment violation. The cases of Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U. S. 649, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, for 
example, dealt with the question whether a State was so in-
volved with racially discriminatory voting practices as to 
invoke the Amendment's protection. Although their facts 
differed somewhat, the question in both cases was whether the 
State was sufficiently implicated in the conduct of racially 
exclusionary primary elections to make that discrimination an 
abridgement of the right to vote by a State. Since the Texas 
Democratic Party primary in Smith v. Allwright was regulated 
by statute, and only party nominees chosen in a primary were 
placed on the ballot for the general election, the Court con-
cluded that the state Democratic Party had become the 
agency of the State, and that the State thereby had "en-
dorse[d] , adopt[ed] , and enforce[d] the discrimination 
against Negroes practiced by a party." 321 U. S., at 664. 
Terry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question of 
state involvement. The primary election challenged in that 
case was conducted by a county political organization, the 
Jaybird Association. that was neither authorized nor regulated 
under state law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird pri-
mary, however, invariably won in the subsequent Democratic 
primary and in the general election, and the Court found 
that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Although 
the several supporting opinions differed in their formulation 
of this conclusion, there was agreement that the State was 
dalt>R purpoHe." Beer \' . Uuited States, 425 U. S. 130, 1-!8 (;vi AHHA H LL, J ., 
di;-;:;enling.) 
The Court in the ·w right cast' :d,;o rrjrrt<·d claim" ma<lr lll HIP r thP Equal 
Protrction Clau:se of the Fourtrenth Amendment Srp p. - , 111jro .. 
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involved in the purposeful exclusion of Negroes from par. 
ticipation in the election process. 
The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v. 
Allwright and Terry v. Adams support the conclusion that the 
at-large system of elections in Mobile is unconstitu tiona!, 
reasoning that the effect of racially polarized voting in Mo-
bile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary primary. 
The only characteristic. however, of the exclusionary primaries 
that offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes were 
not permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was 
whether the "State ha[d] had a hand in" in the patent dis-
crimination practiced by a nominally private organization. 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S., at 473 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
The answer to the appellees' argument is that, as the Dis-
trict Court expressly found, their freedom to vote has not been 
denied or abridged by anyone. ·· The Fifteenth Amendment 
docs not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, and 
neither Smith v. Allwright nor Terry v. Adams contains any 
implication to the contrary. That Amenrlment prohibits only 
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by govern-
ment of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of serviturle." Having found that Negroes 
in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District 
Court and Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the 
appellants invaded the protection of that Amendment in the 
present case. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court 
that Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There re-
mains for consideration, therefore, the validity of its judg-
ment on that score. 
A 
·-The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally 
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deny to some persons the Equal Protection of the Laws has 
been advanced in numerous cases before this Court. That 
contention has been raised most often with regard to multi-
member constituencies within a state legislative apportion-
ment system. The constitutional objection to multimember 
districts is not and cannot be that, as such, they depart from 
appor·tionment on a population basis in violation of Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533. and its progeny. Rather the focus in 
such cases has been on the lack of representation multimem-
ber districts afford various elements of the voting population 
in a systeln of representative legislative democracy. "Cri-
ticism [of multimember districts] is rooted in their winner-
take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities . .. , 
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community in-
terests as closely as possible and disenchantment with politi-
cal parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences 
between contending interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
u. s. 124, 158- 159. 
Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember 
legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they 
are not unconstitutional per se, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 
U. S. 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124; Kilgarin v. 
Hill, 386 U.S. 120; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73; Fort-
son v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433. 1 ~ We have recogui2ed, how-
ever, that such legislative apportionments could violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to 
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic 
minorities. See White v. Regester, supra; Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, 
1~ vYo hnve made <·]par, howcv<·r, that a CO lll'l in formu.latmg an appor-
tionment plan as an exercise of its equity powers should, as a general 
rule, not permit multimember legislative districts. "[S]ingle-member dis-
tricts are to be preferred in court-ordered legislative apportionment plaus 
unless the court can articulate a 'singular combination of unique factors' 
that jul:ltifies a different result. Mahan v. Ilowell, 410 U. S. ·315, 333.''' 
Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S, 407, 415. 
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supra. To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show 
that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected 
representatives in proportion to its numbers. White v. Reg-
ester, supra, at -; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at -. A 
plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was "conceived 
or operated as [a] purposeful device[ l to further racial dis-
crimination," Whitcomb v. Chav'is, supra, at 149. 
This burden of proof is simply one aspect of the basic prin-
ciple that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there 
be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U. S. 252; Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney, 442 r. fl. 256. The Court <·xplicitly indicated in 
Washingto11 v. Davis that this principle appli<'s to claims of 
racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other 
claims of racial discrimination. Indeed, the Court's opinion 
in that case viC'wed Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, as an apt 
illustration of the principle that an illicit purpose must be 
proved before a constitutional violation can be found. The 
Court said: 
"The rule is the same in other contexts. Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), upheld a ~ew York 
congressional apportionment statute against claims that 
district lines had been racial1y gerrymandered. The 
challenged districts were made up predominantly of 
whites or of minority races, and their boundaries were 
irregularly drawn. The challengers did 110t prevail be-
cause they failed to prove that the ~ew York Legislature 
'was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact 
drew the districts on racial lines'; the plain tiffs had not 
shown that the statute 'was the product of a state con-
trivance to segregate on the basis of rae<' or place of 
origin.' !d. , at 56, 58. The dissenters were i11 agree-
ment that the issue was whetlwr the 'bou ndaries .. , 
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were purposefully drawn on racial lines.' !d. , at 67.' ' 
Washington 'i'. Davis, supra, at 240. 
More recently, in Arlington I!eights v. M etropolitan Hous·ing 
Corp., supra, the Court again relied on Wright v. Rockefeller 
to illustrate the principle that "[p] roof of racially discrimina-
tory intent or purpose' is required to show a violation of the 
Equal Protectio11 Clause." 429 U. S., at 252. Although dicta 
may be drawn froln a few of the Court's earlier opinions sug-
gestillg that disproportionate effects alone may establish a 
claim of uncoHstitutional racial vote dilution. the fact is that 
such a view is not supported by any decision of this Court. 13 
More importantly. such a view is not consistent with the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as it has been under-
stood in a variety of other contexts involving alleged racial 
discrimination . W ashinyton v. Davis, supra (employment) ; 
Arlinyton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., supra 
(zoning); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 
U. S. 189, 208 (public schools); Akins v. 'l'e::ras, 325 U. S. 398, 
4:03-404 (jury selecti011). 
t a The di~srnting opinion of MR. JuwrrcE MAHHHALL rc•acb: tht> Court!,; 
opinion in Fort~>oll v. Dor~>e!J. :~79 U. S. 43a, to ;;ay that 11 claim of votl' 
dilution undt>r tlw Equal ProtPction Clau~e could rr~t on rithpr di~crimi­
uatory purpo~r or effect. !Jost. at. 5. In fac·t, tlw Court c•xpltcitly rr-
served thit:' que:-;tion and rxprr~~ed no view eonrrrning it. That ea:;e in-
volvrd :;olrly a claim, which t.IH• Court r!;'jeetPd, that a :-:tate lrgi;:;lativl' 
apport ionmrn1 statutr ereating :-;omr multimNnber di:;trict:-; wa,; con:;titu-
tionall~· infirm on its facr . Although the Court. rrcognized tll<lt " dr~ignedly 
or otherwio;P," multimrmbC'r di~trirting ~chrmPs might, undPr tlw circum-
stance~ of n partiC'ular ca:;c', minimizP tlw voting strrngth of a raeial group, 
an i~~nr a~ to tlw ronstitutionalit~· of :;uch an arraugl'ltll'Jit '' I w Ia,; uot 
prr:-;entrd b~· thP record," and "our holding ha I cl] no ])('a ring 011 that 
wholly :;C'pnmte quP:.:tion." ld., al 439. 
ThP phra:;p "d!;'t~ignPdly or otherwise" in which thi,.: di~t~l'ltt ing opinion 
place::: so mueh :::tuck, wa::; rPpPatrd, abo in dictum, in Bums v. R.ichardsou, 
3R4 U. S. n, 8R. But. the· ('Oilt\1 itutional challenge to the multimPmbrr 
constituenrir:; f:nlecl in that c·a . ..:r becau~c' tlw plaintiff,; dPmon~tratrd 
neither lli~>criminatory purpo~r nor effrct. ld ., at 88-~)0, and llll . 15 iUltL 
115. 
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In only one case has the Court sustained a claim that multi~ 
member legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the 
voting strength of a discrete group. That case was White v. 
Regester, supra. There the Court upheld a constitutional 
challenge by Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a 
legislative reapportionment plan adopted by the State of 
Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the multimember districts 
for the two counties in which they resided minimized the effect 
of their votes in violation of the Fourtee11th Amendment, and 
the Court held that the plaintiffs had been able to "produce 
evidence to support the finding that the political processes 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to 
participation by the group [s] in question." 412 U. S., at 
766-767. In so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in the 
record that included a long history of official discrimination 
against minorities as well as indifference to their needs and 
interests on the part of white elected officials. The Court 
also found in each county additional factors that restricted the 
access of minority groups to the political process. ln one 
county, ~egroes effectively were excluded from the process 
of slating candidates for the Democratic Party, while the 
plaintiffs in the other county were Mexican-Americans who 
"suffer[ed] a cultural and language barrier" that made "par-
ticipation in community processes extremely difficult, partic-
ularly ... with respect to the political life. , of the county. 
Id., at 768 (footnote omitted). 
White v. Regester is thus consistent with "the basic equal \ 
prott>ction principle~ that the invidious quality of a law 
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be 
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.'' Washington v. 
Davis, 426 F. S., at 240. The Court stated the constitu-
tional question in White to be whether the "multimember 
districts [ wPre I being 1tsed invidiously to minimi:w or cancel 
out the voting strength of racial groups." White v. Ueyester, 
81tpm, at 765 (emphasis added), strongly indicating that only 
a purposeful dilution of the plaintiffs ' vote would offPnd the 
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Equal Protection Clausc.14 Moreover, much of the evidence 
on which the Court relied in that case was relevant only for 
the reason that "official action will not be held unconstitu-
tional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 
429 U. S., at 264--265. Of course, "[t]he impact of the offi-
cial action-whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than 
another,' Washington v. Davis, supra, at :242-may provide 
au important starting point." Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Corp., supra, at 266. But where the charac-
ter of a law is readily explainable on groumls apart from 
race, as would nearly always be true where , as here, an entire 
system of local governance is brought into question, dispro-
portionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must 
look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory 
purpose. See ibid.; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 242. 
We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large elec-
tion of city officials with all the legislative, executive and ad-
ministrative power of the municipal government is constitu-
tionally indistinguishable from the election of a few members 
14 In C:ajlle!J v. G-ummi11g, 412 U. S. 735, a. eu;;e drcidrd t hP :same day as 
'White v. Regester, 41:2 lT. 8. 755, tlw Court int(•rprPted both lfhite unci 
the earlier vote dilu t.iou ca . ..;(•::; as turning on the rxi~knce of di,crimmatory 
pllf]lOHC: 
"Stale lrgisbt ive cli;;tricts ma~· be equal or Hubstantially equal in popula-
tion and ,-;till IX' vuhwrable under the Fourteenth Amendment. A di~;­
tricting statute ot.Iwrwi~c arerpt<tblr, may b(1 invalid bPeau~o it ['(•nc·p,.; out 
a racial group ~o a.s to deprive them of their pn•-exiHti11g municipal vote. 
Gomillion v. L~ghtfoot. 36..J. U. S. :339 (1960). A di~t riding plan may 
crr:t((' mult im<·mhN diHI riel~ prrkctl~· aecl'ptablr undl'r <·qual population 
stamlard::~, but invidiou~<ly di;;criminator~· b('c·nusP tl1('y an• employed "to 
minimize or ratwel out tlw \·oting ~tr<•ngtb of racial or political eiPmPnts of 
the voting population ." Fort:;on v. Dorsey, :~79 F S. 433, -l:{V (]965). 
SE'e White v. Ilege:;ter, post, p. 755; Whitcomb r. ('havi8. -!.0;3 l '. S. l:24 
( 1971) ; Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. 8., at 184, n. 2; B'Unt8 v. Rirhanl:;on, 
38..J. U. S., at 88-89." Gnfney v. Cummings, supra, at 751 (rmplw~<i:s 
added) . 
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of a state legislative body in multimember districts-although 
this may be a rash assumption.1 5 But even making this as-
sumption, it is clear that the evidence in the present case fell 
far short of showing that the appellants "conceived or oper-
ated [a] purposeful device [] to further racial discrimina-
tion." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149. 
The District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light 
of the standard that had been articulated by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 
F. 2d 1297. That case, coming before Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S. 229, was quite evidently decided upon the misunder-
standing that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory pur-
pose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause-that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient. 
See 485 F. 2cl, at 1304-1305. and n. 16.1 " 
In light of the criteria identified in Zimmer, the District 
Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality primarily on 
the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the City 
Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of ra-
cially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found 
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests 
of Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of 
these findings, the court concluded that the political proc-
esses in Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its 
15 See Wise v. Lipscomb, 435 U. S. 535, 549, and 550 (conC'urriug 
opinion). It is noteworthy that a system of at-large city elections in place 
of elections of city officials by the voters of small geograpl1ic wards was 
univer ally heralded not many years ago as a praiseworthy and progres-
sive reform of corrupt municipal government. See, e. g., E. Banfield and 
J. Wibon, City Politics 151 (1963). Compare, M. Srasongood, Local Gov-
ifllmPnt (19:3;3); L. StPffcn~, The ShamE' of the Citie.:l (1904). 
1 " Th::; Comt. affirmed the judgment of the Court of Apjw:tl~ iu Zim-
mer v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on by that court 
and explicitly "without approval of the constitutional view::; expre~sed by 
the Court of Appeals." East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. M ar8hall, 424. 
U.S. 636, 638 (per curiam). 
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seemingly inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions 
against Negroes becoming candidates, and that in fact Ne-
groes had registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F. 
Supp., at 387. Finally, with little additional discussion, the 
District Court held that Mobile's at-large electoral system 
was invidiously discriminating against Negroes in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.17 
17 The only indication given by the DiHtriet Court or Ull infrrcnce that 
there existed an invidious purpose was the following statement: "riJ t is 
not a long step from the systematic exclusion of blacks from juries which 
is itself such an 'unequal application of the law . . . as to show inten-
tional discrimination ,' Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 404, . .. to [the] 
prrsent purpose to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case. There 
is a 'current' condition of dilution of the black vote resulting from 
intentional sta te legislative inaction which is as effective as the intentional 
state action referred to in Keyes [v. School District No.1, Denvet Colo., 
413 U. S. 189] ." 423 F. Supp., at 398. 
What the District Court may have meant by this sta tement is uncertain. 
In any event the analogy to the racially exclusionary jury cases appears 
mistaken. Those cases typically have involved a consistent pattern of 
discrete official actions that demonstrated almost to a mathematical cer-
tainty that Negroes were being excluded from juries because of their 
race. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-497, and n. 17 ; Patton 
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 464; Piette v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359; 
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591. 
If the District Court meant by its statement that the existence of the 
at-large electoral system was, like the systematic exclusion of Negroes from 
juries, unexplainable on grounds other than race, its inference is contra-
dicted by the history of the adoption of that system in Mobile. Alter-
natively, if the District Court meant that the state legislature may be 
presumed to have "intended" that there would be no Negro Commis-
sioners, simply because that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large 
voting, it applied an incorrect legal standard. "'Discriminatory pur-
pose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness 
of consequences. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not 
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 
Personnel Adtn'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment reaches only purposeful discrirnination/8 
but held that one way a plaintiff may establish this illicit pur-
pose is by adducing evidence that satisfies the criteria of its 
decision in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra. Thus, because· the 
appellees had proved an "aggregate" of the Zimmer factors, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that a discriminatory purpose 
had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent 
with our decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arling-
ton Heights, supra. Although the presence of the indicia 
relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discrimina-
tory purpose, satisfaction of those criteria is not of itself suffi-
cient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Zimmer criteria 
upon which the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove an UJJconstitu-
tionally discriminatory purpose in the present case. 
First, the two courts found it highly significant that no 
Negro had been elected to the Mobile City Commission. 
From this fact they concluded that the processes leading to 
nomination aud election were not open equally to Negroes. 
But the District Court's findings of fact, unquestioned on ap-
peal, make clear that Negroes register and vote in Mobile 
"without hindrance," and that there are no official obstacles in 
the way of Negroes who wish to become candidates for election 
to the Commission. Indeed, it was undisputed that the only 
active "slating" organization in the city is comprised of Ne-
groes. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, 
but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation. 
1~'fhc Court of Appeal,; expn•,;,;ed the view thai tiH' Ditriet C'ourl'::; 
finding of discrimination in light of the Zimmer criteria was "buttressed" 
by the fact that the Attorney General had interposed an objection under 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the state statute designating the 
functions of each Commissioner. 571 F . 2d, at 246. See n . 6, supra 
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Whitcomb v. Chavis, supm, at 160; see Arlington Heights, 
supra, at 266, and n. 15.10 
Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that 
the persons who were elected to the Commission discriminated 
against Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing 
public services. If that is the case, those discriminated 
against may be entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit 
of a sort quite different from that sought in the present case. 
The Equal Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimi-
nation because of race by any unit of state government, what-
ever the method of its election. But evidence of discrimina-
tion by white officials in Mobile is relevant only as the most 
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional 
invalidity of the electoral system under which they attained 
their offices.~0 
Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals sup-
ported their conclusion by drawing upon the substantial his-
tory of official racial discrimination in Alabama. But past 
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn 
governmental action that is not itself unlawful. The ulti-
mate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has 
been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official 
discrimination in other cases are of limited help in resolving 
that question. 
Finally, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
10 There> haVP bee>n on!~· thrPe Nrgro candidate~ for thr City Com-
mis~iOll, all in 197:3. According to thr Di~trict Court, the Negro candidatrs 
"were> young, iu<•xperiPnccd, and mounted extremely limitrd campaign~" 
and rcrei,·ed only "mocle~t ~upport from the I.Jlack community ... .' ' 423 
F. Supp., at 388. 
" 0 Among tlw difticulti!'>. with tlw District Court.'~< vit•w of the Pvidence 
Wal< it~< failure to identify tlw ,.:tate ofliciab who:;e intrnt it con~idrrrd relP-
vant in assr,;,.~ing the invidiou:<JH'"" of lVIobile's sy:;;trm of g;ovrrnmt•nt. To 
the extent. that the> inquiry ,.;hould properly focus on tlw ~tatl' lqz;i~lature, 
Etee n. 21 , iujro, the a<·tiou,.: of unre>lrtted govcmmental oJ!ieiab would be 
of cotn"He, of quc~tionablc rdevance .. 
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pointed to the mechanics of the at-large electoral system it-
~;elf as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously 
canceled out. But those features of that electoral system, 
such as the majority vote requirement, tend naturally to dis-
advantage any voting minority, as we noted in White v. 
Regester, supra. They are far from proof of a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or intent upon the part of the appellants 
in this case.21 
B 
We turn finally to the arguments advanced in Part I of 
MR. JusTiCE MAR~HALL's dissenting opinion. Tlw theory of 
this dissenting opinion-a theory much more extreme than 
that espoused by the' District Court or the Court of Appeals-
appears to be that every "political group," or at least every 
such group that is in the minority, has a federal constitu-
tional right to elect caudidates in proportion to its numbers. 
Moreover, a political group's "right'' to have its candidates 
elected is said to be a "fundamental interest.' ' the iJlfringe-
ment of which may be established without proof that a State 
has acted with the purpose of impairing anybody's access to 
the political process. This dissenting opinion finds the 
21 Accord in~< to i hr Di~t rieL Court, voters in tlw C'il~· of \lohile arc 
represented in the state legislature by three state senators, any one of 
whom can veto proposed local legislation under the existing courtesy 
rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile's 11-member House delegation can 
prevent a local bill from reaching the floor for debate. Unanimous 
approval of a local meusure by the city delegation, on the other hand, 
virtually a~sures pa~sagc. 423 F . Supp., at 397. 
There was evidence in this case that several proposals that would have 
altered the form of Mobile's municipal government have been defeated 
in the state legislature, including at least one that would ha.ve permitted 
Mobile to govern itself iluough a mayor and city council with members 
elected from individual districtf' within the c·ity. Whrther it may be pos-
sible ultimately to prove that Mobile's present governmental and electoral 
system has been retained for a racially discriminatory purpose, we are in no. 
position now to say. 
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"right'' infringed in the present case because no Negro has 
been elected to the Mobile City Commission. 
Whatever appeal the dissenting opinion's view may have 
as a matter of political theory, it is not the law. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment docs not 
require proportional reprt>sen tation as an imperative of poli-
tical organization. The entitlement that the dissenting opin-
ion assumes to exist simply is not to be found in the Cousti-
tution of the United States. 
It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a funda-
mental right t>xplicitly or implicitly secmt>d by the Constitu-
tion is presumptively unconstitutional. See Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 3~)4 U. S. 618, 634, 638; id., at 642-644 (concur-
ring opinion). See also San A11tonio Ind. School D'islr'ict v. 
Rodriyuez, 411 U. S. 1, 17. 30-32. But plainly "li] t is not 
the province of this Court to create substantive coustitutional 
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the 
laws," id., at 33. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74; 
Da11dridye Y. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485. Accordingly, 
where a state law does not impair a right or liberty protected 
by the Constitution, there is no occasion to depart from "the 
settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislat [iou j . , . 
involving questions of economic and social policy." San An-
tonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 33.22 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion would discard 
these fixed principles in favor of a judicial inventiveness that 
would go "far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.' " 
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 655, 661. We arc not free to 
do so. 
Almost a hundred years ago the Court unanimously held 
22 Tlw pn•:-<umption of eon~titutional validity that nndnli<'" tlw sl'ltled 
mode of n·viPwing lt-gi"lation disapprars, of cour:-;r, if the law tiiHl<·r eon-
sideration rreutr..- rlas:<<'~ that, in u constitutiollal s<>nse, an• inh('l'l'lltly 
"HUSJH:'Ct.' ' Srr Stmuder \', West Viroinia, 100 n. S. :m~ ; t-IP(:' also Lock-
port v. C'itizens fo1' ('ommunity Action, 430 U. H. 2.'il:l ; MfLaughlin v. 
Flor1:da, 879 U. S. 184. 
'. 
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that "the Constitution of the United States does not confer 
the right of suffrage upon any o11e .... " .Minor v. Happer-
sett, 21 Wall. 162, 178. See Lassiter v. Northampton County 
Bd. of Elections, 360 "C. S. 45. 50-51. It is for the States "to 
determine the conditio11s under which the right of suffrage 
may be exercised ... , absent of course tlw discrimination 
which the Constitution condemns." ibid. It is true, as the 
dissenting opinion states. that the Equal Protection Clause 
confers a substantive right to participate i11 elections on an 
equal basis with other qualified voters. See Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U. S. 330. 336; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 F. S. 533, 576. 
But this right to equal participation in the electoral process 
does not protect any "political group,'' however defined , from 
electoral defPat. ~a 
The dissenting opinion erroneously discowrs the asserted 
entitlement to group representation within the "one person-
one vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, and its pro-
2" The bn:<ir fallacy in thl' di~~ent ing opinion'~ t bear~· i" illu~t rat rd by 
analogy to n defendant':< right under the Sixth and Fourte(•nth Amt'nd-
ment:; to :t trial b~· a. jur~· of hi~ JWrr;; in a criminal ra .. ,r. St·r Du11ran v. 
Louisiana, :~01 P . S. 1-!5. That. right, rxpre"',;l~ · ('Onfrrrrd b~· thl' Con-
stitution, is c<·rtainly '·fundamrntnl" 11-'i that word i" ll~<·d in tlw clil:'~Pnting 
opinion . l\forrowr, undrr t]l(' Eqwtl Protretion C'lausP. :t dl'fendant has 
fl right. to rrquire that the Stat.r not rxcluclr from tlw jm~· mrtnb(·r~ of his 
race. Srr Ca~taneda Y. Partida, 4:~0 U. S. 4112, 49:3. But "I fjainH'"" in 
Sl'leetion ha:-; nevrr bem hrld to require proportional rrpr<'~Pntntion of 
mc<'s upon a jury," Akins "· Texas. :325 U. S. 39R, 40:3; nor ha,; the de-
fendanL m•~· " right. to clPill:tllcl that nwmbPr~ of hi.- r:.t<'(' be included;" 
Alexander Y. Lo'Uisiana. 405 U. S. 625, ()2~-G29. The ab~<t'IH'P from a. jury 
of prr::<onH ])('longing to racial or otlwr cognizable groups oftpnd~< thl' Con-
stitution only '·if it rrsult~ from purpo~rful cli;;crimiuat iou." Castaneda v. 
Partida, supra. :1t 493. S<'P Alexander \', Lousiana. supm; ~<<'<' al~<o Wash-
ington \' . Davis, -l2(i C S. 229. :289-240. Thu,;, lh<' fact that then' i"' a 
con::<tit.utional right. to a sy"'trm of jury Rdection that i:s not purpo~rfully 
exclusionar~· tlop,; not rntail a right. to a jury of an.v partirnlar ra<·ial 
composition. Likewit<P, thr fart that thr Equal Protection Clau:-;p <'onft•r;; 
a right. to participalr in elect ion · on an equal ba~i~< with other qualifird 
voters doc~ noL entail LL right to haw one';; candidate;; Jll'<'Yail. 
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geny.2 ' Those cases established that the Equal Protection 
Claus(\ guarantees the right of each voter to "have his vote 
weighted equally with those of all other citizens." /d., at 
576. The Court recognized that a voter's right to "have an 
equally effective voice" in the election of representatives is 
impaired where representation is not apportioned substan-
tially on a population basis. In such cases. the votes of per-
sons in more populous districts carry less weight than do 
those of persons in smaller districts. There can be, of course, 
no claim that the "one person-one vote'' principle has been 
violated in this case, because the city of Mobile is a unitary 
electoral district and the Commission elections are CO!l(lucted 
at-large. It is therefore obvious that nobody's vote has been 
"diluted'' in the sense in which that word was used in the 
Rey11olds case. 
The dissen tillg opinion places an extraordinary interpreta-
tion on these decisions, au interpretation not justified by Reyn-
olds v. Sims itself or by auy other decision of this Court. It 
is, of course, true that the right of a person to vote on an 
21 Tlw di~:::enting opinion abo I'Pii(•R upon srvrral dP<'i~ion;:; of this Court 
that haw hrld ('Onstitutioually invalid variou,.; votrr Pligibility rrquire-
mellt ~: Du1111 v. Blumstei11, 405 U. S. 380 (lrngth of m<id(•nec n·quirc-
mrnt.); Evans v. Comman, 3~)8 U. S. 419 (exclusion of re~ident military 
per,.;omwl); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (prop-
(l'rty or :statu,; requirPment); Harpel' v. Virginia Hoard of l?lectio11s. :~s:~ 
U. S. 663 (poll tax r<'quirPmen1). But thPr<' i~ in thi~ cao;p no attack 
whatever upon :my of the votPr eligibilit~· rPquirPmcnts in :VIobilP. Nor 
do tho cited cas<·~ eontain implieit. support for thP po::;ition of the di;;.,rnt-
ing opinion. The~· ,.:bnd ,;imp!~· for thr proposition that ·'if :L ehaliPnged 
state sta tutf' grants t.hr right to vott> t.o somf' bona fide re,.;idput~ ol' n·qui-
site age and citizf'nshp and deuif's the fmnrhi ::;P to ot lwrs, the Court. mu,.:t 
det<·rminc wlwthf'r tlw l'Xclu:;ions are neees:;ary to JH'OlllOtl' a eompf'lling 
stain intpn•,.;t .. " Kmmcr \'. ['nion Free School District. IJU/JI'a .• a.(, 527. 
IL i» ditlicult to ]lf'n·<·ive :tn~· similarit~· lwtwpen thP rxrludecl p<'r,.:on's 
right to f'qual p]p('(oral participation in the ei(('d ra,.;Ps, and thl' right 
as,.:ertcd hy tlw dis::;Pnting opinion in the prPscnL (':t,.;(•, a.,.;idl' from t be fact 
that they both in ,;omc way im·olvc voting 
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equal basis \vith other voters draws much of its significance 
from tho political associations that its exercise reflects. but 
it is an altogethe1· different matter to concluclf' that political 
groups themselves have an independent constitutional claim 
to r<>pn'sentation.~" And the Court's df'cisiotts hold squarf'ly 
that they do not. Rce Cnited Jewish Organizations\'. Carey, 
430 U. R. 144. 166-167; id., at 170-180 (concurring opinion); 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 lT. R. 149-150. 153-154. 156-157; 
'White v. Regester, 412 F R. 755. 765-766. 
ThP fact is that the Court has sternly set its facr against 
the claim. however phrased, that the Constitution somehow 
guarante<>s proportional r<>presrntation. In ·whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 493 U. 8. 124. the trial court had found that a multi-
member state legislative district had invidiously deprived 
Negroes and poor persons of rights guaranteed them by tho 
Constitution. notwithstanding the abseuce of any eviuencc 
whatever of discl'imination against them. Reversing the trial 
court, this Court said: 
"The District Court's holding. although on the facts of 
2 r. It i" difficult to prrrrin• how t hr implication~ of f hr di~~rnf ing opin-
ion'~ f hrory of group rrpr<':<rnfntion could rationall~· br mhirwd. fndrPd, 
crrtnin prrliminar~· 111'ncticnl qur~tion" inml!:'diatrl~ · come to mind: Can 
on!~· mrmhrr,; of a minority of 11w voting population in a pari ieular llHini<'-
ipalit~· br mrmbrr~ of n "political group?" How lari!;P mu"i a '·group" 
br to bt' a "political group?" Cau an~· "group" cnll it~rlf a '·polifieal 
group?" If not, who i:< to ~n.~· which "gronp::<" nrr ·'polifieal group;:?" 
Can a qualifird votrr lwlong fo morfl than OJH• ''politir<il group'?" Can 
ihrrr bP mon• than ont• "politic<ll group" nmong whitr votrr:< (e. o .. Jri~h­
Ameriran. If.alinn-Arnerican, Poli"'h-Amcrira.n, .T<·w,;, Cal holit·"' · Protf's-
tnnf~) '! Can ih<'n' be morP I han one "politiral group" among nonwhilo 
voter:-~? Do the an~<wrr~ to an~· of the:-;r qur,;tion" drprnd 11pon th<• par-
ticular drmographir compo,;ifion of :1. givf'n cify? l'pou ill(' tofal ::;izc 
of it.-; voting population'! Upon thr sizr of it:< gove-rning body'! Fpon its 
form of govrrnmrnt? Upon ifs hi~<tory'! It~< gPographie locafion? The 
faeL that <'\'Pn thr,;e preliminnr~· qur::;tion::; may hr larw·l~· un:tnt<\\'c•rable 
"ngg<•sf:; "omr of ihr eon<·f'pfual aml pmrfieal fallaciP,.: in th<· t·on::<fitu-
tional t.heOt·~· r,;pousl'd b~· thP di~~Pnt.ing opinion, putting fo onr ~id(l the 
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this case limited to guaranteeing one racial group repre-
tientation, is not easily contained. It is expressive of the 
more general propositio11 that any group with distinctive 
interests must be represented in legislative halls if it is 
numerous enough to command at least 011e seat and repre-
tients a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to 
constitute a single-member district. This approach 
would make it difficult to reject claims of Democrats, Re-
publicans, or members of any political orgaHization in 
Marion County who live in what would be safe districts 
in a single-member district system but who in one year or 
another, or year after year, are submerged in a one-sided 
multi-member district vote. There are also union ori-
ented workers, the university community. religious or 
ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our heter-
vgeneous cities and urban areas. Indeed, it would be 
difficult for a great many, if not most, multi-member dis-
tricts to survive analysis under the District Court's view 
unless combined with some voting arra.ngemen t such as 
proportional representation or cumulative voting aimed 
at providing representation for minority parties or in tcr-
tsts. At the very least, affirmance of the District Court 
would spawn endless litigatiou conceruing the multi-
member district systems now widely employed iu this 
oountry." Wh·itcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 156- 157 (foot-
notes omitted). · 
v 
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the 
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JS 3/15/80 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 77-1844, City of Mobile v. Bolden 
I have read the Court opinion in this case. I do not 
believe that it should cause problems for Fullilove. The Court's 
first constitutional holding is that intent must be shown to 
demonstrate a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Fullilove 
will not deal with the Fifteenth Amendment. 
The Court reiterates that intent must also be shown to 
establish a viol at ion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, 
this is not new. In his dissent in Fullilove Justice Stewart may 
well contend that the legislative history of the set-aside does 
not demonstrate intentional discrimination against minority 
2. 
contractors. The response would not be to challenge use of the 
"intent" standard; rather you could conclude that, given the 
deferrence that must be afforded Congress because of its powers 
under the enforcement clauses of the post-Civil War Amendments, 
there is enough evidence for this Court to accept Congress' 
judgment that intentional discrimination existed. 
Finally, the Court in Mobile rejects the claim that 
there is any right to proportional representation guarenteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This is perfectly consistent with your 
view in Bakke that the University could not set aside a 
percentage of seats simply on the basis of racial preference. I 
see nothing in the Mobile opinion that is inconsistent with your 
view in Fullilove that percentages may be used to redress a 
proven constitutional violation. 
,. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 77-1844 AND 78-357 
City of Mobile, Alabama, et al., 
Appellants, 
77-1844 v. 
Wiley L. Bolden et al. 
Robert R. Williams et al., 
Appellants, 
On Appeals from the United , L _. ~ 
States Court of Appeal~ 
for the Fifth Circui1,, 1, •• --::! tL 
()J lf'T-- ,, 
78-357 v. V: A .. ~ 
Leila G, Brown et al. ~- ~ 
[Februazy - , 1980] ~ ~, 
J 
MR. Jus·rtCJO MAitSHALL, with whom MR. JusTICE BREN- { ~ 
NAN* joins, dissenting. ~ 
The American ideal of political equality, conceived in the ,- • ·r;( LIAA 
earliest days of our colonial existence and fostered by the ~~ : 
/ egalitarian language of the _D~cla:atim~- of ~ndependence, -# 
could not forever tolerate the himtat1on of the nght to vote td 
white propertied males. Our Constitution has been amended _ :\ 
-six times in the tnovement toward a democracy for more than 7 
the few/ and this Court has interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment to provide tha.t "a citizen has a constitutionally 
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis 
with other citizens it1 the jurisdiction," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330, 336 ( 1972) . The Courtjs decision today is in a 
different spirit. The Court concludes that, in the absence of ~~~ 
proof of intentional discrimination by the State, the right to r' .. -_ ~ ,' 
vote provides the politically powerless with nothing more than • Lii""' 
the right to cast meaningless ballots. '" ~.,- _J.,., 
J 
*MR. Jus•rrcE BRENNAN joins all of this opinion hut the Recond pa~~ ~ 
graph of Part IV. , 
l U, S. Const., Amdts. 15, 17, 19, 23; 24, 26, ~ , 
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The District Court in both of these cases found that the 
challenged multimember districting schemes unconstitutionally 
diluted the Negro vote. These factual findings were upheld 
by the Court of Appeals. and the majority does not question 
them. Instead, the Court holds that districting schemes do 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is proved that 
they were enacted or maintained for the purpose of minimiz-
ing or canceling out the voting potential of a racial minority. 
The Court requires plaintiffs in vote-dilution cases to meet 
the stringent burden of establishing discriminatory intent 
within the meaning of Washington '. Da.vis, 426 U. S. 229 
(1976); rillage of Arhngton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); and Personnel 
Admimstrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979). In 
my view. our vote-dilution decisions require only a showing of 
discriminatory Impact to justify the invalidation of a multi-
member districting scheme, and, because they are premised 
on the fundamental interest in voting protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. the discriminatory-impact standard 
adopted by them is unaffected by Washington v. Davis, supra, 
and its progeny. Furthermore, an intent reqUirement is 
inconsistent with the protection against denial or abridgement 
of the vote on account of race embodied in the Fifteenth 
Amendment and in ~ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
U. S. C. ~ 1973.2 If, however, proof of discriminatory intent 
is now to be necessary to support a vote-dilution claim, 1 
would impose upon the plaintiffs a standard of proof less rigi,d 
than that provided by Penwnnel Administrator of Mass. v. 
Feeney, b'Upra. 
I 
The Court does not dispute the proposition that multimem-
%I agree w1th the Court, see ante, at 3-5, that th<> prolnb1tion on denial 
or infrmgement or the right to vote contained m § 2 of the Votmg Right~ 
Act, 42 U. S. C § 19i:3 , contami:l the sa.mt> ~t.andard at-: the Fifteenth 
Amendment . 1 d1.~agret> with the majority's construc110n or that Amend-
ment, however. See Part II, t1tfra. 
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ber districting can have the effect of submerging electoral 
minorities and overrepresenting electoral majorities.3 It is 
for this reason that we developed a strong preference for 
a The Court does not quarrel with the generalization that. in many in-
stances an I.'IPctoral minority will far!.' worsl.' undl.'r multimrmber districting 
than under smgll.'-member districting. Multimf'mber di~triCting greatly 
enhances tho opportunity of the majority political factiOn to elect all 
representatives of the district. In cont.ra<;t, if thr multimember district is 
divided into several single-mE-mber districts, an electoral minonty will have 
J a better chanee to elect a candidate of its choicf', or at lea:;! to exPrt greater 
political inflwmrp H iR obvions that thl.' grratrr thf' dr~rf'e to which 
the electoral minority i:; homogenf'ous and m:;ular ami the greater the 
degree that. bloe votmg occur" along ma.jority-minority luw~, the greater 
will be the ext('nt to wl1ich t11e minority 's voting powPr l::i diluted by multi-
member distncting SPe E. Banfield and J Wilson, C1ty Politics 91-96, 
303-308 (19()3) , H. Dixon, D<'mocratic Repre:;Pntahon 12, 476-484, 503-
527 (1968) , Bonapfel, Minority Challengrs t.o At-Large ElectiOns : The 
Dilution Problem, 10 Ga .. L. Rev. 353, 358-360 (1976) ; DerfnPr, Racial 
Discrimmatwn and the Right. to Vote, 26 Vane!. L. Rev. 523, 553-555 
(1973) ; Comment, ElfectivP Represrnt.ation and Multlffil'mber Districts, 
68 MJCh. L. Rf'v. 1577, 1577-1579 (1970). Recent empirical studies have 
documented the vahdity of t.hii' generalizati011. See Berry and Dye, The 
Discriminntory Effrets of At-Large Election~. 7 Fla. St . U. L. Rev. 85, 
113-122 (1979), ,Jones, The Impact. of Local ElectiOn Sy~tems on Black 
PolitJCal Rl.'pn•;;enta.tion, 11 Urb. Aff. Q. 345 (1976) ; Karnig, Black 
Resources and City Council Hepresentation, 41 J . Pol. 1:34 (1979) ; 
Karnig, Black Representation on Cit.y Councik Thf' Impact of District 
Election.- and Socwrconomic Factors, 12 Urb. Aff. Q. 223 (1976) ; Sloan, 
"Good GovernmPnt" and the Politic...; of HaeC:', 17 Soc. Prob. 1lil (1969); 
The Impact of 'Yiw1icipal Reformi:;m : A Symposium, 59 Soc. SCI . Q. U7 
(1978) . 
J The electoral schPmes in thrsr ca»ei> involve majority-vote, numbered-
post , <IJld f'taggered-tenn reqmrements. See Bolden v City of M ob~le, 423 
F. Snpp. 384, a8f)-:387 (SD Ala. 197fi); Williams v. Brown. 428 F. Supp. 
1123, 1126-1127 (SD Ala. 1976). Tllf'~e f'lecloral rule,; rxacerbate t.he vote-
dilutiw effect,; ol multimember di:;trirtmg. A rrquirement that a. candi-
date mu~t. wm by a majority of the vote forces a mmority candidate who 
wins a plurality of vote:; in the grneral PlPCtion to engage m <1. nm-otr 
election with 'h1s nrarest. com)wtitor. If the compl'titor 1,; a member of the 
dominant polit1cal faction, t!H-' minonty candidate f't~md.s little chance of 
willlling Ill Lhe -.;{'C'Ond elect.iou. A reqmrcment. tha.t euch canlhdate must 
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single-member districting in court-ordered reapportionment 
plans. See ante, at 9, n. 10. Furthermore, and more impor-
tant for present purposes, we decided a series of vote-dilution 
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment tha.t were desig.ned to 
protect electoral minorities from pre,cisely the combination of 
electoral laws and historical and social factors found in the 
present cases.4 In my view, the treatment of these cases. in 
run for a partirulnr '· place" or "post" crt>ates head-to-head contt>sts tl1at 
minority c:mdidntt>.~ cannot. surv1vc. When a number of poHitions <Jn a 
governmentaJ body are to be chosen in the ·arne election, members of a 
minority w11l mcrt>as-e the likelihood of election of a favoritr ('andidnte by 
vot.ing onl~· for him. If thr remamdrr of the elr<'toratP spht;; 1ts votes 
among the othc>r cand1d.nte.~. the minorit~·'s candidate might well IX' elected 
by the minority '~ .;~ingle-,dJOt. votmg." If the term.~ of ofJicp holder:-1 are 
staggered, the opportunity for ::;mgle-shot votmg i,: d.ecrt>a,;ed Se-e City of 
Rome ' UnttPd States, - P. S. - (1980) : Zimmer \, JJcKedhen, 
485 F. 2d 1297 , 1:~05 (CAi'i 197:3) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds sub 
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S 636 (1916) 
(per curiam) , Bonapfrl , supra,, Derfncr, supra. 
4 The Court. not(•s that. a.t-large elections were mRtitutt>d in cities as a 
reform nwa"un· to eonrct corruption and ineffic!'enr.v in munic1p;d govern-
ment, and suggc>"t" 1hat it ''may be a ra~h nR~mnpt10n '' to apply vote-dilu-
tion concept,.: to n muniripal gove-rnment. dected 111 that fa.~luon . See 
/ ante, at 13, and n 15 To tlw contnu~·, lo<'nl ~overnment~ are not PXPmpt. 
from tlw con~titutwnal r€'qmrement. to adopt reprrHentational cllstnrt_ing 
ensuring tlmt the votE>:; of each citizen will haV<' equal weight. Avery v. 
Midland ('ounty. :mo tr. 8. 474 (1968) . Indped, in BePr v. United States, 
425 U. S 130, 142, n 14 (1976) , and Abate v. Mundt . 40:3 r . S. 182, 184, 
n. 2 (1971), we w:;.~umed that our vote-dilution doct rinr appllrd to local 
govemment:s. 
Furthermore, though municipalitiP;;; mu;;t be accorded ,.:ome di~eretion 
in arranging the1r affa1r::;, ::;ee Abate v; Mwl(lt , supra. thert> i:-; all the more 
I 
reason to Rcrutmize assertion~ that mtmic1pnl, rather than State, multi-
member distnctmg dilut<'" thr votP of an electoral minonty : 
"In st~~t£>widt> dedJOlL", 1t is pos::;ible. that ~~ largr mmority group in one 
multi-member di::;trict will be unable to elect an~· legL~lator,.:, while> in 
another multt-mE'mber di"t.rict when" tlw ,.:Hml' group IR n ~hght majority, 
they will elect t.he entire slate of ·Jegislator::;. Thus, the muH.i-member 
electoral syt>tem ma,y hinder a group m one ch::,1:nct but provt> an advan-
. ·tage in anut her. In at-large electwns m cit.ie::; thil'l J::> not po""'iblc. Thero 
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toda.y's decision is fanciful. Although we have held that mul-
timember districts are not unconstitutional per se, see ante, at 
9, there is simply no basis for the Court's conclusion that under 
our prior cases proof of discriminatory intent is a necessary 
condition for the invalidation of multimember districting. 
A 
In Fortson v Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), the first vote-
dilution case to reach this Court, we stated explicitly that such 
a claim could rest on either discriminatory purpose or effect: 
"It m1ght well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-
member constituency apportionment scheme. under the 
circumstances of a particular case, would operate to mini-
mize or cancel out the voting strength of ramal or political 
elements of the voting population.'' /d., at 489 (empha-
sis added) . 
is no W:.t) to balance out the discrimination against a particular minority 
group becausf' the entire city i~ one huge elechon distnct. The minonty's 
loss is ab~olute ." Berr? and DyC', supra n. 3, at 87. 
That at-large election~ werC' mstituted as part. of a " rl'fonn" movement 
in no way amE'horate>< the;:;c harsh effects. Moreover, m some instances 
the efficiL'ncy and hrC'adth of perspPrttvC' ~uppo"edly rr:,;ultmg from a 
reform struci\li'C' of 111\llliCi]Jal government, are aeln<'ved at a lugh cost. 
In a whitC'-maJorit y r1ty m which sPvere rarwl bloe votmg I" conunon, 
the citywide view allegedly inrulrated in e1ty rommi::;~ionrr,. by a.t.-large 
elections need not. extend bryond the white community, and the efficiency 
of the commission form of government can be achit•ved <~imply by tgnoring· 
the concern~ of t lw powerless minont.) . 
It would be a mistake, then, to conclude that. munictpal at-large elec-
tions provide nn inlwrcntly su11erior rC'presentational schf'mr. See also n. 
3, supra ; Chapman'· Meter, 372 F . Supp. a71, 388--:392 (~D 1974) (three-
judge <'oUI't.) (Bright, J ., dis::;enting), rev 'd, 420 ll. S 1 (19i5) It. goeg-
without :::aying thttt a municipality ha . ..; the frf'edom to Ul':sign 1ts own 
governance "ystem. When that system IS subjected to con~titutwnal at~ 
tack, howcvrr, thr que~it.IOn is whether it wa~ enactt•d or maintained w1th 
a discriminatory pnrpo"e or has a d1scrimmatory efirct , not whether it 
comports with mw or another of the comprting 11otion" :tho\tL ''goo<t 
'ovenunent,'' 
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We reiterated these words in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. ·S, 
73 ( 1966) , interpreted them as the correct test . to apply . to 
vote-dilution · claims, and described the standard as one 
involving "invidio~s effect/' . id., at 88.,, We then .held that 
the plaintiffs had failed to meet their borde'n of proof: 
"[T]he demonstration that a particular multi-member 
scheme effects ,an invidious result must appear from evi-
dence in ,the record. . . . -That demonstration was not 
made here. In · relying on conjecture as to the effects of 
multi-member districting rather than demonstrated fact, 
the court acted in a manner more appropriate to the body 
l'esponsible for drawing up the districting plan. Specula~ 
tions do not supply evidence that the rnulti-niember .. dis~ 
tricting was designed to have or had the ir1vidious effect 
necessary to a judgment of the unconstitutionality of the 
districting.'' T d., at 88-89 (emphasis 'added) (footnote 
omitted). 
It could not be plainer that the Court in Burns considered 
discriminatory effect a sufficient condition for invalidating a 
multimember districting plan. 
In Whitcomb v. ·Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), we again 
repeated and applied the Fortson standard, id., at 143, 144, 
but determined that the Negro community's lack of success 
at the polls was the result of partisan politics, not racial vote 
dilution . ld., at 150-155.- The Court stressed that both the 
Democratic and Republican parties had nominated Negroes, 
and several had been elected. · Negro candidates lost only 
when their entire party slate went down to defeat. 1d., at 150, 
nn. 29- 30 ; 152-153. In addition, the Court was impressed 
that there was 110 finding that officials had been unresponsive 
to Negro co.11cerns. · ld., at 152, n. 32, -J5,5.r. 
.J 5 As the majority notes, see ante, at 10, we indicatrd iu Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, '40:~ U. S. l:Z4, 149 (1971), that. mnlt.im<·mbPJ' di~tl'iet~ wero 
unconstitutional ii' they were ''conceived or operatNl a;; pttrpo~rful drvices 
- to further racial or erono,~ic Cl\:><'ri1nhu1thw." The Cm.Trt m Whitcomb diq 
T 
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More recently, in White v. Regester, 412 ll. S. 755 (1973), 
we invalidated the challenged multimember districting plans 
because their characteristics, when combined with historical 
and social factors, had the discriminatory effect of denying 
the plaintiff ~egroes and Mexican-Americans equal access to 
the political process. Id., at 766-770. We stated that 
"it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discrimi-
nated against has not had legislative seats in proportion 
to its voting potential. The plaintiffs' burden IS to pro-
duce evidence to support findings that the political proc-
esses leading to nomination and election w!:'re not equa.lly 
open to participation by the group in question-that its 
members had less opportunity than did other residents m 
the district to participate in the politwal processes and to 
elect legislators of their choice." I d., at 766. 
We held that the three-judge District Court had properly 
applied this standard in invalidating the multunember dis-
tricting schemes in the Texas counties of Dallas and Bexar. 
The District Court had determined that the characteristics of 
the challenged electoral systems-multimember districts, a 
majority-vote requirement for nomination in a primary elec-
not, however, suggel't that. discriminatory plli'JJ<'H:' wa:- ,, m·l·essar) condi-
tion for tlw invalidation of rnult.inwmlwr districting. Our deci:>ion in 
Whitcomb . id .. at. 143, aeknowlt>dgrd the contmning validity of the dis-
criminatory impact. test. adopted in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 t:. S. 433, 439 
(1965), nnd restnt('d it. m; requirmg plaintiff:; to prove that ''mult.J-member 
districts uneon:;tJtutionally operate to dilute or ranee! thP votmg strength 
of racinl or pohtical elements." Whitcomb ' . Chavis, ~;upra, at. 144. 
(emphasis nddPd) . 
Abate v. Mundt, 403 . S. 182 ( 1971), decided the same day a.:; Whit-
comb, providl'S further endence that Whitcomb did not alter the discrimi-
natory-effects stnnclard drveloped in enrlier cases. In Abate, supra, a.t 
184, n . 2, wP rejPct('d the argunwnt thnt a multJmembPr districting scheme 
had a vote-dilutiw effeet, berau~t> '' [pjetitioners . . havt> not showt\ 
that these multimember distncts, by them:;('lV'e~, operate to impair the 
voting strength of particular racwl or political elrmeut,., . , • , ,;ee Burns • 
Ricbard$on, 384 C. S. 73, 88 (19Gti) ... 
I 
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tion, and a rule mandating that a candidate running for a 
position in a multimember district must run for a specified 
"place" on the ticket-though "neither in themselves improper 
nor invidious,'' reduced the electoral in'fluence of Negroes and 
Mexican-Americans. I d., at 766.6 ·The District Court identi-
fied a number of social and historical factors that, when com-
bined with the Texas electoral structure, resulted in vote dilu-
tion : ( 1) a history of official racial discrimination m Texas, 
including discrimination inhibiting the registration, casting of 
ballots, and political participation of Negroes; (2) proof that 
minorities were sti1l suffering the effects of past discrimination; 
(3) a history of gross underrepreseutatio11 of minority inter-
ests; ( 4) proof of offiCiaJ insensitivity to the needs of minority 
· citizens, whose votes · were not needed by those in power; 
( 5) the receut use of racial campaign tactics; and ( 6) a cul-
. tural and language barrier inhibiting the participation of 
Mexican-Americans. !d., at 766-770. Based "on the totality 
of the circumstances, ' ' we affirmed the District Court's conclu-
sion that the ust' of multimember districts excluded the plain-
tiffs "from effective participation in political" ·life." I d., at 
769,1 
e See n. 3, supra 
T White ' . Re(tester, 412 n R 755 (1973)' make, dear tlw di~tinction 
betw<•rn thr c·onc·rpb of vote dilution and proportional repref,'<'ntation. 
We have !wid that, 111 order to prove an allegat.Ion of vot(' dilutwn, the 
plaintiffs mu~t ,.:how more than ::;imply that they ha.ve brrn unable to 
elect camhdatr~ of thPir choice. Sre Wh1te ,·:Regester, supra. at 765-766; 
Whitcomb ' · ('havis. -l03 U. S. 124, 149-150. 153 (Hl71) . The Co~ti­
tut.ion, thrn•fore, dor,.: not. contain an~· requirement of proporttonnl repre~ 
sentation. Cf. l '11ited Jewish Organizations v. C'are .lf, 430 r . S. 144 
(1977) ; Gaffney\ , C'umrnings, 412 P . S. 735 (1973). When all that. is 
proved Is mere lack of succes;;; at the polls, the Court will not presume that 
member::; of a political minority ha.ve suffered an 1mpermi~sible dilution of' 
political pOW('f. Rather, it, is a~:;umed that the::;!' J>Pr,.;on~ have mrans. 
availahln to them through which ther can haY!' somr effr<'t. on govern-
mental deci~ionmaking . For example, many of the,.;c• per:;ons might. be-o 
long to a vanrty of other politiCal, socia.l, and economic group:; that have· 
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It is apparent that a showing of discriminatory intent in 
the creation or maintenance of multimember districts is as 
unnecessary after White as it was under our earlier vote-
dilution decisions. Under this line of cases, an electoral dis-
tricting plan is invalid if it has the effect of affording an elec-
toral minority "less opportunity than ... other residents in 
the district to participate in the political processes and to elect 
legislators of their choice," id., at 766. It is also apparent 
that the Court in White considered equal access to the political 
some impact, on officials. In the absence of eviclrnre to the contrary, it 
can be a~snmed that official:; will not be improperly inf!urnced by ~uch 
factor:> as th<' racr or place of residence of persou~ sePking govrrmnental 
action. Furthermore, politica.! fact1ons out of office often :serve as watch-
dogs on the performance of the government, bind t.ogether into coalitions 
having enhanced influence, and have the 1•espectu,bility nece:;sary to affect 
public policy. 
Uncon::;t.itut.ional vote dilution occurs only when a discrete political 
minority whose voting :'trength is diminished by a districting scheme 
provei:l tlmt historical and sochtl factors render it largely incapable of 
effectively utilizing alterna.tive avenues of influencing public policy. See 
/ n. 19, infra. In these circumstances, the only means of breaking down 
the barriers encasing the political arena is to structure the electoral dis-
tricting so that. the minority ha:; a fair opportunity to elect candidates of 
its choice. 
The t•eRt for unconst.itutional vote dilution, then, looks only t.o the 
discriminatory effects of the combination of an elE'ctoral stn10ture and 
historical and social factors. At t.he same time, it requirrs ·electoral mi~ 
norities t.o prove far more than mere lack of succe::;s at the polll:l. 
We have also spoken of dilution of voting power in cases arising under 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1971 et seq. Under § 5 of 
/ that Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, a state or local government covered by the 
Act may not enact new electoral procedures having the purpose or efi'ect 
of denying or abridging the right t.o vot·e on arcount. of mce or color, 
We luwe interpreted this provision as prohibiting any retrogression in 
Negro voting power. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976) . 
In some eases, we have labeled such retrogrrssion a ''dilut.ion" of the 
minority vote . See, e. g., City of Rome v. United States, - U. S. -
(1980) , Vote dilution under § 5, then, involves a stand:trd diffrrent from 
that applied in ca::;e:; such as White v. Regester, supra, In whirh diminution 
of the vote violating the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments is alleged,. 
" 
77-1844 & '78-357-DISSENT 
10 MOBILE v. BOLDEN 
process as meaning more than m~rely allowing the . minority 
the opportunity to vote. White stands for the propositiot1 
that an electoral sy~tem may not relegate an electoral minority 
to political impotence by diminishing the importance of its 
vote. The Court~s holding requiring proof of discriminatory 
purpose in the pre'sent cases is, then, ,squarely contrary td 
White and its predecessors.s 
B 
The Court fails to apply the discriminatory effect standard 
of White Y. Regester because that approach conflicts with 
what the C'ourt takes to be a elementary principle of law. 
' / " [ 0] nly if there is purposeful discrimination,' ' announces the 
Court, "can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
/ of the Fourteenth Amendment.'' Ante, at 10. That proposi· 
tion is plainly overbroad. It fails to distinguish between two 
distinct hnes of equal protection decisions~ those mvolving 
suspect classificatiOns, and those involving fundamental rights. 
We have long recognized that under the Equal Protection 
Clause classifications based on race are ~'constitutionally sus..; 
pect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 ( 1954), and are 
subject to the " most rigid scrutiny," Korernats'U \'. United. 
States, 323 U. R. 214, 216 (1944), regardless of whether they 
infringe on an independently protected constitutional right. 
Cf. Regents of the Universtty of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978). l"nder Washington v. Davis, 426 tT. S. 229 
( 1976) , a showing of discriminatory purpose is necessary to 
impose strict scrutiny on facia.lly neutral classifications having 
a racially discriminatory inipact. Perhaps because the plain.; 
tiffs in t.he present cases are Negro, the Court assumes that 
8 The Court ':, holding b also inconsi~tent with our ~tatrm('nt in Dallas 
f)ounty v. Reese. 421 U.S. 477, 480 (1975) (per cunam), that multimem· 
her districting v10lntr" thr Equal Protection Clau~<' if it, "m fact, operate:.~. 
impermi:s:sibly to dilutl' the voting strength of an idrntifiable rlC'ment of 
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their vote-dilution claims are premised on the suspect-classifi-
cation branch of our equal protection cases, and that under 
Washington v. Davis, supra, they are required to prove dis-
criminatory intent. That assumption fails to recognize that 
our vote-dilution decisions are rooted in a different strand of 
equal protection jurisprudence. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, if a classification 
"impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
rfcb/tected by the Constitution, .. . strict judicial scrutiny'' 
is required, Sa11 Antonio J nd. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1,17 (H)73), regardless of whether thf' infringement was 
inteutwnal1' As l will explain, our cases recognize a funda· 
menta1 right to equal electoral participation that encompasses 
protection against vote dilution. Proof of discriminatory pur~ 
pose IS, therefore, not required to support a claim of vote 
dilutwn/ 0 The Court's erroneous collclusion to the contrary 
9 Se~> , hapim 1. Thompson. :394 U. S. Gl (HlH9) (right to tr:wel); 
Reyuolds v. Sim.s. :~i7 lT. S. 5:3:3 (Hl64) (nght to \'Ote), 'Douglas v. 
Califomia, :372 t'. S. ;~53 (196:n; and Griffiu v.lllmms, :351 U.S. 12 (1956) 
(right. to fau aerr~,., to eriminal procf'«S) . Undrr thP r\1bne of' th<> funda.-
mental nght. of pnvacy, we have recogm~ed t.hat. mdividuab ha.ve freedom 
from unju<"tifi<'d governnwntal mterferenre W1t.l1 ]lt'r<"onal dPrJ,;wn~< involv-
ing marria.ge, Zablocf.:1 "· Uedhail, 4a-l F. S. :~i-! (Hl7~). Lovwg '·Vir-
gina, 388 ('. S . I (HHi7) ; prorreatwn, ~l.:inner \', Oklahoma, :316 U. S. 
535 (Hl42) , contmN'JliJOn, Cru'e11 v. Population Services lnte1'110tional, 431 
U. S. 678 (19ii ); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 ,tJ. S. 438 (1972) ; Gliswold v. 
Connecticut, :381 U. S. 481 (1965); abortion, Roe v. Wade , 410 U . S. 113 
(197:3) ; fmmly rrlation::;hip~. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 
(1944) ; and child rearing and C'ducation. Prince " · Society of Sisters, 268 
U. S. 510 (1925) ; 'Meyer'· Nebras~·a. 2(i2 U.S. 390 (192:3) . Sec abo 
Moore"· East C'levrfand, -1-:n U.S. 815 (1977) . 
:J.O As thr prr:-:rnt. Ca:'('S mustmte, a requiremrnt of proof of chscrimina-
t.ory int{'nt ~<>riou,;l~· j<•opardlzr:; the free rxerri;;e of the fundamental right 
t.o vote. Although the right. to vote b incti~tingui,;hahlP for pre~ent pnr-
posr.- from thP othpr fnndamrnt.nl right" our ra,;e,; hav<> rrrognizf'rl, ~e~ 
n. 9, supra, surc>ly the Court dors not mtrnd to rNtnirP proof of discrimma-
tory purpo;.;e in tho,;(• ea~e~ . The Court fail :; to arti('u)atr why the right 
·to vote ,;honlrl receive "uch $in.,.ula.r trratnwnf,, Furtlwrmorr, the Court 
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is the result of a failure to recognize the central distincti0n 
between White v. Regester, 412 U. S .. 755 (1973), and Wash-
ington v. Davis, $Upra: the former involved an infringement 
of a constitutionally protected right, while the latter dealt with 
a claim of racially discriminatory di.stribution of an interest 
to which no citizen has a constitutional entitlement.11 
Nearly a century ago, the. Court recognized the elementary 
propositio11 upon which our structure of civil rights is based : 
"[T]he political franchise of voting is ... a fundamental 
refuses to rrcogmzp thr cli~ntilit.y of rpquiring 11roof of discriminatory 
purpo~<' m fnndamrntal right" ca,-r:>. For rxnmplr, 11 would make no 
sens<• to rrqlllrr ~u<'h a ~howmg whrn thr qur~t 1011 1" whrther a ~tate 
statutr r<'gulatmg ahortwn violnte~ the right of prr~onal ('hOH'<' recognized 
in Roe' · Wade. -llO t r. 8. 11;{ (J973). The onl~· logwal inquiry L" whethrr, 
/ regardlr~~ of the lrgn·daturp '~ motl\:f', thr ,;tatutc ha~ lhP effrct of mfrmgmg 
that. right.. Sec, f. g., Planned Parenthood \', Danforth, 4-2& F S. 52 
{1976) . 
11 .Judge Wwlom of the Court of Appeal,; brlow recogmzf•d th1s distinc-
tion in a companion ease, Ree Nevett " · S1des, ·571 F 2cl 209, 231-234 
{CA5 197~) {opPciall~· roncurrmg opinion). See alr.:o Commrnt, Proof of 
Racially D1"cnmmatory Pnrpo~e Under tlw Equal Protrrtion Clause: 
Washington v. Davts, Arli1tgton He ights, Mt. Ifealthy, and Williamsburgh, 
12 Hnrv C. H.-C. L. L Hev . 725, 758, n 175 (1977); Note, Rac1al Vole 
Dilution in l\lult·lllll'mher Di~tnrts : The Con~titutional Standard After 
W ashi11gto11 ' Dul 'tS, 7() ::\Jirh. L. Rev . 604;· 7:!2-726 ( 1978), Comment., 
Con~titut ion a! Ch:dlrng<•,.; to ( irrrymandrr,.;, 45 U. CIH. L. Rev 845, 869-
877 (1078) . 
WasTnngton v. Davis, 426 U . 229 (1976), involvrd allrged rac1al dis-
crimination in publir rmployment. By describmg mtrrr.~ts such as pubhc 
employment a,; rom;tit .ubonal gratuities, I do not , of course, mean t.o 
suggest thaf, their drprivation i;; immune from con.-;htutional scru.tiny. 
Indeed, our dew;ions have refrrrrd to tho importance of employment, 
see Ilam7Jton Y. Jlott• Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 116 {1~76), Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 r 8\. :390, 399 (192a) ; 'l'ruax ' . Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 
(1915) , and W<' havr explicit .!~· rPcognizrd that. in ~orne circum~tances public 
employment fall" w1thm the ra.t<'gori<'" or libl'rty and property protected' 
by tJ1e Fifth and Fourt<'Pnth Amrndmrnts, He<', e. (f., Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U. S. 1:34 (1974) : Pdry ' Si11dermmm, 408 U S. 59:~ (1972) . The' 
Court ha.~ not held, however, that a Clh&eJI has a eonst1tutJonal nght to• 
public employment. 
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political right, because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). We reiterated that theme 
in our landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 
561-562 ( 1964), and stated that, because "the right of suffrage 
is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society[,] ..• 
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote 
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Ibid. We 
realized that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debase-
ment or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effec-
tively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the fran-
chise/' ld., at 555. Accordingly, we recognized that the 
Equal Protection Clause protects "[t]he right of a citizen 
to equal representation and to have his vote weighted equally 
with those of all other citizens." ld., at 576. See also Wes-
berry v. Sa·nders, 376 U. S. 1, 17 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368, 379-380 (1963).12 
Reynolds \'. Sims and its progeny 13 focused solely on the 
discriminatory effects of malapportionmen t. They recognize 
that, when population figures forrthe representational districts 
of a legislature are not similar, the votes of citizens in larger 
12 We have not, however, held that the Fourteenth Amendment. con-
tains an absolutl' right to vote. As we explained in Dww \. Blum.stein, 
405 u. s. :330 (1972) : 
"In drci~ion after deci::~ion, this Court has made clear tlmt. a. citizen has 
a constitutionally protected right to participate in elrctions on an equal 
basis with other citizrns in the jurisdiction. [Citing cases.] This 'equal 
right to vote' ... is not. absolutf> ; t,he States have the power t,o impose 
voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other 
ways. . . . But as a general maUer, 'before that right [to vote] can be 
restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the assl:'rtedly overriding 
interests served by it must. meet close constitutional scruti11y.'" Jd., at 
336 (quoting Evans v. Cornman. 3D8 U.S. 41D, 426,422 (1970)) . 
13 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968), applied the equal~ 
representation standard of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 5:33 ( 1!:164), to, 
local governments. See also, e. g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407 (1D77); 
Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U. S. 259 (1977) ; Hadley 
v. Junior Collegl:' Dist ., 397 U. S. 50 (1970), 
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districts do not carry as much weight in the legislature as do 
votes cast by citizens in smaller districts. The equal protec-
tion problem attacked by the "one person, one vote" principle 
is, then, one of vote dilution: under Reynolds, each citizen 
must have an "equally effective voice'' in the election of repre-
sentatives. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 565. In the present 
--~e!l~~!t'! , the alleged vote dilution, though caused by the combined 
effects of the electoral structure and social and historical fac-
tors rather than by unequal population distribution, is analyti-
cally the same con dept: the mij ustified abridgement of a fun-
damental right. 14 1t follows, then, that a showing of discrimi-
natory intent is .iust as unnecessary under the vote-dilution 
approach adopted in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), 
and applied m White v. Regester, 412 U. S. /55 ( 1973). as it 
is under our reapportionment cases.1" 
Hln attl"rnptmg to limtt Reynold~ v. Sims to its faeb, s<'e unte, at 20--21, 
the ma.]ont,v ronfu::;E'~ tlw nature of the con~titutwnal nght recognized in 
that dcr1~10n wtth the tnE'aHH 1Jy whtrlt that ngltt tall be violated. 
Reynolds held that undPr tlte Equal Protection Clam'P <'aeh citizen must 
be accordcd an (',;~cnttally equal voicc in the PIPction of representatives. 
The Court detormmed tltat lliH'qtta1 population dtstnbutwn in a multi-
district representational Helwme was otw readily a::;certamaulc means by 
which tim: nght wa" abridged. The Court certainly di<1 uot sugge::;t, how-
ever, that viOlation~ of the nght to d'fective polihral partiCJpalwn mat-
ten•d on!~ tf tlw~ WPr<' cauHrd by malapportionnwut. Tlw majority's 
a.,.;ertwn to 1 h<· eonn·nr~· m tl11" ca,.,<· apparently would requirc it to read 
Reyuold~ a::- rero~lllzm~ fair apportionmrnt as an l'tl<l in it:srlf, ratlwr than 
as simply n meanH to protect again~>t votf' dilution 
15 Proof of di:;rriminator~· purpose has been equally unn<·crs&'lry in our 
decisiom~ assessing wlwther various imprdunents to electoral participation 
are incon~1stcnt w1th the fundamental intere~>L in voting [n the seminal 
case, Ilarper Y V1rguua Board of Elections, 38:3 U S . ()63 (1966), we 
invalidatrcl a $1.'50 poll tax imposf'd a~ a precondition to votmg. Relying 
on our deci:,;1on two year, earlicr 111 Re!Jiwlds v. Sims. 377 F . S. 53;3 (1964), 
see Harper, su.pra. at 667-668, 670, we determmt>d that '·tlw right to vote 
is too prccwu,, too fundamental t.o be so burdrncd or eonditioned," id., 
at 670. We analyzed the right to vok under thc fmruhar ~tandard that, 
"where fundamental rtght;; and liberttl's art> 11~,;t>rted nndt>r tlw Equal 
Protection Clause, elas~Jficatwm, wlu('h might. invadt' or re~train thell) 
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Indeed, our vote-dilution cases have explicitly acknowledged 
that they are premised on the infringement of a fundamental 
right, not on the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of 
racial discrimination. Our first vote-dilution decision, Fort-
son v. Dorsey, supra., involved a 1962 Georgia reapportion-
ment statute that allocated that 54 seats of the Georgia 
Senate among the State's 159 counties. Thirty-three of the 
must be closely exnmined and carefully confined." Ibid In urcord with 
Harper, we have npplied heightem•d ;;crutiny in as.~essmg the 1mpos1tion 
of filing fprs, e. y .. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); limitatiOns on 
who rna~· partH'lpate in elertiom mvolving specmlized governmental ('lltities, 
e. g., Kmml:'r' Cnion Frl:'e School District, a95 ll. S. 621 (1969), dura-
tional re~Idl'ncy rrqmremrnt:', e. y., Dunu ,., Blumsteut, 405 F. S. 330 
(1972); wrollmPut tinw limitatiOn~ for voting in par1~ pnmary elrct10ns, 
e. g., Kusper v. Pont1kes. 414 U. S. 51 (197:3), and reHtnrtJOn:< on,.facce;;:s 
to the ballot, e g., Illinais State Board of Electious v Sol'lahst Workers 
Party, 440 U. S. 17:3 (1979) . 
To be sure, we havf' approved ~omr limitation:> on the r1gh1 to vote. 
Compare, e. g .. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Luke Ba~iu !-Vater Storage 
District. 410 U.S. 7W (1973), with Kramer v. Union Pree Sehoul District 
No. 15, supm.. We have never, however, reqmred a ;;bowing of discrimi-
natory pnrposf' to l'Upport a elaim of infringement of thiR fundamental 
intere~t . To thr ron1 mry, the Court. has a<·eeptcd at. face value the 
purpo:-;e::o arti<~ulat.<·d for a qnalificat.ion of tlu" right, and ha.-< mvalidated 
such a limitatJOIJ under t.l1r Equal Protection Clausr onl~' If it:; purposes 
either larked sufficirut. substantiality when compared to the individual 
intere"ts affe0t•cd or could have been achieved by less restrictive means. 
See, e. g., Dunn v Blumstein, supra, at 335, 337, 343-360. 
The approach u.doptrd in tllis line of cases has been synthesized with 
the one per:-;on, one vote doctrine of RetJnolds v. Sims, :377 U.S. 533 (1964), 
in the following fa"hion : "It has been established in n•ceut year;; that the 
Equal Protection Clau~e confer~ t.he Hnb:>tantJv<' nght. to partiCipate on 
tm equal ba<;Js w1th other qualified votf'r;; whrrever the State haH adopted 
an electoral procr,.;H for drte1mimng who will represent any !'egmcnt of the 
State's population.'' Sa.n Antonio Ind. School D1st . v. Rodriguez. 411 
U.S. 1, 59, n. 2 (S'l'EWAit'l', .1 ., concurring) (citing Reynolds v. Stms, supra; 
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. J:j, supr·a., Duun v. Blumstein, 
supra) . It. is 11lmn that. this standard rrqlllre,; no :-howing of discmnina~ 
tory purpose' to tngger "trict ,;;crutiny of state interference with the right 
to vow. 
[l 
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senatorial districts were made up of from one to eight counties 
each, and were single-member districts. The remaining 21 
districts were allotted among the seven most populous coun-
ties, with each county containing at least two districts and 
electing all of 1ts senators by countywide vote. The plain-
tiffs, who were registered voters residing in two of the-multi-
district counties, 11' at-gued that the apportionm~nt plan on its 
face violated the Equal Protection Clause because countywide 
voting in the seven multidistrict counties denied their residents 
a vote equal to that of voters residing in single-member con-
stituencirs. tz We were unconvinced that the plan oprrated 
/ to dilute any Georgian 's vote, and therefore upheld the facial 
validity of the scheme. We cautioned, however, that the 
Equal ProtectiOn Clause would not tolerate a multimember 
districtmg plan that "designedly or otherwise, . . operate [ d] 
to minimize or cancel out the votmg strength of racial -or 
polthcal elements of thr voting pttation." !d., at 439 (em-
phasis added). 
The approach to vote dilution adopted in Fortson plainly 
consisted of a fuHdamenta.l-rights analysis. If the Court had 
believed that the equal protection problem with alleged vote 
dilution was one of racial discrimination and not abridgement 
of the right to vote, it would not have accorded standing to 
the plaiutifl's, who were simply registered voters of Georgia 
alleging that the state apportionment plan, as a theoretical 
matter, diluted their voting strength because of where they 
lived. To the contrary, we did not question their standing, 
and held against them solely because we found unpersuasive 
their claim on the merits. · ·The Court did not reach this result 
by inadvertence; rather, we explicitly recognized that we had' 
10 See Dorsey v. Purtsun, 228 F. Supp. 259, 261 (ND Ga . HJ64) (three-
judge court), rw'l:l, am t". S'. 43:~ (1965) . 
17 SpPcifically, the plamtiff~ contended that countywide voting in the 
multidi;;trrct. conntie>< could, a;; a ma.tter of mathematic~, result m the• 
nullification of the unanimous choice of the voter:l of one district. Fortson• 
1 v. Dorsey; am. rr R 43a1 437. (1965)!. 
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adopted a fundamental-rights approach when we stated that 
the Equal Protection Clause protected the voting strength of 
political as well as racial groups. 
Until today, this Court had never deviated from this prin-
ciple. We reiterated that our vote-dilution doctrine protects 
political groups in addition to racial groups in Burns v. Rich-
ardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966), where we allowed a general 
class of qualified voters to assert such a vote-dilution claim. 
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 ( 1971), we again explic-
itly recognized that political groups could raise such claims, 
id., at 143. 144. In White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 735 ( 1973), · 
the pla.intifl"s were Negroes and Mexican-Americans, and 
accordingly the Court had no reason to discuss whether uon-
minority plaintiffs could assert claims of vote dilution. 1 ~ In 
a companiou case to White, however, we again recognized that 
"political elements" were protected against vote dilution. 
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 751 ( 1973). Two years 
later, in Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U. S. 477 (1975) (per 
curiam). we accorded standing to urban dwellers alleging vote 
dilution as to the election of the county commission and stated 
that multimember districting is unconstitutional if it "in fact 
operates impermissibly to dilute the voting strength of an 
identifiable element of the voting population." I d., at 480 
(emphasis added). And in United Jewish Organizations v. 
Carey, 430 l'". , . 144 ( 1977), the plurality opinion of MR. 
JusTICE ·wHrrE stated that districtiug plans were subject to 
attack if they diluted the vote of "racial or politwal groups." 
Id., at 167 (emphasis in original).19 
ts The ~mne is true of our most recent case discu:ssing vote dilution, 
Wise v. Lipscomb, 4:37 P. S. 535 (1978). 
10 In contra:st to a racial group, however, a political group will bear a 
rather substantwl burden of showing that it. is ::;uffici<•ntly di,;crete to :;uffer 
vote dilution . See Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U. S. 477 (1975) (per 
curiam) (allowing city dwellers to attack a countywide multimember 
district) . See grnerally Comment, Effectiv<.' Representation and ~Iulti­
member District:;, 68 Mich. L. "Rev. 1577, 15!)4-1596 (HHO) . 
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Our vote-dilution decisions, then, involve the fundamental-
interest branch, rather than the antidiscrimination branch, of 
our jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause. They 
recognize a substantive constitutional right to participate on 
an equal basis in the electoral process that cannot be denied 
or diminished for any reason, racial or otherwise, lacking quite 
substantial justification. They are premised on a rationale 
wholly apart from that underlying Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 ( 1976). That decision involved application of a 
dift'erent equal protection principle, the prohibition on ·racial 
discrimination in thf' governmental distribution of interests 
to which citizens have no constitutional cntitlement.20 ·what-
eve!' may be the merits of applying motivational analysis to 
the aHocation of constitutionally gratuitous benefits, that 
approach is completely misplaced where, as hf're, it is applied 
to th<' distnbutwn of a constitutionally protectecl interest.21 
20 Thr di~putt> in Waslungton Y. Davis. 42() U.S. 229 (197()), concerned 
allegrd racial <hsrrimmation in publir rmployment, an interest to which 
no on!.' ha~ a constitutional right. set' n. 11, supra . In that dt'cision, 
the Com1. held only that. " the invidious quality ol a law claimed to be 
racially d?.Scl'llllttuttor.tf must ultima trly be t meed to a rariall~· di~crimina­
tory p11rpos<>.'' lrl.. n.t 240 ( rmpha,.;i~ added) . Tlw Court·~ deci1>ions 
followmg Waslunyton \'. DaVls have al:so mvolwcl alleg!'d d1~crimma.tion 
in tho allocation of intt'rr::;ts fallmg ,;hart of const1tutwnal right::>. Per-
sonnd Adm'r u} .Ua8sachusetts v. PcenPy, 442 U.S. 25() (1979) (all!'ged 
srx tl!,;c·rimmalton in public rmploymt'nt) ; Village of Arlmgton lleights v. 
Metmpolitan Houst~ng Development Corp .. 429 1'. S. 252 (1977) (allrged 
rari:tl cli::;crimm:ttion in zoning) . A..~ rxplained in Peeney, supra. ''l w I hen 
f:OmP other indt>pPndPnt right. is not nt stakP ... anti wheu thert' is no 
'rt'ason to inkr antipathy,' .. it it< prt'~umrcl that 'rwn improvident 
d('Cistons will c•ventually he rrctified by tlw drmocratir proce>;~ '" /d., at 
272 (quotmg Vance v. B1·adley. 440 U.S. !)3, 97 (1979)). 
21 Prof!'Si:ior EI~· haH recognizPd this dii:itJnetwn : 
"The dang(•r I SP(' 1s . .. t.hnt. tlw Court., in its nPwfound t'nthui:iiasm for 
mot h·a t ion analy::>l~, will i-!Crk to export it to fidel,; wht'r<' it hm; no bu~uWHR , 
It tlwrefore cannot bt' t'mpha:-:tz!'d too ,;t .rongl~· that analy:-;1~ of motivation 
i;; uppropria.tr onlr to elaims ol improper t!iscriminatwn 111 the di:-;trihutwn 
of good,.: thu l arc1 tonstit utwually grut.uitous (that J><, lx·netlt.-; to which. 
GDJ -
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Washington v. Davis, then, in no way alters the discrimina-
tory impact test developed in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 
(1965), and applied in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), 
to evaluate claims of dilution of the fundamental right to 
vote. In my view, that test is now, and always has been, 
the proper method of safeguarding against inequitable dis-
tribution of political influence. 
The majority's response is that my approach amounts to 
nothing less than a constitutional requirement of proportional 
representation for groups. See ante, at 18-23. That asser-
tion amounts to nothing more than a red herring : I explicitly 
reject the uotwn that the Constitution contains any such 
requirement. See n. 7, supra. The constitutional protection 
against votP dilution found in our prior cases does not extend 
to those situatiOns iu which a group has merely failed to elect 
represen tativcs in proportion to its share of the population. 
To prove unconstitutiona] vote dilution, the group is also 
required to carry the far more onerous burden of demonstrat-
ing that it has been effectively fenced out of the political 
process. See ibid. Typical of the majority's mischaracteri-
z~;ttion of my position is its assertion that I would provide pro-
tection against vote dilutwn for "every 'political group,' or at 
peopiP nre nol rntJlled ns a mnltpr of subtihmtivr con~tHutional right.) ... . 
Howevrr, u•here what is denied /.~ something to u•luch the complainant 
has a substatllive constitutional right-either becau,.;e it , i:; granted by the 
terms of the Con,-titution, or brrauS(' it is e:s.-'rntial to thr rffectJve func-
tioning of :t d!'nH>eratic government-the reasons it u·as denied are in·ele-
vant. It ma) IH'como import•mt m eourt what justlfiratwno: cou11sel for 
t.he state can articulate in ;.;upport of it:; drnial or nonprovision, but the 
reasons that. actually inRpirrd the denial never can : To have a right to 
something i~ to haw a claim on it irrrHpectivr of why Jt JS denied. It 
would be a t r:t11;edy of the first order wrrr thr Court to expand its burgeon~ 
ing awarcnes..,; of thP rf'lt>vanC'C of motin1tion into the thoroughly mishtkrn 
notion that a drnwl of a constitutional~does not count as such unless 
it wil.S intentional." Ely, 'fhe Crntrality and Limits of 1\lotivatton Anal-
ysis, 15 San Diego L. Rrv. 1155, llfi0-1 Hil (1978) (emphasi,.; tn anginal) 
(footnoteR omitterl ). 
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least every such gi'Oup that is in the minority." Ante, at 18. 
The vote-dilution doctrine can logically apply only to groups 
whose ekctoral discreteness and insularity allow dominant 
political factions to ignore them. Sec nn. 7 and 19, supra. 
In short, thr distinction between a requirement of proportional 
representation and the discriminatory effect test I espouse is 
by no means a difficult one, and it is hard for me to under-
stand why the Court insists on ignoring it. 
The plaintiffs m No. 77-1844 proved that no Negro had ever 
been elected to the Mobile City Commission, despite the fact 
that Negrors eonstitute about one-third of the rlectorate, and 
that thr persistence of srver<' racial bloc voting ma<k it highly 
unlikely that any .:. regro could he ekcted at-large in the 
foreseeablr future. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 
384. 387-:3RD n·m Ala. 1976). Contrary to the Court's COD• 
tention, see ante, at 18-H). however, I do not find unconstitu-
tional vote dilution in this case simply becausr of that show-
ing. The plaintiffs convinced the District Court that Mobile 
Negroes wrre unable to use altemativc avenues of political 
influence. They showed that Mobile Negroes still suffered 
pervasive present rffrcts of massive historical official and pri-
vate d1scnmination. and that the city commission had been 
quite uuresponsive to the needs of the minority community. 
The City of Mobile has been guilty of such pervasive racial 
discrimination in hiring employees that extensive in terven-
tion by the Federal District Court has been required. Id., at 
389, 400. Xegroes are grossly underrepresented on city boards 
and committees. I d., at 389-390. The city's distribution 
of public services is racially discriminatory. 1 d., at 390-391. 
City officials and police were largely unmoved by Negro com-
plaints about police brutality and "mock lynchings.' ';( The 
District Court concluded tha.t "[t]his sluggish and timid 
response is another· manifestation of the low priority given to 
the needs of the black citizens and of the r commissioners'] 
political fear of a white backlash vote when blac"k citizens._ 
.LeO.) 0.. +--
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11eeds are at stake."\ .fd., tti 392. See also the dissenting 
opinion of my Brother WHITE .• an..te. 
A requirement qf proportional representation would indeed 
transform this Court into a "super-legislature," ante, a.t 19, 
and would create the risk that some groups would receive an 
undeserved windfall of political influence. In contrast, the 
protection against vo~ dilution recognized by our prior cases 
serves as a minim&Uyintrusive guarantee of political survival 
for a discrete political minority that is effectively locked 
out of governmental decisionnuiking processes. So under-
stood. the doctriue hardly "'create[s] substantive constitu-
tional rights iu the name of guaranteeing equal protection of 
the laws,' " ante, at 19. quoting San Antonio Ind. School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). Rather, the doc-
trine is a simple reflection of the basic principle that the Equa:l 
'Protection Clause protects "I t]he right of a citizen to equal 
representation aud to have his vote weightfld equa.lly with 
those of all other citizens;'' ReynOlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 
576 (1964).1~ 
22 Thr forrgoing disposes of any contention that, merely by citing Wright 
v. Rockefeller, 376 U S. 52 (1964), thr Court in Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976), and Village of Arlington He1:ghts v. Metroppli-
tan Hotu.-ing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977), in.tended to 
bring votr-dilution cases within the discriminatory-purpose requirement. 
Wright v. Roc/cefeller, s'Upra, was a racial gerrymander case, and the 
plaintiffs had alleged only that thry were the victims of an intentional 
/ scheme to draw d1stricting linr~ discriminatorily. In focusing solely on 
w4ether the plaintiffs had provrd intentional discrimination, the Court in 
Wright v. Rockefelle1' was mrrely limiting the scope of its inquiry to the 
issue raisrd by thr pl~.intiffs. If W1'ight v. Rockefelle1' had been brought 
after thi~ Court had decided our vote-dilutiOn decisions, the plaintiffs 
perhaps would have recognized that., in addition, to a claim of intentional 
racial gerrymandering, they could n.llcge an equally sufficient cause of 
action under the Equal Protection Clause-that the districting line:s had. 
the effect of diluting their vote. 
Wright v. Rockefeller, then, treated proof of discriminatory purpose af! 
a sufficient condition to trigger :strict scrut.iny of a districting schrme, but 
had no occa,;ion to consider whether such proof was necles:;;ary to"'{{ ttai~ ..-:;;;;;> 
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Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
"The r1ght of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude." 
Today the Court gives short shrift to the argument that proof 
of discriminatory intent is not a necessary condition to relief 
under this Amendment. See ante, at 5-8. I have examined 
this issue in another context and reached the contrary result. 
Beer '\. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 146-149, and nn. 3-5 
(H)76) (dissenting opinion). I contmue to believe that "a 
showing of purpose or of effect is alone sufficient to demon-
strate unconstitutionality," id., at 149, n. 5, and wish to ex-
plicate further why 1 find this standard appropriate for 
Fifteenth Ame11dment claims. First, however, it is necessary 
to address the majonty's apparent suggestion that the Fif-
teenth Amendment protects against only denial, and not 
dilution, of the vote.23 
_ that~ Its CJta.tions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington 
~hts, supra, were uSt?ful to show the relevancy, but not the nece::;sity, 
of ev1drnrc of di::;cnminatory mtent,. The,.;e citations are in no way 
incon::;i,.,tent with my view that proof of di:;criminatory purpo:;e is not a 
nece::;sary eoncht10u to the mvalidation of multimember dbtricts that dilute 
the vote of racial or political Plement<>. 
In addit10n, any argument that., merely by citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 
the Court in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights intended to apply 
the di::;crinunatory-intent. rcq11irement to vote-dilution claims is premi~ecf 
on two unpalatable assumptions. First, because the discussion of Wright 
v. Rockefeller WHR unnrcessary to the resolut.ion of the i;;::;ues in both of those 
decisions, the argument assumes that the Court, m both cases decided 
import.ant, IS~Hr:-~ in bnt>f dicta. Second, the argument. assumes tha,t, the-
Court twice mtrnded covertly to ovl:'rrule the discriminatory-effect::; test 
applied in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (197a), without even citing 
White. Neither wssumption IS tenable. 
23 Tlw maJority ~tates that "lh]avmg found that Negroes in Mobile 
•register a.nd vl!>1te withom.1t hmdramct'/ the Distri<'L Cottrt and ConrL :of' 
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The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer an absolute right 
to vote. See ante, at 5. By providi11g that the right to vote 
cannot be discriminatorily "denied or abridged," however, the 
Amendment assuredly strikes down the diminution as well M 
the outright denial of the exercise of the franchise. An inter-
pretation holding that the Amendment t·eaches only complete 
I 
abrogation of the vote would render the Amendment essen-
tially useless, since it is no difficult task to imagine schemes in 
which the Negro's marking of the ballot is a meanipgle~ 
exercise. 
The Court has loug understood that the nght to vote encom .. 
passes protectiOn against vote dilution. "[T]he right to have 
one's vote counted" is of the same importance as "the right to 
put a ballot in a box." United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 
383, 386 (1915) . See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 
(1941); Swafford v. 1'empleton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley 
v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 
651 ( 1884). The right to vote is protected against the dilut-
ing effect of ballot-box stuffing. United States v. Saylor, 322 
U. S. 385 ( 1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 ( 1880). 
Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that the Fifteenth 
Amendment protects against vote dilution. In Terry v. 
Adams, 345 F. S. 461 ( 1953). and Smith v. Altwright, 321 U. S. 
649 ( 1944), the ~ egro plain tiffs did uot question their access 
to the ballot for general elections. Instead they argued, and 
the Court recognized, that the value of their votes had been 
diluted by their exclusion from participation in primary elec-
tions and in the slating of candidates by political parties. 
rrhe Court's struggles with the concept of "state action" in 
those decisions were necessarily premised on the understanding 
that vote dilution was a claim cognizable under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
Appeals wen• in error in belif'ving that th<> appellant, invaded th<> protec-
tion of that Amendmenl in the present ra.-;e." Anti', a.t f'. 
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'Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), recognized that 
an allegation of vote dilution resulting from the drawing of 
district lines stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
The plaintiffs in that case argued that congressional district-
ing in New York violated the Fifteenth Amendment because 
district lines had been drawn in a racially discriminatory 
fashion. Each plaintiff had access to the ballot; their com-
plaint was that because of intentional discrimination they 
resided in a district with population characteristics that had 
the effect of diluting the weight of their votes. The Court 
treated this claim as cognizable under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. More recently, in United Jewish Organizations v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). we again treated an allegation of 
vote dilution arising from a redistricting scheme as stating a 
claim under the Fifteenth Amelldment. See id., at 155, 161-
162, 165-168 (opinion of WHITE, J.). I11deed. in that case 
MR. JusTICE STEWART found no Fifteenth Amendment viola-
tion iu part because the plaintiffs had failed to prove "that the 
redistricting scheme was employed ... to minimize or cancel 
out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or 
otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected per-
sons to participate in the political process.'' 1 d., at 179 
(STEWART, J .. joined by PowELL, J .. concurring in the judg-
ment) (citing. e. y., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); 
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Wright v. Rockefel-
ler, 376 U. S. 52 ( 1964)) . See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960) . 
It is plain, then, that the Fifteenth Amendment shares the 
concept of vote dilutiou developed in such Fourteenth Amend-
ment decisions as Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), and 
Fortson v. Dorsey, supra. In fact, under the Court's unified 
view of the protections of the right to vote accorded by dis-
parate portions of the Constitution, the concept of vote dilu-
tion is a core principle of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth : 
"The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a. State from. 
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denying or abridging a Negro's right to vote. The Nine-
teenth Amendment does the same for women. If a State 
in a statewide election weighted the male vote more 
heavily than the female vote or the white vote more 
heavily than the Negro vote. none could successfully con-
tend that that discrimination was allowable. See Terry 
v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461. . . . Once the geographical unit 
for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, 
all who participate in the election are to have an equal 
vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex. whatever 
their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever 
their home may be in the geographical unit. This is 
required by the Equal Protection C'lause of the Four .. 
teenth Amendme11t. 
" •.. The conception of political equality from the Decla-
ration of Independence, to Lincolu's Gettysburg Address, 
to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and ~inetcenth Amend-
ments ean mean only one thing-one person, one vote." 
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368. 379, 381 (HJ63) . 
The majority's suggestion that the Fifteenth Amendment 
reaches only outright denial of the ballot is wholly mconsistent 
not only with our prior decisions, but also with the gloss the 
majority would place upon the Fourteenth Amendment's pro• 
/ tectiou against vote dilution. As I explained in Part I, supra, 
I strongly disagree with the Court's conclusion that our Four-
teenth Amendment vote-dilution decisions have been based 
upon the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of racial dis .. 
crimination. Be that as it may. the Court at least does not 
dispute that the Fourteenth Amendment's language-that 
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws"-protects against dilution, 
as well as outright denial, of the right to vote on racial 
J grounds, even though the Amendment does not mention any 
right to vote and speaks only of the denial, and not the 
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diminution, of rights. Yet, when the Court construes the 
language of the Fifteenth Amendment-which explicitly 
acknowledges the right to vote and prohibits its denial or 
abridgement on account of race-it seemingly would accord 
protection against only the absolute abrogation of the ballot. 
An inteq)retation of the Fifteenth Amendment limiting its 
prohibitions to the outright denia1 of the ballot would convert 
the words of the Amendment into language illusory in symbol 
and hollow in substance. Surely today's decision should not 
be read as endorsing that interpretatiou.2~ 
B 
'l'he ma.iority concludes that our prior decisions rstablish 
the principl«:> that proof of discriminatory intent is a necessary 
element of a Fifteeuth Amendment claim.u' In contrast, I 
continue to adhNe to my conclusion in Beer v. l 'mied States, 
425 U. S. 130. 148. n. 4 (1976) (dissenting opiuion). that 
"[t]he Court's decisions relating to the relevance of purpose-
and/or-effect analysis in testing the constitubo11ahty of legis-
lative enactments are somewhat less than a seamless web." 
As I there explained. at various times the Court's decisions 
have seemed to adopt three inconsistent approaches : ( 1) that 
purpose alone is the test for unconstitutionality; (2) that 
effect alone is the test; and (3) that purpose or effect. either 
24 The Court could have deeidecl thi:; case advcr~ely to the plaintiffs 
simply by relying on thii> intrrprctation. That it ha" not. di~po.-<rd ol' the 
case in thi£; fa,;hion su~gri'tR that its d<•cision i~ basrd upon itf: conclusion 
/ that proof of di"criminatory intent i:> nece:::sary io Hllpport a claim 
under t.h<> Fifteent.h Amen,dmcnt. 
25 The Court dors not attempt to support this proposition by relying on 
the hi;.; tory i'urronndmg the adoption of the FiftrPnt h Anl('nchnrnL I 
agree that we• should resolvr the i~snr of the rPicvnnc~· of pmof of dis-
criminator~· purpo,;e and cffrct by examining our prior dee1~10n.~ and by 
considering thr appropriatenes~ of alternative ~tandnrd~ in ltght of con-
temporary circnm,;tancr,.:. Tha.t was, of eoursr, the approach Ui<t'd in 
Washingtou \ Da11is. 426 U. S 229 (197H) , to <·v;tlunk th<Ll· i~;.,·uc witlt 
regard to Fourteenth Amendmellt racial di:Ocrimiuatwn rlalm"'. 
.. 
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11lone or in combination, is sufficient to show unconstitution-
ality. Ibid. In my view, our Fifteenth Amendment juris-
prudence on the 11ecessity of proof of discriminatory purpose is 
no less unsettled than was our approach to the importance of 
such proof in Fourteenth Amendment racial discrimination 
eases prior to }V.ashington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976). 
What is called for in the present cases is a fresh considera-
tion-similar to our inquiry in Washington v. Davis, supra, 
with regard to Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claims-
of whether proof of discriminatory purpose is necessary to 
establish a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. I will first 
justify my conclusioll that our Fifteenth Amemiment prece-
dents do not control the outcome of this issue, and then turn 
to an examiuation of how the question should be resolved. 
1 
/ The Court cites Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 374 
(1915) ; Gomilliou v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Wright 
v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 ( 1964); Lassiter v. !v"orthampton 
Co'Unty Bd: of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959); and Lane v. 
Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939). as holding that proof of dis-
criminatory purpose is uecessary to support a Fifteenth 
Amendment claim. To me, these decisions indica.te confusion, 
not resolution of this issue. A.s the majority suggests, ante, 
/ at 5-6, the Court in Guinn v. United States, supra, did examine 
the purpose of a "grandfather clause" in the course of invali-
dating it. Yet 24 years later, in Lane v. Wilson, supra, 307 
U. S., at 277·, the Court strucR down a more sophisticated 
exclusionary scheme because it "operated unfairly" against 
Negroes. In accord-with the prevailing doctrine of the time, 
see Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455. and n. 7 (1931), 
the Court in La:ne seemingly di~ not question the motives 
of public officials. 
In upholding the use of a literacy test for voters in Lassiter 
v. Northampton Co'unty Bd. of Elections, supra, the Court 
&pparently concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove 
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either discriminatory purpose or effect. Gomillion v. Light-
foot, supra, can be read as turning on proof of discriminatory 
motive, but the Court also stressed that the challenged redraw-
ing of municipal bounda.ries had the "essential inevitable 
effect" of removing Negro voters from the city, id., at 341, and 
that "the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry 
and geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored 
citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights," id., at 347. 
Finally, in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), the 
plaintiffs alleged only purposeful discriminatory redistricting, 
and therefore the Court had no reason to consider whether 
proof of discriminatory effect would satisfy the Fifteenth 
Amenclmeut.2 ~, 
The maJority ignores cases suggesting that discnminatory 
purpose is not necessary to support a Fifteenth Amendment 
claim. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953), a case in 
which no majonty opinion was issued, three Justices approv-
ingly discussed two decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 27 holding "that no election 
machinery could be sustained if its purpose or effect was to 
deny Negroes on account of their race an effective voice in 
the governmental affairs of their country, state, or commu-
nity.' '' ld., at 466 (opinion of Black, J., joined by Douglas 
and Burton . JJ. ) (emphasis added). More recently, in reject-
ing a First Amendment cha.llenge to a federal statute provid-
ing criminal penalties for knowing destruction of a Selective 
Service registration certificate, the Court in United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968), stated that "[i]t is a 
familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court wiU 
not strike down an otherwise constitutional sta.tute on the 
basis of an alle~ed illicit legislative motive." The Court in 
O'Brien, id., at a85, interpreted Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra, 
2u See n 2:l, supra . 
27 Riel! v. Elmorl!, 165 F . 2d 387 (CA4 1947). cert. denied, 333 U. S, 
875 (1948) , and Baskm v. Brown, 174 F . 2d 391 (CA4 1949) 
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as turning on the discriminatory effect, and not the alleged 
discriminatory purpose, of the challenged redrawing of munici~ 
pal boundaries. Three ye11rs l;1ter, in Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U. S. 217, 224-225 (1!}71), the Court relied on O'Brien 
to support its refusal to iqquire whether a city had closed its 
swimming pools to avoid racial integration. As in O'Brien, 
the Court in Palmer, supra, at 225, interpreted Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot as focusing "on the actual effect" of the municipal 
boundary change, and not upon what motivated the city to 
redraw its borders. See also Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 
U.S. 451, 461-462 (1972). 
In holding that racial discrimination claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause must be supported by proof of discrimina~ 
tory intent. the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 
(1976) , signaled some movement away from the doctrine that 
such proof is irrelevant to constitutional adjudication. AI~ 
though the Court, id., at 242-244, and n. 11, attempted 
mightily to distinguish Palmer v. Thompson, supra, its decision 
was in fact based upon a judgment that, in light of modern 
circumstances, the Equal Protection Clause's ban on racial 
discrimination in the distribution of constitutional gratuities 
should be interpreted as prohibiting only intentional official 
discrimination .~ 8 
These vacillations in our approach to the relevance of 
discriminatory purpose belie the Court's determination that 
our prior decisions require such proof to support Fifteenth 
Amendment claims. To the contrary, the Court today is in 
the s11me unsettled position with regard to the Fifteenth 
Amendment as it was four years ago in Washington v. Davis, 
supra, regarding the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on 
racial discrimination. The absence of old answers mandates 
a new inquiry. 
2 
The Court in W a.<;hington v. Dav·is required a showing of 
'2s See nn . 20-21, supm, and accompanying text. 
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discriminatory purpose to support r~cial discrimination claims 
largely because it feared that a standard based solely on dis-
proportionate impact would unduly interfere with the far-
ranging governmental distribution , of constitutional gratui-
ties.20 Underlying the Court's decision was a determination 
that, since the Constitution does not entitle any person to such 
governmeutal benefits, courts should accord -discretion to those 
officials who decide how the government shall allocate its 
scarce resources. If the plaintiff proved only that govern-
mental distribution of constitutional gratuities had a dispro-
portionate effect on a racial minority, the Court was willing 
to presume that the officials who approved the allocation 
scheme either had made an honest error or had foreseen that 
the decision would have a discriminatory impact and had 
found persuasive, -legitimate reasons for imposing it nonethe-
less. These assumptions about the good faith of officials 
allowed the Court to conclude that, standing alone, a showing 
that a governmental policy had a racially discriminatory 
impact did not indicate that the affected minority had suffered 
I 
the stigma. frustration. and unjust treatment prohibited 
under the suspect classification branch of our equal protection 
jurisprudence. 
Such .iudicial deference to official decisionmaking has no 
place under the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 1 of that 
Amendment differs from the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition on racial discrimination in two crucial respects : it 
explicitly recognizes the right to vote free of hindrances 
20 The Couri ::;tutt"d : 
"A rule that a sta.tute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless in-
valid, absrnt comp£>1hug ju:;tifica.tion, if in practicP it benefits or burdens 
one race more than another would be far reaching and would rui::;p serious· 
que~tion.~ about. nnd 1wrha.p~ invalidate, a whole range of tax, wclfuref 
public service. regulatory, uml liccn:;ing :;t.atut<.'.-; that may be morP bur-
densome to the poor and to thP average black than to the more affluent 
white." WWJMuytu/1 Y. D:av~ 426 u.s· 229, 24R- (191fi.). 
See n . ZO, ~~~ p ~:u .. 
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related to race, and it sweeps no further. In my view, these 
distinctions justify the conclusion that proof of racially dis-
criminatory impact should be sufficient to support a claim 
under the Fifteenth Amendment. The right to vote is of such 
fundamental importance in the constitutional scheme that the 
Fifteenth Amendment's command that it shall not be 
"abridged" on account of race must be interpreted as provid-
ing that the votes of citizens of all races shall be of substan-
tially equal weight. Furthermore, a disproportionate-impact 
test under the Fifteenth Amendment would not lead to con-
stant judicial intrusion into the process of official decisionmak-
ing. Rather. the standard would reach only those decisions 
having a discriminatory effect upon the minority's vote. The 
Fifteenth Amendment cannot tolerate that kind of decision, 
even if made in good faith, because the Amendment grants 
ra:eial ·minoritie~; tl1e full enjoyment of the right to vote, not 
sim})ly protection against the unfairness of intentional vote 
dilution along racial lines.30 
In addition. it is beyond dispute that a standard based 
solely upo11 the motives of officia1 decisionmakers creates 
significant problems of proof for plaintiffs and {orces the 
inquiring court to uudertake an unguided, tortuous look into 
the minds of officials in the hope of guessing why certain poli-
cies were adopted and others rejected. See Palmer v. Thomp-
son, supra, at 224-225; United States v. O'Brien, supra, at 
383-385; cf. Keyes v. School District No . . 1, 413 U.S. 189,224, 
227 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). An approach based on motivation creates the risk 
that officials will be able to adopt policies that are the products 
of discriminatory intent so long as they sufficiently mask their 
ao Even if a municipal policy il:l shown to dilute the right to vote, how-
ever, the policy will not. be struck down 11' the city shows that it serves 
highly important local interests and IS closely tailored to effectuate only 
-those interests. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 F. S. 330 (1972) . Cf. Abate-
v. Mundt.. 40a 1· S. JH:.! (1971), 
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motives through the use of subtlety and illusion. Washing-
ton v. Davis is premised on the notion that this risk is insuffi-
cient to overcome the deference the judiciary must accord to 
governmental decisions about the distribution of constitutional 
gratuities. That risk 'becomes intolerable, however, when the 
precious right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment 
is concerned. 
I continue to believe, then, that under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment an "I e] valuation of the purpose of a legislative enact-
ment is just too ambiguous a task to be the sole tool of 
constitutional analysis. . . . [A] demonstration of effect ordi-
narily should suffice. If, of course. purpose may conclusively 
be shown, tt too should be sufficient to demonstrate a statute's 
unconstitutionality." Beer Y. "Cn.Ued State&, 425 C. ~ . 130, 
149, n. 5 (1976) (MARSHALL, J .. dissenting). The Court's 
refusal in this case even to consider this approach bespeaks an 
indifference to the plight of minorities who, through no fault 
of their ow11. have suffered diminution of the right preserva-
tive of all other rights.~ 1 
31 In my Vt('IV, tlH' Hiauclarcl of WhitP "· Regpster, 412 r . S. 755 (1973), 
sec n. 7, supra, and accompanying tcxi, iR the ]lrop<'r tr,.;t mHlcr both t.he 
Fourteenih and Fiftr(•nth Amrnclmeni:-; for drtrrmining wlwi IH•r a di,.;trict~ 
ing scheme ha" tlw uneon~titutional effect of dllntmg tlw );pgro ,·otr. li j,;: 
pla.in that the D1~triri . Court in both of the cnRe~ hrforr us made the 
"inten~>ely lora] ap]Jrai~al" JH'ces.~nry under White. supra. ai 769, ru1d 
"'""tly deotded tlHtl tbe M"l"'"'' oleotoml ~·l>t'me< lot· the "•bile oily l 
commistiion and count~· school board violntrd the White standard. As ((P. 
I earlier note with rrsprct to ~o. 77-1144, ~re 
trict Court rlrtcrminrd : (1) that ::\lobile Nrgrors ~t11l :'.uffrrrd pervasivo 
present effects of ma,~;ivc hi"toricnJ official nnd priva tP d1srrimination; 
(2) that. thr eity eommi~sion ani! rouni~· ,.,r.hool lJoard had bren quite 
unre:>ponRiv<' fo t'he nPrdl'l of thr minont~· rommumt~·; (:3) tlwt no Nrgro 
had ewr bP('IJ pfectrd Lo ritlwr hod~·. drspif<> the fart f hai N'Pgrors con-
-stitute abom mw-i hird of t1Je rlertorate : ( 4) tlmi fhe JWr,.;i,;t rnre of "evrm 
racial bloc voting marl<' it highly unlikrl~· that any Nrgro could IX' Plerted 
-at-large to eithf'r body in the forescPablp futnre ; and (5) that no state 
policy favorc·d ai -largo rlcction,.;, and the I oral pref<'rrncp for that ,.;rh<'mc 
was outweighed by the fact that the uncon"tiiutional vote dilution f'ould 
I 
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III 
1f it is assumed that proof of discriminatory intent is neces-
~ary to support the vote-dilution claims in these cases, the 
question becomes what evidence will satisfy this requirement.32 
The Court assumes, without any analysis. that these cases are 
appropriate for the application of the rigid test developed in 
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 
(1979), requiring that "the decisionmaker . . . selected o.r 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because 
o!,' not merely' 'i'? spite of.," its adverse effects upon an iden... 7 
tlfiable group.' In my v1ew, the Feeney standard creates a ~~~ S e... '3.. 
burden of proof far too extreme to apply in vote-dilution ·~t: 
This Court has acknowledged that the evidentiary inqmry 
involving discriminatory intent ·must necessarily vary depend-
ing upon the factual context. See Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Authority, 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (STE\'ENS, J .. concur-
ring). One useful evidentiary tool, long recognized by the 
be corrected only h~· the impo,;ition of singlP-mcmhcr di,;t.rict~. Bolden v. 
City of Mobile. 423 F. Supp. :384 (SD Ala. 1976) ; Brown v. Mool'e, 428 
F. Supp. 1123 (SD Ala. 1976) . The Court, of Appeab affimH.'d the:>e 
findings in all rp;.pret~ . Bolden v. City of Mobile. 571 F'. 2d 2:31{ (CA5 
1978) ; Brotclt ' . . lfovre. Xo. 77- 158:3 (CA5 .June 2, Hl7R) . See also the 
dissenting opimOTI of m~ Brother WHr'l'E, ante. 
82 Thr ~tatutp~ providing for a.t-Jarge rlrction of th<' m<>mbcr~ of ihe 
two governmental bodirs involved in these ca.<,Ps, see n . .g&,'lsupra, have 
been in effect ::;inee the day::; when Mobilr Negroes wrrr totally disen-
franchised b~' the Alabama Con,;titut.ion of 1901. Th<> District Court in 
both cases found, thereforr, thnt the at-la.rge ~chrmcs could not have been 
adopted for d1scriminntory purpose::<. Bolden "· rity of Mobile, 423 F. 
Supp. 384, 386, :397 (SD Aht. 1976) ; Bmwn Y. Moore. 428 .F. Supp. 1123, 
1126-1127, 1138 (SD Ala .. 19i6) . Tl1e i::;::;uc 1s, t.hen, whether officwl:> have 
maintained these electoral s~·stems for discriminatory purpose,:. Cf. 
Village of Arlington Ilezghts v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp ., 
429 U . S. 252, 257-258, 268-271, nnd n. 17 (1977) . 
88 A~ the di:.::senting opinion of my Brothrr WHITE demonstratl'::;, how,., 
€ver, the faet:,; of tlws<' easr~ compel a findmg or uncon:.:tJtutional vote 
tdilution f'vPn nndrr tlw mnjorit 'H standarcl. 
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common law, is the presumption that "[elvery man must 'be 
taken to contemplate the probable consequences of the act he 
does." Townsend v. Wathetn, 103 Eng. Rep. 579, 580-5Sl 
(K. B. 1808). The Court ilil Feeney, supra, at 27'9, and n .. 25. 
acknowledged that proof of foreseeability of discriminatory 
consequences could raise a "strong inference that the adverse 
effects were desired," but refused to treat this presumption as 
conclusive in cases alleging discriminatory distribution of con-
stitutional gratuities. 
I would apply the common-law foreseeability presumption 
to the present cases. 'The plaintiffs surely proved that main-
tenance of the challenged multimember clistricting would have 
the foreseeable effect of perpetuating the submerged electoral 
influence of Negroes, and that this discriminatory effect could 
be corrected by implementation of a single-member districting 
plan.H1 Because the fon'seeahle disproportionate impact was 
so severe, the burden of proof should have shifted to the 
defendants, and they should have been required to show that 
they refused to modify the districting schemes in spite of, not 
because of, their severe discriminatory effect. See Feeney, 
supra, at 284 (MARSHALL, J .. dissenting). Reallocation of the 
burden of proof iR especially appropriate in these cases, where 
the challenged state action infringes on the exercise of a fun-
damental right. The defendants would carry their burden 
of proof ouly if they showed that they considered submergence 
of the Negro vote a detriment, not a benefit. of the ni.ulti-
member systems, that they accorded minority citizens the same 
respect given to whites, and that they nevertheless decided to 
maintain the systems for legitimate reasons. Cf. Mt. Healthy 
City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)-; 
34 Inde('d, the Di:strirt Comt in the present cas& conrlnded that the 
evidence ,;npporwct the plaintiff:;' po8ition that uncom<tJt utional vote dilu-
tion was tl1e natural and fon•secable con:<equence of the maintenance of the 
challenged mult'imembcr di~tricting. Brown v. Moor'f', 428 F Supp. 1123, 
1138 (SD Ala. Hl76) ; Bolden v. C£ty of Mobile, 423 F . Supp. 384, 397-
. 398 (SD Ala. 1976}. 
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Village of Arl·ington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 
429 U. S. 252, 270, n. 21 (1977). 
This approach recognizes that 
"[f] requen tly the most probative evidence of intent will 
be objective evidence of what actQally happened rather 
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of 
the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have 
intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is 
particularly true in the case of governmental action which 
is frequently the product of compromise, of collective 
decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation.'' Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (STEVENS, J., concurring). 
Furthermore, if proof of discriminatory purpose is to be 
required in these cases, this standard would comport with my 
view that the degree to which the government must justify a 
decision depends upon the importance of interests infringed 
by it. See San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. ·1, 70 (MAR~HALL, J .. dissenting) . 
The Court also fails to recognize that the maintenance of 
multimember districts in the 'face of foreseeable discrimina-
tory consequences strongly suggests that officials are blinded 
by "racially selective sympathy and indifference.'' 35 Like 
outright racial hostility, selective racial indifference reflects ·a 
belief that the concerns of the minority are not worthy of the 
same degree of attention paid to problems perceived by whites. 
When an interest as fundamental as voting is diminished along 
racial lines. a requirement that discriminatory purpose must be 
proved should be satisfied by a showing that official action was 
produced by this type of pervasive bias. In the present cases, 
the plaintiffs presented strong evidence of such bias : they 
8" Bref<t, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword. In Dcfen~c of the 
Antidiscrimmat10n Principle, 90 Harv. L. Hev. 1, 7 (1976) . See also 
Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts : The Constitutional 
Standard After Washin(}lton v. Davis, 76 ~fich, L. Hev. o94, 716-71!} 
.. (1978). 
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showed that Mobile officials historically discrimina.ted against 
Negroes, that there are pervasive present effects of this past 
discrimination. and that officials have not been responsive to 
the needs of the minority community. H takes only the 
smallest of inferential leaps to conclude that the decisions to 
maintain multimember districting having obvious discrimina-
tory effects represent, at the very leas.t. selective racial sym-
pathy and indifference resulting in the frustration of minority 
desires, the stigmatization of the minority as second-class 
citizens,:::;hJ the perpetuation of inhumanity.06 
/ 3n The Court, ante, at 1R, n. 21, indicates that on remand the lower 
courts are to exHmim-' the evidence in thet>r cases undrr the discriminatory 
intent ;;tandard of Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U: S. 
256 ( 1979) , and may conclude that this trst is mrt by proof of the 
refusal of ~lobilr 's ;;tate-legi ·lative delegation to stimulatr the passage 
of legislation clwngmg 1\Iobile's city governmpnt into a mayor-council 
system in wluch council member::; are rlectrd from single-membrr districts. 
The Court. holds, then, only that the Distnct Court and' the Court of 
Appeals in Pnch of the prrsent cases evaluated the evidence under an 
improper legal :-;t :mdard , and not that the evidence fails to support a claim 
under Feeney , supra. When the lower courts Pxamine these cases under 
the Feeneu standard, they should, of cour~, recognizE' thr relevancy of the 
plaintiffs' rv1dencr that. votr dilution was a forp:-;prablr and natural con-
sequencP of thr maintenance of the challenged multimembrr dist.ricting, 
and that offic1ab have apparently rxhibitPcl ::;el<·ctive racwl sympt.hy and 
indifference. ('f. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkmm1.- U. S. - (1-979) ; 
Columbus Bd. of Educ . v. Pentck,-U.S. - (1979) . 
Finally, it is important not to confuse the differing viPws the Court and 
I have on the elements of proving unconstitutional vot<' dilut1on. · The 
Court holds that proof of intentional discrimination, as drfinrcl in Feeney, 
supra. is necessar~· to ><upport. ~urh a claim. ThP Court finds this require-
ment consistrnt with thE' statrment in White v. Z~egester. 412 U. S. 755, 796 
(1973), that unconstitutional vote dilution docs not occur simply because a 
minonty has not brrn able to elect. reprpsentatiVPI' in proportion to its 
voting potPntial . The extra ncce~l'ary elemrnt, according to the Court, is 
a showmg of discriminatory mtPnt . In th<• Court.'s viPw, the evidence 
presented in White going beyond mere proof of underrrprcsentation of the 
minority properly supported an inferencE' that. the multimember districting 
scheme in que~tion was tamted w1t.h a discriminatory purpose · 
The Court 's approach ~hould be sa tisfied, thrn, b proof th<LL an elec-
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IV 
The American approach to government is premised on the 
theory that, when citizens have the unfettered right to vote, 
public officials will make decisions by the democratic accom· 
modation of competing beliefs, not by deference to the man· 
dates of the powerful. The American approach to civil rights 
is premised on the complementary theory that the unfettered 
right to vote is preservative of all other rights. The theoreti-
cal foundations for these approaches are shattered where, as 
in the present cases. the right to vote is granted in form, but 
denied in substance. 
It is time to realize that manipulating doctrines and drawing 
improper distinctions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Atnendments. as well as under Congress' remedial legislation 
enforcing those Amendments, make this Court an accessory 
to the perpetuation of racial discrimination. The Court's 
requirement of proof of intentional discrimin-ation, so inappro~ 
priate in today's cases, may represent an attempt to bury the 
legitimate concerns of the minority beneath the soil of a doc-
trine almost as impermeable as it is specious. If so, the 
superficial tranquility created by such measures can be but 
short-lived. If this Court refuses to honor our long-recognized 
principle that the Constitution "nullifies sophisticated as well 
toral scheme enacted with a discriminatory purpose effected a retrcgres-
sion in the minority's voting power. Cf. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 
130, 141 (1976) . The standard should also be satisfied by proof that a 
scheme maintained for a discriminatory purpose has the effect of sub-
merging minority electoral influence below the level it would have under a 
j reasonable alterpative scheme. 
The Court does not address the question whether proof of discriminatory 
effect is neces&lr)' to support a vote-dilution claim. It is clear from th& 
above, however, that if the Court at some point creates such a require-
ment, it would be satisfied by proof of mere disproportionate impact. Such 
a requirPment would be far less stringent. than the burden of proof re-
quired under thr rather rigid discriminator~· ·effects test I find in Whitt 
v. Regester, 8U'Jlra.. S<•e n .. 7, s·up~ia,. and. accompanying test. 
j_l 
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' . as simple-minded modes of discrimin&tion," Lane v: Wilson, 
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939), it cannot expect the victims of dis-
1 crimination to respect political channels of seeking redress. 
' I dissent. 
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for the Fifth Circuit. 
1 ey . o en et a .
[March - , 1980] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the city 
of Mobile's commission form of government. Black citizens 
in Mobile , who constitute a minority of that city's registered 
voters, challenged the at-large nature of the elections for the 
three positions of City Commissioner, contending that the 
system "dilutes" their votes in violation of the Fifteenth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. While I agree with the Court that no 
violation of respondents' constitutional rights has been demon-
strated, my analysis of the issue proceeds along somewhat 
different lines. 
In my view, there is a fundamental distinction between state 
action that inhibits an individual's right to vote and state 
action that affects the political strength of various groups 
that compete for leadership in a democratically governed 
community. That distinction divides so-called vote dilution 
practices into two different categories "governed by entirely 
different constitutional considerations," see Wn:ght v. Rocke-
feller, 376 U.S. 52, 5 (Harlan, J. , concurring) . 
In the first category are practices such as poll taxes or 
literacy tests that de11y individuals access to the ballot. Dis-
tricting practices that make an individual's vote in heavily 
populated districts less significant than an individual's vote in 
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a smaller district belong in the same category. See Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U. S. 186; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533.1 Prac-
tices in this category are tested by the strictest of constitu-
tional standards, whether challenged under the Fifteenth 
Amendment or under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
This case does not fit within the first category. The Dis-
trict Court found that black citizens in Mobile "register and 
vote without hindrance"~ and there is no claim that any 
individual's vote is worth less than any other's. Rather, this 
case draws into question a politica1 structure that treats all 
individuals as equals but adversely affects the political 
strength of a racially identifiable group. A1though I am satis-
fied that such a structure may be challenged under the Fif-
teellth Amendment as well as under the Equal Protection 
1 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court quoted Mr. Justice Douglas' state-
ment that thr right to vote "include:; the right to have the vote counted 
at full v:due without dilution or di::;rount ... ," 377 U. S., at 555, n. 29, 
as well aH tiH' comment in Westb'U!'!J v. SandPrs, :376 U.S. 1, 14, that "one 
man'::; vote in a eougrc.;:;ional election i::; to be worth a::; much a:;; another'::;." 
377 U. S., at 559. 
2 Thi::; finding di;,;tinguishes this cu::;r from White v. Regester, 412 U . S. 
755. In White tlw Court held that, in order to r::;tabli::;h a. Fourteenth 
Amendmrnt violation, a group alleging vote dilution mu::;t 
" ... produce rvidence to :support finding~ that the political prore:,;:;r:; lead-
ing to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by 
the group in que:stion-that it::; members had les::; opportunity than did 
other re::;idcnt::; in the di::;trict to participate in the political proce::;se::; and 
to !'!ret legi::;lator::; of their c1wice." 412 U. S., <Lt 766. 
The Court affirmed a judgment in favor of black and Mexican-American 
voters on the ba::;i:; of the Di:;t.rict Court'~ expre::>s finding~ that black 
voter::; had been "'effectively !'xcludrd from participation in the Demo-
cratic Jlrimary selection proce:-;:;,'" id .. at 767, and that "' ... cultural 
incompatibility ... conjoined with the poll lax and the mo~t re::;trirtive 
voter r!'!!:i::;tra t ion proc!'dure::; in the nation ha[ d] oprrat!'d to t'fl'ectivcly 
deny Mcxiean-Ameriram; arc!'S::> to the political proc!' ·~e::; in Texas even 
longer than the Black:; were formally denied acce:;:; by the white primary.'" 
ld., at 768. 
.. 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,3 I believe that under 
either provision it must be judged by a standard that allows 
the political process to fuuctiou effectively. 
My conclusion that the Fifteenth Amendment applies to a 
case such as this rests on this Court's opinioll in Gomillion v. 
Ughtfoot, 364 U. S. 339. That case established that the 
Fifteenth Amendment does not simply guarantee the individ-
ual's right to vote; it also limits the States' power to draw 
political boundaries. While Gomillion itself involved a situa-
tion in which the districting structure completely excluded 
the members of one race from participatiou in the city's elec-
tions,4 I do 11ot believe that it stands for the proposition tha.t, 
in order to prevail on a Fifteenth Amendment claim, a racial 
group must prove that an electoral system has the effect of 
8 Thus, I di:sagree with the ma.iority'i:i couclui:iion that the Fifteenth 
Amendment a]Jplie:s only to practices that directly affect acces:s to the 
ballot and hence is totally inapplicable to the case at bat'. Ante, at 8. I 
ubo find it difficult to 111tder;;tand why, given this position, the majority 
rea.chel:i out 1 o decide that discriminatory purpo:sc must be demonstrated 
in a. proper Fifteenth Amendment case. Ante, at 5-7. 
'1 "The petitioner:; here complain that afllrmativc legi::;lative action de-
prives them of their vote:; and the con:;equent advautages that the ballot 
affords . When a legi:>laturc thus :single:; out. a readily i~olated :segment of 
a. racial minorit~' for ;,;pecial di:;criminatory treatment , it violate:> the 
Fifteenth Amendment. In no case involving unequal weight in voting dis-
tribution that hns come before the Court did the decision sanction a differ-
entiation on racial lines when•by approval wa:; given to unequivocal with-
drawal of the vote solely from colored citizens. 
"According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legisla.1me has not 
merely rrdrawn the Tu:;kegee city limits with incidental inconvenience to 
the petitioner~ ; it is more accurate to say that it has tkprived the peti-
tioner;; of the muuicipal franchise and consequent right::; and to 1 hat end 
it has incidentally changed the city':; boundaries. While in form thi:; i::; 
merely an act redefining mete::; aud bound:;, if the allegatiom; are estab-
lished, the inescapable human effect of thi::; e::;;;ay in geometry and geogra-
phy is to de::;poil colored citizens, and onl~, colon•d citizen:;, of their there-
tofore enjoyed voting rights." 364 U. S., at 34G, 347 . 
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making its members' right to vote, in MR. JusTICE MAHSHALL's 
words. "nothing more than the right to cast meaningless 
ballots." Post, at 1. I agree with MR. JusTICE MARSHALL 
that the protections afforded by the Fifteenth Amendment 
need not and should not be so narrowly construed. I do not 
agree, however, with his view that every "showing of dis-
criminatory impact" on an historically and socially disadvan-
taged racial group, post, at 2, 9, n. 7, is sufficient to invalidate 
a districting plan." 
Neither Gmnillion nor, for that matter, any other case 
decided by this Court establishes a constitutional right to 
proportional representation for racial minorities.u What 
Gmnillio 11 holds is that a sufficieu tly "uncouth" or irrational 
racial gerrymander violates the Fifteenth Amendment. As 
Mr. Justice Whittaker's concurrence in that case demon-
strates, the same result is compelled by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 364 U. S., at 
349. The fact that the "gerrymander" condemned in Go-
million was equally vulnerable under both Amendments indi-
cates that the essential holding of that case is applicable, not 
5 I ali:io di~agn·r with Mu . .Ju::;'!'ICE MAHHHALL to the extrnt that he 
implie:; that the votes ca:;t in an at-large election by member~ of a racial 
minorit~· can never be anything morr than "meaningle::;:; ballot::;." I have 
no doubt that aualy::;e::; of prP::;idential, senatorialm1d other ::;tatewidP elec-
tions would drmonstrate that ethnic and racial minoritic::; have often had 
n critical impact on tlw choice of candidate;; and the outcome of electiom;. 
Ther<' is no reaHon to believe that the ::;ame Jlolitical force::; cmuwt operate 
in smaller dPetion districtH regardlei:is of the dPpth of conviction or emo-
tion that nia~· Heparate the parti::;am; of different points of virw. 
6 And t hi::; i>< true rrgardlrr;r; of the apparrnt nred of a particular group 
for proportional represPntat ion brcau::;e of its hi::;toricall~· di~advantagrd 
position in the commuuity. See Cousins \'. City Council of City of Chi-
cago, 466 F. 2d 830, 852 (CA7 Hl72) (S'l'E\"ENI:l, .T., di:>Heuting), rert. druicd, 
409 U.S. 89:3. Thi:; does not mran. of course, that a legi::;lnturr i~ con::;titu-
tionally prohibited from nccording Home mra::;ure of proportional repre-. 
sentntion to a minority group, ;;ec United J~wish Organizatious v. Carey, 
430 U, S. 144. 
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merely to gerrymanders directed against racial minorities, 
but to those aimed at religious, ethnic, economic and political 
groups as well. Whatever the proper standard for identifying 
an unconstitutional gerrymander may be, I have long been 
persuaded that it must apply equally to all forms of political 
gerrymandering, including racial gerrymandering. See Cous-
ins v. City Council of City of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 848-852 
(CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 
893.7 
This conclusion follows, I believe, from the very nature of a 
gerrymander. By definition, gerrymandering involves draw-
ing district boundaries (or using multimember districts or at-
large elections) in order to maximize the voting strength of 
those loyal to the dominaut political party and to minimize 
the strength of those opposed to it.8 466 F. 2d, at 847. In 
'Thi::; view iti con::;i::;tent with the Court's Fourteenth Amendment ca~;es, 
in whirh it ha~ indicated that at.tach Oil apportionment ::;chemc~ on racial, 
political, or economic ground::; should all br judgPd by the same conl:ltitu-
tional standard. See, e. g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (di::;-
trict::; that are "conceived or operated a::; purpo::;(:'ful dPvic<'s to further 
racial m· economic di,.;crimiuation" are profiioited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment) ( empha;;i::; i:lUJlpliPd); Po1'tson v. Do1'sey. 379 U. S. 433, 
439 (an UJ1portionmPnt ::;chrme would be invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment if it "operateldJ to minimize or cancel out the voting l:ltrength 
of racial 01' political elements of the voting population") (emphasis 
supplied). 
s Gerrymander:; may also be used to prei:lervc the current balance of 
power betwPen political parties, see, e. g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 
U. S. 735, or to preserve the safe district"' of incumbent:; , cf. Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52. In Gaffney the Court point,pd out that." ... it 
requirE's no special genius to recognize the political cm1&'qnencp,.; of drawing 
& district line nlong one street rather tha.n a.not.her. It i,.; not only obvious, 
but abr;olutPly unavoidable, thnt t.he loca.tion and shapr of di::;tricts may 
wdl detrrmine the political complPxion of the a.rra. Di:strict linrs are 
rarely neutrnl phPnomPna . They C<\.ll well drt.ermine what district will be 
prrdominantly Democratic or predominantJy Rrpublican , or makr a clo::;c~ 
race likely. Redist.ricting may pit. incumbents again::;t one another or 
III7lke very difficult the election of. the most expcriencrd Jrgi....;la.tor. Tlio 
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seeking the desired result, legislators necessarily make judg~ 
ments about the probability that the members of certain iden-
tifiable groups, whether raciaL ethnic. economic or religious, 
will vot<> in the same way. The success of the gerrymander 
from the legislators' point of view, as well as its irnpact on the 
disadvantaged group, depends on .the accuracy of those 
predictions. 
A prediction based on a racial characteristic is not neces-
sarily more reliable than a prediction based on some other 
group characteristic. Nor, since a legislator's ultimate pur-
pose in making the prediction is political in character. is it 
necessarily more invidious or benign than a prediction based 
on other group characteristics.j) In the line-drawing process, 
racial, religious, ethnic, and ecouomic gerrymanders are all 
species of political gerrymanders. 
From the standpoint of the groups of voters that arc af-
fected by the line-drawing process. it is also important to 
recognize that it is the group's interest in gaining or maintain-
ing political power that is at stake. The mere fact that a 
number of citizens share a common ethnic, racial. or religious 
background does 11ot create the need for protection against 
gerrymandering. It is ouly when their common interests are 
strong enough to be manifested in political a!Ctio1J that the 
need arises. For the political strength of a group is not a 
function of its ethnic, racial, or religious composition; rather, 
it is a function of numbers-specifically the number of persons 
who will vote in the same way. In the long run there is no 
reality is thnt districting inevitably ha,. and i · intended to have sub:stantial 
politiral consrrt~IPtH'es." Id .. at 753. 
9 Tim:;;, i.lrcrr iH littlr qualit-ative c!iffrrPnce hetwern the motivation of a 
legi:<lator who .has. ta~en a ~>o:-;it.ion on the abortion. i"sn~ ~ho attrmrfio---G 
gerrymander lu,.: d1stnct to mrlude or t>xcludo rertam rrhgwn~ gronp::; and 
the motivation of a legi~:>lator who hw; taken a political J10~ition genrrally 
thought to be offeuJ:<ive to a particular racial group who attrmpt,.: to 
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more certainty that individual members of racial groups will 
vote alike than that members of other identifiable groups will 
do so. And surely there is no national interest in according 
special constitutional protection to racial minorities if the 
effect will be to make it especially desirable to define political 
groups by racial characteristics.10 
My conclusion that the same standard should be applied 
10 As Mr . .JusticP Douglas wrotl' in his dis.sont. in Wright v. Rockefeller: 
"Hacial elPctorlll regiHtPr,.;, like religious ones, have no place in n o;ociety 
that honor:; thr Lincoln tradition-'of the pcoplf', by the people, for the 
people.' Here thr individual is important, not his race•, his erPcd, or hi:; 
color. The principle of equality i:; at war with thc notion that District A 
must be rcpre~cnted by a Ncgro. as it is with the notion that Di~trict B 
muo;t bc rpprc,;cntrd by a Cauca,.;ian, District C by a .lew, Distriet D 
by a Catholic, and ::;o on. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. :~68, :379. The 
racial electoral r<•gister systPm weights votes along one racial line more-
heavily than it doc,;; other votes. That system, b~· whatever name it is 
called, i;; a divi;;ive force in a community, emphasizing differencc':-i bPtween 
candidatrH and votPrs that are irrPlcvant in the con:;titutional ~c·uo:P. Of 
cour,;e race, likP religion, pla.y" an important role iu thP choirc,.; which 
individual voter~ make from among various candidates. But govPrnmeut, 
ha:; no bu,;ine~s designing electoral districts along racial or religious lines. 
"When racial or rPligious lines nrc drawn Ly the State, the multiracial, 
multireligiom; eommunitie:- that our Constitution seek~ to weld together 
as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion 
rather than to political i::;::;ue,; are genera ted; communities scek not the 
best repre~entative but the best racial or religious parti:;an. Since that. 
system is Nt war with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here."· 
376 n. s. 52, 66-67. 
See also my di::;::it•nt in Cousius, supra: 
"In my opinion au interpretation of the Constitutiou whieh affordcd 0110 
kind of political protection to black,; and another kind to rnpmiJer:> of 
otlH'r identifiable groups would it:;elf be invidiou,.;. HPspcet for the citi-
zenry in thc black communit~r compPl~ acceptance of the fact that in the 
long run therc i~ no more rPrtainty that the,;p individual::; will vote alike 
than will individual membPr~ of any ot.her cthnir, economic. or social 
grom;p. The probability of parallel voting fiuc:twte::; as the bleud of 
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whenever a group challenges a district boundary or an at-
large system of elections on the ground that its political power 
has been adversely affected thereby leads me also to conclude 
that the standard cannot condemn every adverse impact on 
one or more political groups without spawning more dilution 
litigation than the judiciary can manage. Difficult as the 
issues engendered by Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186. may have 
been, nothing comparable to the mathematical yardstick used 
in apportionment cases is available to identify the difference 
between permissible and impermissible adverse impacts on the 
voting strength of political groups. 
In its prior cases the Court ·has phrased the standard as 
whether the distri<cting practices in question "uncoustitution-
ally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial 
or political elements." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 
144. In Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1973), 
the Fifth Circuit attempted to outline the types of proof that 
would satisfy this rather amorphous standard. ·Today, the 
Court rejects the Zimmer analysis, holding that the primary, 
if not the sole, focus of the inquiry must be on the intent of 
the political body responsible for making the districting de-
tiSIOlL While I agree with the Court that the proper standard 
must distinguish between routine political decisions and de-
eisions motivated solely by an intent to discriminate against 
a.n identifiable group, I do not believe that it is appropriate to 
focus on the subjective intent of the decisionmakers. 
The proper standard, I believe, is suggested by three char-
a.cteristics of the gerrymander condemned in Gomillion; 
political isHuPs affpcting the outcome of an election change~ from time to 
time to emphaHiZ(' one issue, or a few, rather than othPrs, as dominant. 
The facts that a polit.icnl group has it:,: own history, hn:,: :,: uff('red its own 
sperinl inju~tices, and ha:; it>~ own cong('rie~ of ~:<pecial political intpre::-;t;;;, do 
not make one :mch group different from nn~' otlwr in the Pyes of the law. 
The m('mbers of ('HCh go to the polls with ('qual dignity and with an 
equal right to be protected from invidiou::> discrimination ." 466 :F. 2d, 
at 852. 
l . . 
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(I) the 28-sided configuration was, in the Court's word, 
"uncouth," that is to say, it was manifestly not the product 
of a routine or a traditional political decision; (2) it had a 
significant adverse impact on a minority group; and (3) it was 
unsupported by any neutral justification and thus was either 
totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the 
political strength of the minority. These characteristics sug-
gest that a proper test should focus 011 the objective effects of 
the political decision rather than the subjective motivation of 
the decision maker. \ In this case, if the commission form of 
. government in Mobile were extraordinary, or if it were noth-
~ V. ~ '~ ing more than a vestige of history, with no greater justifica-
tion than the grotesque figure in Gomillion, it would surely "7~ 
violate the Constitution. · Th~clusion would follow simply ~ -
.. 
l.l . S · -~c, 71 from its adverse impact on black voters plus the absence of any 
legitimate justification for the system, without reference to 
the subjective intent of the political body that has refused to 
alter it. 
Conversely, I am also persuaded that a political decision 
that affects group voting rights may be valid even if it can be 
proved that irrational or invidious factors have played some 
part in its enactment or retention.11 The standard for testing 
the acceptability of such a decision must take into account 
the fact that the responsibility for drawing political bound-
aries is generally committed to the legislative process and that 
the process inevitably involves a series of compromises among 
different group interests. If the process is to work, it must 
reflect an awareness of group interests and it must tolerate 
some attempts to advantage or to disadvantage particular 
11 "It i~ unreali~tic, on the one hand, to requirt> the victim of alleged 
discrimination to uncovPr the actual ~ubjective intrnt of the deri::<ionmaker 
or, conversely. to invalidate otherwi~<" legitimate action simply becau~c an 
improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant i11 the decit'ionaJ 
process. A law cou~cripting clerics ~hould not. be invalidatrd lwcau:;e a.n 
athei~t voted for it." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (S'J'EV~ms, 
J., dissenting) . 
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segments of the voting populace. Indeed, the same "group 
interest" may simultaneously support and oppose a particular 
boundary change.12 The standard cannot, therefore, be so 
strict that any evidence of a purpose to disadvantage a bloc 
epf voters will justify a finding of "invidious discrimination"; 
CDtherwise, the facts of political life would deny legislatures 
the right to perform the districting function. Accordingly, 
a political decision that is supported by valid and articulable 
justifications cannot be invalid simply because some partici-
pants in the decisionmaking process were motivated by a 
]pUrpose to disadvantage a minority group. 
The decision to n~tain the commission form of govemment 
in Mobile, Ala., is such a decision. I am persuaded that some 
support for its retention comes, directly or indirectly, from 
membc•rs of the white majority who are motivated by a de-
sire to make it more difficult for members of the black 
minority to serve in positions of responsibility in city govern-
linent. I deplore that motivation and wish that neither it nor 
u,ny other irrational prejudice played any part in our political 
processes. But I do not believe otherwise legitimate political 
choices can be invalidated simply because an irratio11al or 
invidious purpose played some part in the decisionmaking 
process. 
As the Court points out, Mobile's basic election system is 
the same as that followed by literally thousands of munici-
palities and other governmental units throughout the Nation. 
12 For exampl E', if 55% of 1 he voten; in an area comprbing two diHt ricts 
belong to group A, their interest s in electing two repre;;ruta t i ve~ would be 
best served by evenly dividing tlw voters in two di~trirt ~, but thc1r inter-
ests in making ~ure llwt the~· elert at lrast one rPprPHrnt atJve would 
be sPrvNl b~· conrrntratiug a larger majority in on<• di~tri C'L Sec C'ousius 
v. City Co uncil of Chicago , supra. 466 F. 2d, at 855, n. :30 (S'I'EVJ;N S, J ., 
dii:il:ienting) . SPe alo;o W1ight v. Rockefeller, :376 U. S. 52, when' the mainte-
nance of racially ~eparate congrei:i~;ional district;; was clwllengPd by ouc 
group of blacks a.nd supported by anot.her group having tlw dominan t 
lJowcr in the black-controlled di::~trict. 
,, 
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Ante, at 3. 19 The fact that these at-1arge systems character-
istically place one or more minority groups at a significant 
disadvantage in the struggle for political power cannot invali-
date all such systems. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 
124, 156--160. Nor can it be the Iaw that such systems arc 
valid when there is no evidence that they were instituted or 
maintained for discriminatory reasons, but that they may be 
selectively co11demned on the basis of the subjective motiva-
tion of some of their supporters. A contrary view "would 
spawn endless litigation conceming thl::' multimember districts 
now widely employed in this Country." 'id., at 157. and would 
entangle the judiciary iu a voracious political thicket.11 
13 I empha~izc I hi;; point hecau~e in 111~' opinion therr i~ a "ignificunt 
differem·<· bPtwPrn a ;.;tafPwide lPgi::::lative plan that ·'bapprn~" to usc 
multimember ch~trict.,; on!~· in thosP area,; where the·~· di~advanlagP dJR-
crete minorit~· group:; and I hP u.,;p of a genPrally acceptable' municipal 
form of govPrnnwnt that involve~ the elPction of commi~sionrrs b~· the 
votPrs at larg<'. While it i;; manifest that tlwrp i::; a sub~t<mtial 11rutral 
jn~tifira tion for a mnniripalit~·';; r'hoire of a connni:s.,;ion form of gov<•rn-
ment, it i:-< b~· no mean;; obvious that an occa"ional multimember di:;t rirt 
in a. StatP which typirall~ · u:;p::; singlr memb<•r districto: can be adrquatel~· 
explainrd on urut ral grounds. 1\"othing in the Court's opimou in White v. 
Regeste1·. 41:2 U. R. 755, dP:;cJ·iuP~ any purported Jlf'ut ral explanation for 
tlw multinwmber di~trict~ in Bf'xar and Dalla,; CountiPs. In thi~ connec-
t ion, it ~hould be rrmemlwn•d that Kilgadin v.1-lill. ;~8G U. S. l:.W, did 110~ 
uphold thr con:-<titutionalit~· of a "crazy quilt" of ~ingle-member and 
multimPmb<'r di,;trirts; rather, in that cmw thi::~ Court merr!~· uphPld the 
findiug,; b~· thr Di:>trirt Court that the plaintiff~ had failed to prove their 
allegation;: that tht' uistricting plan con:;titutecl ::~ uch a crazy quilt. 
H Rrjection of Mr .. Ju;;tice Frankfurter';,; view:; in thr "prcific ron-
trover::~y prr;:f'nted b~· Bake1· \'. Carr, :3()9 U. S. 18(), dor" not refute the 
basic wi~dom of hi::; call for judicially manageable Htandards in thi::~ area : 
"Disregard of inherent limit:-< in the effrctive exercisr of th(• Court';; 'jnch-
cial Powpr' not only pre~ageH the futility of judicial intervention in i he 
essential!.'· political C'onflict of forces by which the rrlation LPtwf'<'n popula-
tion and rPprr:-<entation lw~ time out of mind bl•en nnd now i::; drtermiued. 
It ma~· well impair the Court'" position a" the ultimate organ of ' the 
suprcmr Law of the Land' in that va;:t rauge of !Pgal problem:<, oft<'n 
strongly entangled iu popular feding, on which thi~ Court mu::;t pronounce. 
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In sum, I believe we must accept the choice to retain Mo-
bile's commission form of government as constitutionally 
permissible even though that choice may well be the product 
of mixed motivation, some of which is invidious. For these 
reasons I concur in the Court's judgment of reversal, 
The Court';; aut hority~po~seli~ed of neither the pursr nor the sword-
.ultimately rest ~:; on sustained public confidence in it~ moral sanction. Such 
ifeQ)ing must be uouri~:;hed by the Court's complete detachmrnt, in fact and 
in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from inject-
ing itself into the clash of political force~:; in political settlement~." 369 
U. S., at 267 (Frankfurter, J ., dis:;enting). 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
~uprtntt <lf&ttttt ~ tltt ~nittb hdts 
._,N:Sftington, ~. <11· 2!1?'1-~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
April 7 
,, 
Re: No. 77-1844 - City of Mobile v. Bolden 
Dear Potter: 
I have finally decided not to write and thus to add 
to the many pages already submitted for this case. There-
fore, please note at the end of your opinion: "Mr. Justice 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
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